

Caliphate

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Caliphate

The term **caliphate** (from the Arabic خِلافة or khilāfa) refers to the first system of government established in Islam, and represented the political unity of the Muslim Ummah (nation). In theory it is constitutional republic^[1] (see Constitution of Medina), meaning that the head of state (the Caliph) and other officials are representatives of the people who must govern according to Islamic law; which limits the government's power over citizens. It was initially led by Muhammad's disciples as a continuation of the political system the prophet established, known as the 'rashidun caliphates'. It represented the political unity, not the theological unity of Muslims as theology or mazhab was a personal matter. It was the world's first major welfare state.^[2] A "caliphate" is also a state which implements such a governmental system.

Sunni Islam dictates that the head of state, the caliph, should be selected by Shura - elected by Muslims or their representatives.^[3]

Followers of Shia Islam believe the caliph should be an imam descended in a line from the Ahl al-Bayt. After the Rashidun period until 1924, caliphates, sometimes two at a single time, real and illusory, were ruled by dynasties. The first dynasty was the Umayyad. This was followed by the Abbasid, the Fatimid, and finally the Ottoman Dynasty.

The caliphate was *"the core political concept of Sunni Islam, by the consensus of the Muslim majority in the early centuries."*^[4]

History

The caliph was often known as *Amir al-Mu'minin* (أمين المؤمنين) "Commander of the Believers". Muhammad established his capital in Medina, and after he died it remained the capital for the Rashidun period. At times in Muslim history there have been rival claimant caliphs in different parts of the Islamic world, and divisions between the Shi'a and Sunni communities.

According to Sunni Muslims, the first caliph to be called *Amir al-Mu'minin* was Abu Bakr Siddique, followed by Umar ibn al-Khattāb, the second of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. Uthman ibn Affan and Ali ibn Abi Talib also were called by the same title, while the Shi'a consider Ali to have been the first truly legitimate caliph, although they concede that Ali accepted his predecessors, because he eventually sanctioned Abu-Bakr.^[5]

The rulers preceding these first four did not receive this title by consensus, and as it was turned into a monarchy thereafter.


After the first four caliphs, the Caliphate was claimed by dynasties such as the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans, and for relatively short periods by other, competing dynasties in al-Andalus, North Africa, and Egypt. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk officially abolished the last Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, and founded the Republic of Turkey, in 1924. The Kings of Morocco still label themselves with the title *Amir al-Mu'minin* for the Moroccans, but lay no claim to the Caliphate.

Some Muslim countries, like Indonesia and Malaysia were never subject to the authority of a Caliphate, with the exception of Aceh, which briefly acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty.^[6] Consequently these countries had their own, local, sultans or rulers who did not fully accept the authority of the Caliph.



The last Caliph, Abdülmecid II.

Rashidun, 632–661



Abu Bakr, the first successor of Muhammad, according to Sunni beliefs, nominated Umar as his successor on his deathbed, and there was consensus in the Muslim community to his choice. Umar Ibn al-Khattab, the second caliph, was killed by a servant. His successor, Uthman Ibn Affan, was elected by a council of electors (Majlis), but was soon perceived by some to be ruling as a "king" rather than an elected leader. Uthman was killed by members of a disaffected group. Ali then took control but was not universally accepted as caliph by the governors of Egypt, and later by some of his own guard. He faced two major rebellions and was assassinated after a tumultuous rule of only five years. This period is known as the Fitna, or the first


Islamic civil war. Under the Rashidun each region (Sultanate, Wilayah, or Emirate) of the Caliphate had its own governor (Sultan, Wālī or Emir).^[7]

Muawiyah, a relative of Uthman and governor (*Wali*) of Syria, became one of Ali's challengers and after Ali's death managed to overcome the other claimants to the Caliphate. Muawiyah transformed the caliphate into a hereditary office, thus founding the Umayyad dynasty.

In areas which were previously under Sassanid Persian or Byzantine rule, the Caliphs lowered taxes, provided greater local autonomy, greater religious freedom for Jews, indigenous Christians, and brought peace to peoples demoralized and disaffected by the casualties and heavy taxation that resulted from the decades of Byzantine-Persian warfare.^[8]

Umayyads, 7th–8th centuries

Under the Umayyads the Caliphate grew rapidly in territory. Islamic rule expanded westward across North Africa and into Hispania and eastward through Persia and ultimately to the ancient lands of Indus Valley, in modern day Pakistan, and Abhisara, present-day Kashmir. This made it one of the largest unitary states in history and one of the few states to ever extend direct rule over three continents (Africa, Europe, and Asia). Although not ruling all of the Sahara, homage was paid to the Caliph by Saharan Africa, usually via various nomad Berber tribes. However, it should be noted that, although these vast areas may have recognised the supremacy of the Caliph, de facto power was in the hands of local sultans and emirs.



For a variety of reasons, including that they were not elected via Shura and suggestions of impious behaviour, the Umayyad dynasty was not universally supported within the Muslim community. Some supported prominent early Muslims like Al-Zubayr; others felt that only members of Muhammad's clan, the Banu Hashim, or his own lineage, the descendants of Ali, should rule.


There were numerous rebellions against the Umayyads, as well as splits within the Umayyad ranks (notably, the rivalry between Yaman and Qays). Eventually, supporters of the Banu Hashim and the supporters of the lineage of Ali united to bring down the Umayyads in 750. However, the *Shi'at 'Alī*, "the Party of Ali", were again disappointed when the Abbasid dynasty took power, as the Abbasids were descended from Muhammad's uncle, `Abbas ibn `Abd al-Muttalib and not from Ali. Following this disappointment, the Shi'at 'Alī finally split from the majority Sunni Muslims and formed what are today the several Shi'a denominations.

The Caliphate in Hispania

During the Umayyad dynasty, Hispania was an integral province of the Umayyad Caliphate ruled from Damascus, Syria. When the Caliphate was seized by the Abbasids, *Al-Andalus* (the Arab name for Hispania) split from the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad to form their own caliphate. The **Caliphate of Córdoba** (قبطرق ءفيلخ) ruled the Iberian Peninsula from the city of Córdoba from 929 to 1031. This period was characterized by remarkable flourishing in technology, trade and culture; many of the masterpieces of Spain were constructed in this period, including the famous Great Mosque of Córdoba. The title **Caliph** (ءفيلخ) was claimed by Abd-ar-Rahman III on 16 January 929; he was previously known as the **Emir of Córdoba** (قبطرق ريم).

All Caliphs of Córdoba were members of the Umayyad dynasty; the same dynasty had held the title Emir of Córdoba and ruled over roughly the same territory since 756. The rule of the Caliphate is considered as the heyday of Muslim presence in the Iberian peninsula, before it fragmented into various taifas in the 11th century.

Abbasids, 8th–13th centuries



Mustansiriya University in Baghdad.


The Umayyad dynasty was overthrown by another family of Meccan origin, the Abbasids, in 750. The Abbasids had an unbroken line of Caliphs for over three centuries, consolidating Islamic rule and cultivating great intellectual and cultural developments in the Middle East. By 940, however, the power of the Caliphate under the Abbasids was waning as non-Arabs, particularly the Berbers of the Maghrib, the Turks, and later, in the latter half of the 13th century, the Mamluks in Egypt, gained influence, and the various subordinate sultans and emirs became increasingly independent.

However, the Caliphate endured as a symbolic position. During the period of the Abbasid dynasty, Abbasid claims to the caliphate did not go unchallenged. The Shi'a Ubayd Allah al-Mahdi Billah of the Fatimid dynasty, which claimed descent from Muhammad through his daughter, claimed the title of Caliph in 909, creating a separate line of caliphs in North Africa.

Initially controlling Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the Fatimid caliphs extended their rule for the next 150 years, taking Egypt and Palestine, before the Abbasid dynasty was able to turn the tide, limiting Fatimid rule to Egypt. The Fatimid dynasty finally ended in 1171. The Umayyad dynasty, which had survived and come to rule over the Muslim provinces of Spain, reclaimed the title of Caliph in 929, lasting until it was overthrown in 1031.

Fatimids, 10th-12th centuries

The Fatimid Caliphate or al-Fātimiyyūn (Arabic *نويم طافل*) was an Arab Shi'a dynasty that ruled over varying areas of the Maghreb, Egypt, Sicily, Malta and the Levant from 5 January 909 to 1171. The caliphate was ruled by the Fatimids, who established the Egyptian city of Cairo as their capital. The term Fatimite is sometimes used to refer to the citizens of this caliphate. The ruling elite of the state belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shi'ism. The leaders of the dynasty were also Shia Ismaili Imams, hence, they had a religious significance to Ismaili Muslims.




Shadow Caliphate, 13th–16th centuries

1258 saw the conquest of Baghdad and the execution of Abbasid caliph al-Musta'sim by Mongol forces under Hulagu Khan. A surviving member of the Abbasid house was installed as caliph at Cairo under the patronage of the newly formed Mamluk Sultanate (literally: The Sultanate of the Slaves) three years later; however, this line of caliphs had generally little authority although some Abbasid rulers had the actual rule over the Mamluk Sultans. Later Muslim historians referred to it as a "shadow" caliphate. Thus, the title continued into the early 20th century.

Ottomans, 16th-20th century

Ottoman rulers (generally known as Sultans in the West) were known primarily by the title of Padishah and used the title of Caliph only sporadically. Mehmed II and his grandson Selim I used it to justify their conquest of Islamic countries. As the Ottoman Empire grew in size and strength, Ottoman rulers beginning with Selim I began to claim Caliphal authority.

Ottoman rulers used the title "Caliph" symbolically on many occasions but it was strengthened when the Ottoman Empire defeated the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517 and took control of most Arab lands. The last Abbasid Caliph at Cairo, al-Mutawakkil III, was taken into custody and was transported to Constantinople, where he reportedly surrendered the Caliphate to Selim I. According to Barthold, the first time the title of "Caliph" was used as a political instead of symbolic religious title by the Ottomans was the peace treaty with Russia in 1774.



The outcome of this war was disastrous for the Ottomans. Large territories, including those with large Muslim populations, such as Crimea, were lost to the Russian Empire. However, the Ottomans under Abdul Hamid I claimed a diplomatic victory by assigning themselves as protectors of Muslims in Russia as part of the peace treaty. This was the first time the Ottoman caliph was acknowledged as having political significance outside of Ottoman borders by a European power. As a consequence of this diplomatic victory, as the Ottoman borders were shrinking, the powers of

the Ottoman caliph increased.

Around 1880 Sultan Abdul Hamid II reasserted the title as a way of countering Russian expansion into Muslim lands. His claim was most fervently accepted by the Muslims of British India. By the eve of the First World War, the Ottoman state, despite its weakness relative to Europe, represented the largest and most powerful independent Islamic political entity. The sultan also enjoyed some authority beyond the borders of his shrinking empire as caliph of Muslims in Egypt, India and Central Asia.

Sokoto, 19th century

The Sokoto Caliphate was an Islamic spiritual community in Nigeria, led by the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa'adu Abubakar. Founded during the Fulani Jihad in the early 19th century, it was one of the most powerful empires in sub-Saharan Africa prior to European conquest and colonization. The caliphate remained extant through the colonial period and afterwards, though with reduced power.

Khilafat Movement, 1920

In the 1920s the Khilafat Movement, a movement to defend the Ottoman Caliphate, spread throughout the British colonial territories in what is now Pakistan. It was particularly strong in British India, where it formed a rallying point for some Indian Muslims as one of many anti-British Indian political movements. Its leaders included Maulana Mohammad Ali, his brother Shaukat Ali, and Abul Kalam Azad, Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, and Barrister Muhammad Jan Abbasi. For a time it worked in alliance with Hindu communities and was supported by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who was a member of the Central Khilafat Committee.^{[9] [10]} However, the movement lost its momentum after the arrest or flight of its leaders, and a series of offshoots splintered off from the main organization.

End of the Caliphate, 1924

On March 3, 1924, the first President of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as part of his reforms, constitutionally abolished the institution of the Caliphate. Its powers within Turkey were transferred to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the parliament of the newly formed Turkish Republic. The title was then claimed by King Hussein bin Ali of Hejaz, leader of the Arab Revolt, but his kingdom was defeated and annexed by Ibn Saud in 1925. The title has since been inactive.

A summit was convened at Cairo in 1926 to discuss the revival of the Caliphate, but most Muslim countries did not participate and no action was taken to implement the summit's resolutions.

Though the title *Ameer al-Mumineen* was adopted by the King of Morocco and by Mullah Mohammed Omar, former head of the now-defunct Taliban regime of Afghanistan, neither claimed any legal standing or authority over Muslims outside the borders of their respective countries. The closest thing to a Caliphate in existence today is the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an international organization with limited influence founded in 1969 consisting of the governments of most Muslim-majority countries.

Religious basis

Quran

The following excerpt from the Qur'an, known as the 'Istikhlaf Verse', is used by some to argue for a Quranic basis for Caliphate:

" God has promised those of you who have attained to faith and do righteous deeds that, of a certainty, He will make them *Khulifa* on earth, even as He caused [some of] those who lived before them to become *Khulifa*; and that, of a certainty, He will firmly establish for them the religion which He has been pleased to bestow on them; and that, of a certainty, He will cause their erstwhile state of fear to be

replaced by a sense of security [seeing that] they worship Me [alone], not ascribing divine powers to aught beside Me. But all who, after [having understood] this, choose to deny the truth - it is they, they who are truly iniquitous!"[24:55] (Surah Al-Nur, Verse 55)

In the above verse the word *Khulifa* (the plural of *Khalifa*) has been variously translated as "successors" and "ones who accede to power".

Small subsections of Sunni Islamism argue that to govern a state by Islamic law (Shariah) is, by definition, to rule via the Caliphate, and use the following verses to sustain their claim.

So govern between the people by that which God has revealed (Islam), and follow not their vain desires, beware of them in case they seduce you from just some part of that which God has revealed to you
 ___[Qur'an 004:049]

O you who believe! Obey God, and obey the messenger and then those among you who are in authority; and if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to God and the messenger's rulings, if you are (in truth) believers in God and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end.
 ___[Qur'an 004:059]

Hadith

The following Hadith from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal can be understood to prophesy two eras of Caliphate (both on the lines/precepts of prophethood).

"Hadhrat Huzaifa narrated that the Messenger of Allah said: Prophethood will remain among you as long as Allah wills. Then Caliphate (Khilafah) on the lines of Prophethood shall commence, and remain as long as Allah wills. Then corrupt/erosive monarchy would take place, and it will remain as long as Allah wills. After that, despotic kingship would emerge, and it will remain as long as Allah wills. Then, the Caliphate (Khilafah) shall come once again based on the precept of Prophethood."^[11]

In the above Hadith the first era of Caliphate is commonly accepted by the Muslims as that of the Rashidun Caliphate.

Nafi'a reported saying:

It has been reported on the authority of Nafi, that 'Abdullah b. Umar paid a visit to Abdullah b. Muti' in the days (when atrocities were perpetrated on the People Of Medina) at Harra in the time of Yazid b. Mu'awiya. Ibn Muti' said: Place a pillow for Abu 'Abd al-Rahman (family name of 'Abdullah b. 'Umar). But the latter said: I have not come to sit with you. I have come to you to tell you a tradition I heard from the Messenger of Allah. I heard him say: One who withdraws his band from obedience (to the Amir) will find no argument (in his defence) when he stands before Allah on the Day of Judgment, and one who dies without having bound himself by an oath of allegiance (to an Amir) will die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahillyya. - Sahih Muslim, Book 020, Hadith 4562.

Hisham ibn Urwah reported on the authority of Abu Saleh on the authority of Abu Hurairah that Muhammad said:

Leaders will take charge of you after me, where the pious (one) will lead you with his piety and the impious (one) with his impiety, so only listen to them and obey them in everything which conforms with the truth (Islam). If they act rightly it is for your credit, and if they acted wrongly it is counted for you and against them.

Muslim narrated on the authority of al-A'araj, on the authority of Abu Hurairah, that Muhammad said:

Behold, the Imam (Caliph) is but a shield from behind whom the people fight and by whom they defend themselves.

Muslim reported on the authority of Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, who said,

I accompanied Abu Hurairah for five years and heard him talking of Muhammad's saying: The Prophets ruled over the children of Israel, whenever a Prophet died another Prophet succeeded him, but there will be no

Prophet after me. There will be Khalifahs and they will number many. They asked: What then do you order us? He said: Fulfil the baya'a to them one after the other and give them their due. Surely God will ask them about what He entrusted them with.

The Sahaba of Muhammad

Al-Habbab Ibn ul-Munthir said, when the Sahaba met in the wake of the death of Muhammad, (at the thaqifa hall) of Bani Sa'ida:

Let there be one Amir from us and one Amir from you (meaning one from the Ansar and one from the Mohajireen).

Upon this Abu Bakr replied:

It is forbidden for Muslims to have two Amirs (rulers)...

Then he got up and addressed the Muslims.^{[12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]}

It has additionally been reported^[18] that Abu Bakr went on to say on the day of Al-Saqifa:

It is forbidden for Muslims to have two Amirs for this would cause differences in their affairs and concepts, their unity would be divided and disputes would break out amongst them. The Sunnah would then be abandoned, the bida'a (innovations) would spread and Fitna would grow, and that is in no one's interests.

The Sahaba agreed to this and selected Abu Bakr as their first Khaleef. Habbab ibn Mundhir who suggested the idea of two Ameer's corrected himself and was the first to give Abu Bakr the Bay'ah. This indicates an Ijma as-Sahaba of all of the Sahaba. Ali ibn abi Talib, who was attending the body of Muhammad at the time, also consented to this.

Imam Ali whom the Shia revere said^[19] :

People must have an Amir...where the believer works under his Imara (rule) and under which the unbeliever would also benefit, until his rule ended by the end of his life (ajal), the booty (fay'i) would be gathered, the enemy would be fought, the routes would be made safe, the strong one will return what he took from the weak till the tyrant would be contained, and not bother anyone.

The sayings of Islamic scholars

Al-Mawardi says^[20] :

It is forbidden for the Ummah (Muslim world) to have two leaders at the same time.

Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (Al-Nawawi) says^[21] :

It is forbidden to give an oath to two leaders or more, even in different parts of the world and even if they are far apart.

Ahmad al-Qalqashandi says^[22] :

It is forbidden to appoint two leaders at the same time.

Ibnu Hazm says^[23] :

It is permitted to have only one leader (of the Muslims) in the whole of the world.

Al-sha'rani says^[24] :

It is forbidden for Muslims to have in the whole world and at the same time two leaders whether in agreement or discord.

Al-Qadhi Abdul-Jabbar (he is a Mu'tazela scholar), says^[25] :

It is forbidden to give the oath to more than one.

Al-Joziri says^[26] :

The Imams (scholars of the four schools of thought)- may Allah have mercy on them- agree that the Caliphate is an obligation, and that the Muslims must appoint a leader who would implement the injunctions of the religion, and give the oppressed justice against the oppressors. It is forbidden for Muslims to have two leaders in the world whether in agreement or discord.

The Shia schools of thought and others expressed the same opinion about this^{[27] [28] [29] [30]} However, the Shia school of thought believe that the leader (Imam) must not be appointed by the Islamic ummah, but must be appointed by God.

Al-Qurtubi said in his Tafsir^[31] of the verse, "Indeed, man is made upon this earth a Caliph"^[32] that:

This Ayah is a source in the selection of an Imaam, and a Khaleef, he is listened to and he is obeyed, for the word is united through him, and the Ahkam (laws) of the Caliph are implemented through him, and there is no difference regarding the obligation of that between the Ummah, nor between the Imams except what is narrated about al-Asam, the Mu'tazzili ...

Al-Qurtubi also said:

The Khilafah is the pillar upon which other pillars rest

An-Nawawi said^[33] :

(The scholars) consented that it is an obligation upon the Muslims to select a Khalif

Al-Ghazali when writing of the potential consequences of losing the Caliphate said^[34] :

The judges will be suspended, the Wilayaat (provinces) will be nullified, ... the decrees of those in authority will not be executed and all the people will be on the verge of Haraam

Ibn Taymiyyah said^[35] :

It is obligatory to know that the office in charge of commanding over the people (ie: the post of the Khaleefah) is one of the greatest obligations of the Deen. In fact, there is no establishment of the Deen except by it....this is the opinion of the salaf, such as al-Fadl ibn 'Iyaad, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and others

Reestablishment of the Caliphate

Once the subject of intense conflict and rivalry amongst Muslim rulers, the caliphate has lain dormant and largely unclaimed since the 1920s. For the vast majority of Muslims the caliph as leader of the ummah, "is cherished both as memory and ideal"^[36] as a time when Muslims "enjoyed scientific and military superiority globally,"^[37] though "not an urgent concern" compared to issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.^[36]

Tight restrictions on political activity in many Muslim countries, coupled with the obstacles to uniting over 50 nation-states under a single institution, have ensured that calls to revive the Caliphate have remained muted. Popular apolitical Islamic movements such as the Tablighi Jamaat identify a lack of spirituality and decline in personal religious observance as the root cause of the Muslim world's problems, and claim that the caliphate cannot be successfully revived until these deficiencies are addressed. No attempts at rebuilding a power structure based on Islam were successful anywhere in the Muslim world until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which was based on Shia principles and whose leaders did not outwardly call for the restoration of a pan-Islamic Caliphate.

Islamist call

A number of Islamist political parties and Jihadist guerrilla groups have called for the restoration of the caliphate by uniting Muslim nations, either through political action (e.g., Hizb ut-Tahrir) or through force (e.g., al-Qaeda).^[38] Various Islamist movements have gained momentum in recent years with the ultimate aim of establishing a Caliphate; however, they differ in their methodology and approach. Some are locally oriented, mainstream political parties that have no apparent transnational objectives.

Al-Qaeda chiefs revealed **world domination** design in 2005, under which, in what they call "Phase five" there will be "an Islamic state, or caliphate."^[39]

Abul Ala Maududi believed the caliph was not just an individual ruler who had to be restored, but was man's representation of God's authority on earth:

Khilafa means representative. Man, according to Islam is the representative of "people", His (God's) viceregent; that is to say, by virtue of the powers delegated to him, and within the limits prescribed by the Qu'ran and the teaching of the prophet, the caliph is required to exercise Divine authority.^[40]

The Muslim Brotherhood advocates pan-Islamic unity and implementing Islamic law, it is the largest and most influential Islamic group in the world, and its offshoots form the largest opposition parties in most Arab governments.^[41] Founder Hassan al-Banna wrote about the restoration of the Caliphate.^[42]

A document that was entered into evidence in the 2008 United States v Holy Land Foundation terrorist finance trial was titled "An Explanatory Memorandum On the General Strategic Goal for the Group In North America. It was written in 1991 by Mohamed Akram, a senior Hamas leader in the U.S. and a member of the Board of Directors for the Muslim Brotherhood in North America (also known as the Ikhwan). Strategic goals number 6 was: "supporting the establishment of the global Islamic State wherever it is". The Memorandum explains "settlement process" as a "grand jihad" eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and "sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated...." Author Robert Spencer has characterized this process as "stealth jihad."^[43] ^[44]

One transnational group whose ideology is based specifically on restoring the caliphate as a pan-Islamic state is Hizb ut-Tahrir (literally: "party of liberation"). It is particularly strong in Central Asia and Europe is and growing in strength in the Arab world. It is based on the claim that Muslims can prove that God exists^[45] and that the Qur'an is the word of God.^[46] ^[47] Hizb-Ut-Tahrir's stated strategy is a non-violent political and intellectual struggle.

Global Jihad

One of the clearly stated goals of the jihadist group al-Qaeda is the re-establishment of a caliphate.^[48] Bin Laden has called for Muslims to "establish the righteous caliphate of our umma."^[49] Al Qaeda recently named its Internet newscast from Iraq "The Voice of the Caliphate."^[50] According to author Lawrence Wright, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden's mentor and Al-Qaida No.2 in command), once "sought to restore the caliphate...which had formally ended in 1924 following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire but which had not exercised real power since the thirteenth century. Once caliphate was established, Zawahiri believed, Egypt would become a rallying point for the rest of the Islamic world, leading the jihad against the West. "Then history would make a new turn, God willing," Zawahiri later wrote, "in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world's Jewish government."^[51]

Opposition

Scholar Olivier Roy writes that "early on, Islamists replace the concept of the caliphate ... with that of the amir." There were a number of reasons including "that according to the classical authors, a caliph must be a member of the tribe of the Prophet (the Quraysh) ... moreover, caliphs ruled societies that the Islamists do not consider to have been Islamic (the Ottoman Empire)."^[52] This is not the view of the majority of Islamist groups, as both the Muslim Brotherhood (the largest) and Hizb ut-Tahrir view the Ottoman state as a caliphate.^[53] ^[54]

A prominent private British think-tank named the Quilliam Foundation was set up to oppose Islamism and the call to re-establish a Caliphate.

Political system

Electing or appointing a Caliph

Fred Donner, in his book *The Early Islamic Conquests* (1981), argues that the standard Arabian practice during the early Caliphates was for the prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for this shura, or consultative assembly. Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader, but they were not necessarily his sons. Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majority Sunni view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.

This argument is advanced by Sunni Muslims, who believe that Muhammad's companion Abu Bakr was elected by the community and that this was the proper procedure. They further argue that a caliph is ideally chosen by election or community consensus, even though the caliphate soon became a hereditary office, or the prize of the strongest general.

Al-Mawardi has written that the caliph should be Qurayshi. Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani has said that the leader of the Muslims simply should be from the majority. The founder of the biggest Sunni Madh'hab, Imam Abu Hanifa also wrote that the Caliph must be chosen by the majority.^[3]

Sunni belief

Following the death of Muhammad, a meeting took place at Saqifah. At that meeting, Abu Bakr was elected caliph by the Muslim community. Sunni Muslims developed the belief that the caliph is a temporal political ruler, appointed to rule within the bounds of Islamic law (Sharia). The job of adjudicating orthodoxy and Islamic law was left to Islamic lawyers, judiciary, or specialists individually termed as Mujtahids and collectively named the Ulema. Many Muslims call the first four caliphs the Rashidun meaning the Rightly Guided Caliphs, because they are believed to have followed the Qur'an and the sunnah (example) of Muhammad.

Shi'a belief

Shia Muslims believe in the Imamate, in which the rulers are Imams *divinely chosen, infallible, and sinless* from Muhammad's family - Ahl al-Bayt *literally "People of the House (of Muhammad)"* regardless of majority opinion, shura or election. They claim that before his death, Muhammad had given many indications, in Ghadir Khumm particularly, that he considered Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, as his successor. They claim that Abu Bakr had seized power by threatening to use force against Ali, and so Shia Muslims consider the three caliphs elected before Ali as usurpers of power against the divine appointment of Ali. As per Twelver/Ithna Ashery Shia, Ali and his eleven descendants, the twelve Imams, are believed to have been considered, even before their birth, as the only valid Islamic rulers appointed and decreed by God.

After these twelve Imams, the potential Caliphs, had passed, and in the absence of the possibility of a government headed by their Imams, some Shi'a believe it was necessary that a system of Shia Islamic government based on Vilayat-e Faqih be developed, due to the need for some form of government, where an Islamic jurist or faqih rules Muslims, suffices. However this idea, developed by the Marja (Ayatollah) Ruhollah Khomeini and established in Iran, is not universally accepted among Shi'as.

Shia group of Ismaili/ Fatimid/ Dawoodi Bohra believe in Imamate principle mentioned above, but they need not be ruler. To safe guard divine authority of Allah the "Din", from politics of World "Duniya" the 'external World', they have instituted office of Dai al-Mutlaq even from the era of their 21st Imam Tayyab (1130A.D.), under jurisdiction of Suleyhid Queen, as Imam was under seclusion. In the twelver shia also many Imams were not ruler ,and they sacrificed much to upheld "Din".

Take the case of Imam Hasan, After Ali, Imam Hasan was his successor. It is told that there was power struggle between Imam Hasan and Muawwiah, finally agreement reached between them. As Hasan was more interested in safeguarding Islam, he has kept the 'Din' with him and sacrificed Caliphate to Muawwiah. One thing is very clear that Imamate need not have power of ruler, but there cannot be two representatives of Allah at one moment, hence to have two Imams at a time is ruled out. Even a small organization has clear hierarchy, a clear cut single line of downward delegation, how come the almighty organisation of Allah be governed in anarchy.

The same was philosophy of Fatimid, and same being literally followed by Dawoodi Bohra's Dai in absence and on behalf of their hidden Imam. This is the result that Bohras have unity amongst them all over the world. There is universal brotherhood amongst them, a same culture, same habits of living, togetherness for the cause of Islam and same time dedication to the land they live. This was the Islam and Fatimid's true dream, and the Fatimid/Dawoodi Bohra seems champion to this cause. There is quote from web;

"...All five of us had different nationality passports. 1 Kenyan, 1 British, 1 Yemeni, 1 Indian passport issued in Egypt & another Indian passport issued in Nairobi. The Jordanian Immigration officer did not have to be explained why such a mixed group. He knew & he smilingly made a statement, that was actually a stunner. He jokingly said, "Why don't you have a Bohra Passport? It will make things so much more easier for you, & us too."

"....We .. people .. do not have a nation .. treated like a single nationality, do not have a kingdom, but are treated royally. From Japan in the East to the West Coast of USA, .. have a common bond, a unique culture, a common language, a standard calendar, a uniform code of conduct that..defines the rights & the wrongs, one goal, one platform & one base of knowledge..Our geographic existence might be checkered, but the entire mosaic of our community is a beautiful picture of harmony, painted by a divine hand,..Our Tryst with destiny begins & ends in the same spiritual allegiance,..loyal to the country reside in,.. contributing to..socio-economic progress and prosperity of the country, .. peace loving community,..and yet in spite of all diversities, we are one. What really makes us..special? We have a Maula, ..given us an identity, .. no other government in the world can provide." [55]

Majlis al-Shura: Parliament

Traditional Sunni Islamic lawyers agree that *shura*, loosely translated as 'consultation of the people', is a function of the caliphate. The Majlis al Shura (literally *consultative assembly*) or parliament was a representation of this idea of consultative governance. The importance of this is premised by the following verses of the Qur'an:

"...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]" [42:38]

"...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah" [3:159]

The majlis is also the means to elect a new caliph. [3] Al-Mawardi has written that members of the majlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also said that in emergencies when there is no caliphate and no majlis, the people themselves should create a majlis and select a list of candidates for caliph; then the majlis should select a caliph from the list of candidates. [3]

Some modern interpretations of the role of the Majlis al-Shura include those by Islamist author Sayyid Qutb and Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of a transnational political movement devoted to the revival of the Caliphate. In an analysis of the shura chapter of the Qur'an, Qutb argued that Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually their representatives) and govern within the general context of God-made laws. Taqiuddin al-Nabhani writes that Shura is an important part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate "but not one of its pillars," meaning that its neglect would not make the Caliphate's rule unislamic, hence justifying rebellion. Non-Muslims may serve in the Majlis. Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest Islamist movement and main opposition in Egypt, argue that in the modern age Shura is democracy and that Islam and the caliphate system is inherently democratic without any need to conform to western political notions [56].

Accountability of rulers

Sunni Islamic lawyers have commented on when it is permissible to disobey, impeach or remove rulers in the Caliphate. This is usually when the rulers are not meeting their obligations to the public under Islam.

Al-Mawardi said that if the rulers meet their Islamic responsibilities to the public the people must obey their laws, but a Caliph or ruler who becomes either unjust or severely ineffective must be impeached via the Majlis al-Shura. Similarly, Al-Baghdadi believed that if the rulers do not uphold justice, the ummah via the majlis should warn them, and a Caliph who does not heed the warning can be impeached. Al-Juwayni argued that Islam is the goal of the ummah, so any ruler who deviates from this goal must be impeached. Al-Ghazali believed that oppression by a caliph is sufficient grounds for impeachment. Rather than just relying on impeachment, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani stated that the people have an obligation to rebel if the caliph begins to act with no regard for Islamic law. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said that to ignore such a situation is *haraam* and those who cannot revolt from inside the caliphate should launch a struggle from outside. Al-Asqalani used two ayahs from the Qur'an to justify this:

“...And they (the sinners on qiyama) will say, 'Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and our chiefs, and they misled us from the right path. Our Lord! Give them (the leaders) double the punishment you give us and curse them with a very great curse'...”^[33:67–68]

Islamic lawyers commented that when the rulers refuse to step down after being impeached through the Majlis, becoming dictators through the support of a corrupt army, if the majority is in agreement they have the option to launch a revolution. Many noted that this option is to be exercised only after factoring in the potential cost of life.^[3]

Rule of law

The following hadith establishes the principle of rule of law in relation to nepotism and accountability^[57]

Narrated 'Aisha: The people of Quraish worried about the lady from Bani Makhzum who had committed theft. They asked, "Who will intercede for her with Allah's Apostle?" Some said, "No one dare to do so except Usama bin Zaid the beloved one to Allah's Apostle." When Usama spoke about that to Allah's Apostle Allah's Apostle said: "Do you try to intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah's Prescribed Punishments?" Then he got up and delivered a sermon saying, "What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would inflict Allah's Legal punishment on him. By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand."

Various Islamic lawyers, however, place multiple conditions and stipulations on the execution of such a law, making it difficult to implement. For example, the poor cannot be penalized for stealing out of poverty, and during a time of drought in the Rashidun caliphate, capital punishment was suspended until the effects of the drought passed.

Islamic jurists later formulated the concept that all classes were subject to the law of the land, and no person is above the law; officials and private citizens alike have a duty to obey the same law. Furthermore, a Qadi (Islamic judge) was not allowed to discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, colour, kinship or prejudice. In a number of cases, Caliphs had to appear before judges as they prepared to render their verdict.^[58]

According to Noah Feldman, a law professor at Harvard University, the system of legal scholars and jurists responsible for the rule of law was replaced by the codification of Sharia by the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century:^[59]

Economy

During the Muslim Agricultural Revolution, the Caliphate understood that real incentives were needed to increase productivity and wealth and thus enhance tax revenues. A social transformation took place as a result of changing land ownership^[60] giving individuals of any gender,^[61] ethnic or religious background the right to buy, sell, mortgage, and inherit land for farming or any other purpose. Based on the Quran, signatures were required on contracts for every major financial transaction concerning agriculture, industry, commerce, and employment. Copies of the contract were usually kept by both parties involved.^[60]

There are similarities between Islamic economics and leftist or socialist economic policies. Islamic jurists have argued that privatization of the origin of oil, gas, and other fire-producing fuels, agricultural land, and water is forbidden. The principle of public or joint ownership has been drawn by Muslim jurists from the following hadith of the Prophet of Islam:

Ibn Abbas reported that the Messenger of Allah said: "*All Muslims are partners in three things- in water, herbage and fire.*" (Narrated in Abu Daud, & Ibn Majah) [62] Anas added to the above hadith, "*Its price is Haram (forbidden)*" [63]

Jurists have argued by qiyas that the above restriction on privatization can be extended to all essential resources that benefit the community as a whole. [62].

Aside from similarities to socialism, early forms of proto-capitalism and free markets were present in the Caliphate,^[64] since an early market economy and early form of merchant capitalism developed between the 8th and 12th centuries, which some refer to as "Islamic capitalism".^[65] A vigorous monetary economy developed based on the circulation of a stable high-value currency (the dinar) and the integration of previously independent monetary areas. Business techniques and forms of business organization employed during this time included early contracts, bills of exchange, long-distance international trade, early forms of partnership (*mufawada*) such as limited partnerships (*mudaraba*), and early forms of credit, debt, profit, loss, capital (*al-mal*), capital accumulation (*nama al-mal*),^[66] circulating capital, capital expenditure, revenue, cheques, promissory notes,^[67] trusts (*waqf*), startup companies,^[68] savings accounts, transactional accounts, pawning, loaning, exchange rates, bankers, money changers, ledgers, deposits, assignments, the double-entry bookkeeping system,^[69] and lawsuits.^[70] Organizational enterprises similar to corporations independent from the state also existed in the medieval Islamic world.^[71] [72] Many of these concepts were adopted and further advanced in medieval Europe from the 13th century onwards.^[66]

The concepts of welfare and pension were introduced in early Islamic law as forms of *Zakat* (charity), one of the Five Pillars of Islam, since the time of the Rashidun caliph Umar in the 7th century. The taxes (including *Zakat* and *Jizya*) collected in the treasury (*Bayt al-mal*) of an Islamic government were used to provide income for the needy, including the poor, elderly, orphans, widows, and the disabled. According to the Islamic jurist Al-Ghazali (Algazel, 1058–1111), the government was also expected to stockpile food supplies in every region in case a disaster or famine occurred. The Caliphate was thus one of the earliest welfare states.^[2] [73]

The demographics of medieval Islamic society varied in some significant aspects from other agricultural societies, including a decline in birth rates as well as a change in life expectancy. Other traditional agrarian societies are estimated to have had an average life expectancy of 20 to 25 years,^[74] while ancient Rome and medieval Europe are estimated at 20 to 30 years.^[75] The life expectancy of Islamic society diverged from that of other traditional agrarian societies, with several studies on the lifespans of Islamic scholars concluding that members of this occupational group enjoyed a life expectancy between 69 and 75 years.^[76] Such studies have given the following estimates for the average lifespans of religious scholars at various times and places: 72.8 years in the Middle East, 69–75 years in 11th century Islamic Spain,^[77] 75 years in 12th century Persia,^[78] and 59–72 years in 13th century Persia.^[79] However, Maya Shatzmiller considers these religious scholars to be a misleading sample who are not representative of the general population.^[80] Conrad I. Lawrence estimates the average lifespan in the early Islamic Caliphate to be above 35 years for the general population.^[81]

The early Islamic Empire also had the highest literacy rates among pre-modern societies, alongside the city of classical Athens in the 4th century BC,^[82] and later, China after the introduction of printing from the 10th century.^[83] One factor for the relatively high literacy rates in the early Islamic Empire was its parent-driven educational marketplace, as the state did not systematically subsidize educational services until the introduction of state funding under Nizam al-Mulk in the 11th century.^[84] Another factor was the diffusion of paper from China,^[85] which led to an efflorescence of books and written culture in Islamic society, thus papermaking technology transformed Islamic society (and later, the rest of Afro-Eurasia) from an oral to scribal culture, comparable to the later shifts from scribal to typographic culture, and from typographic culture to the Internet.^[86] Other factors include the widespread use of paper books in Islamic society (more so than any other previously existing society), the study and memorization of the Qur'an, flourishing commercial activity, and the emergence of the Maktab and Madrasah educational institutions.^[87]

Famous caliphs

- Abu Bakr - First Rashidun (Four Righteously Guided Caliphs) of the Sunnis. Subdued rebel tribes in the Ridda wars.
- Umar (Umar ibn al-Khattab) - Second Rashidun. During his reign, the Islamic empire expanded to include Egypt, Jerusalem, and Persia.
- Uthman Ibn Affan - Third Rashidun. The Qur'an was compiled under his direction. Killed by rebels.
- Ali (Ali ibn Abu Talib) - Fourth and last Rashidun, and considered the first imam by Shi'a Muslims. His reign was fraught with internal conflict.
- Hasan ibn Ali - Fifth Caliph (considered as "rightly guided" by many Sunnis as well as Shias). He ruled for six months only and handed the powers to Muawiyah I in order to unite the Muslims again.
- Muawiyah I - First caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. Muawiyah instituted dynastic rule by appointing his son Yazid I as his successor, a trend that would continue through subsequent caliphates.
- Umar ibn AbdulAziz - Umayyad caliph considered by some (mainly Sunnis) to be a sixth true and legitimate caliph under Islamic Laws of electing Caliph.
- Harun al-Rashid - An Abbasid caliph during whose reign Baghdad became the world's prominent centre of trade, learning, and culture. Harun is the subject of many stories in the famous work One Thousand and One Nights.
- Abū Tamīm Ma'add al-Mu'izz li-Dīn Allāh - (953-975) 4th Fatimid Caliph (Egypt is conquered during his reign and city of Cairo founded).
- Suleiman the Magnificent - Early Ottoman Sultan during whose reign the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith.
- Abdul Hamid II - The last Ottoman Sultan to rule with absolute power.
- Abdülmecid II - The last Caliph of the Ottoman Dynasty, the 101st Caliph in line from Caliph Abu Bakr and nominally the 37th Head of the Ottoman Imperial House.

See also

- Caliph
 - Islamic Golden Age
 - Islamic state
 - Muslim Agricultural Revolution
 - Sheikh ul-Islam
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Notes

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- [84] Andrew J. Coulson, *Delivering Education* (http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817928928_105.pdf), Hoover Institution, p. 117, , retrieved 2008-11-22, "In neither case did the state supply or even systematically subsidize educational services. The Muslim world's eventual introduction of state funding under Nizam al-Mulk in the eleventh century was quickly followed by partisan religious squabbling over education and the gradual fall of Islam from its place of cultural and scientific preeminence."
- [85] Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", *Journal of World History* (University of Hawaii Press) **20** (2): 165–186 [177], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "According to legend, paper came to the Islamic world as a result of the capture of Chinese paper makers at the 751 C.E. battle of Talas River."
- [86] Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", *Journal of World History* (University of Hawaii Press) **20** (2): 165–186 [177], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "Whatever the source, the diffusion of paper-making technology via the lands of Islam produced a shift from oral to scribal culture across the rest of Afroeurasia that was rivaled only by the move from scribal to typographic culture. (Perhaps it will prove to have been even more important than the recent move from typographic culture to the Internet.) The result was remarkable. As historian Jonathan Bloom informs us, paper encouraged "an efflorescence of books and written culture incomparably more brilliant than was known anywhere in Europe until the invention of printing with movable type in the fifteenth century."
- [87] Edmund Burke (June 2009), "Islam at the Center: Technological Complexes and the Roots of Modernity", *Journal of World History* (University of Hawaii Press) **20** (2): 165–186 [178], doi:10.1353/jwh.0.0045, "More so than any previously existing society, Islamic society of the period 1000–1500 was profoundly a culture of books. [...] The emergence of a culture of books is closely tied to cultural dispositions toward literacy in Islamic societies. Muslim young men were encouraged to memorize the Qur'an as part of their transition to adulthood, and while most presumably did not (though little is known about literacy levels in pre-Mongol Muslim societies), others did. Types of literacy in any event varied, as Nelly Hanna has recently suggested, and are best studied as part of the complex social dynamics and contexts of individual Muslim societies. The need to conform commercial contracts and business arrangements to Islamic law provided a further impetus for literacy, especially likely in commercial centers. Scholars often engaged in commercial activity and craftsmen or tradesmen often spent time studying in madrasas. The connection between what Brian Street has called "maktab literacy" and commercial literacy was real and exerted a steady pressure on individuals to upgrade their reading skills."

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Further reading

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- The History of Al-Khilafah Ar-Rashidah (The Rightly Guided Caliphates) (<http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN1563163667&id=YnDEQSxrykC&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&ots=iVWAdPvPoi&dq=khilafah&sig=QGzhtYrS0do3QGiwzoRKsB1m0ZQ#PPP1,M1>) School Textbook, By Dr. 'Abdullah al-Ahsan, `Abdullah Ahsan
- The Crisis of the Early Caliphate (<http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN0791401545&id=oALiYvjV0fEC&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&dq=caliphate&sig=mtByr6XbvTuDrM-AknV5rN7Kvvs#PPP1,M1>) By Richard Stephen Humphreys, Stephen (EDT) Humphreys from The History of al-Tabari
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- The Caliphate, Its Rise, Decline, and Fall. From Original Sources (<http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN1402193270&id=eqYX3c0I6e4C&pg=RA2-PA1&lpg=RA2-PA1&dq=caliphate&sig=XJx8zaWgdbuIH5koF3iCQaV38sE#PPP1,M1>) By William Muir
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- The Fall of the Caliphate of Cordoba: Berbers and Andalusis in conflict (http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9004098682&id=m-Wvg__iHPAC&pg=PA1&lpg=PA1&ots=aqqGiYHRhP&dq=caliphate&sig=4ECgAiUXUMDjhW5LZXE41YW8ocI#PPP1,M1) By Peter C. Scales
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Rashidun

The Rightly Guided Caliphs or **The Righteous Caliphs** (نودشارلأءافلخال al-Khulafā'u r-Rāshidūn) is a term used in Sunni Islam to refer to the first four Caliphs who established the Rashidun Caliphate. The concept of "Rightly Guided Caliphs" originated with the Abbasid Dynasty. It is a reference to the Sunni tradition, "Hold firmly to my example (sunnah) and that of the Rightly Guided Caliphs" (Ibn Majah, Abu Dawood).^[1]

History

The first four Caliphs who ruled after the death of Muhammad are often quoted as the Khulafah Rashidun.

The Rashidun were either elected by a council (see The election of Uthman and Islamic democracy) or chosen based on the wishes of their predecessor. In the order of succession, the *rashidun* were:

- Abu Bakr (632-634 A.D.)
- Umar ibn al-Khattab, (Umar I) (634-644 A.D.)
- Uthman ibn Affan (644-656 A.D.)
- Ali ibn Abi Talib (656-661 A.D.)

Hasan ibn Ali was appointed as Caliph in 661 following the death of Ali and is also regarded as a righteous ruler by Sunni Muslims,^[2] although he was recognized by only half of the Islamic state and his rule was challenged and eventually ended by the Governor of Syria, Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan.

In addition to this, there are several views regarding additional *rashidun*. Umar ibn Abdul Aziz (Umar II), who was one of the Umayyad caliphs, is sometimes regarded as one of the Rashidun and is quoted by Taftazani. In the Ibadhi tradition, only Abu Bakr and Umar are considered to be the **Two Rightly Guided Caliphs**. Suleiman the Magnificent and Abdul Hamid I of the Ottoman period are regarded by some to be amongst the rightly guided Caliphs.

Ibn Hajr al-Asqalani includes the Khulafah of the Bani Abbas (i.e., the Abbassids) in his enumeration.

Abu Bakr

Soon after Muhammad's death a gathering of *Ansar* and some of the *Muhajirun*, in Medina, appointed Abu Bakr as the successor to Muhammad or the *Caliph*.

Following his succession, various Arab tribes rebelled against Abu Bakr, refusing to pay the zakat, claiming that they would make the salah but wouldn't give charity. Abu Bakr insisted that the zakat and the salah both must be done to be a complete Muslim. This was the start of the *Ridda wars* (Arabic for the Wars of Apostasy).

After restoring peace in Arabia, Abu Bakr directed his generals towards the Byzantine and Sassanid empires.

Some traditions about the origin of the *Qur'an* say that Abu Bakr was instrumental in preserving it in written form, as he was the first to order the collection of the sacred revelations.

Abu Bakr died in 634 in Medina, naming Umar ibn al-Khattab as his successor shortly before his death.

Umar ibn al-Khattab

Umar was named caliph through the same deliberation process that had brought Abu Bakr into leadership. During Umar's reign Muslims conquered Mesopotamia, parts of Persia, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, North Africa and Armenia.

The general social and moral tone of the Muslim society at that time is well-illustrated by the words of an Egyptian who was sent to spy on the Muslims during their Egyptian campaign. He reported:

"I have seen a people, every one of whom loves death more than he loves life. They cultivate humility rather than pride. None is given to material ambitions. Their mode of living is simple... Their commander is their equal. They make no distinction between superior and inferior, between master and slave. When the time of prayer approaches, none remains behind..."

Umar (in English usually called Omar) was known for his simple, austere lifestyle. Rather than adopt the pomp and display affected by the rulers of the time, he continued to live much as he had when Muslims were poor and persecuted. In 639, his fourth year as caliph and the seventeenth year 17 since the Hijra, he decreed that the years of the Islamic era should be counted from the year of the Hijra and. Umar died in 644, after he was stabbed by Abu-Lu'lu'ah in the Masjid al Nabawi mosque in Medina.

Whilst on his deathbed, he was urged to select a successor, which he refused to do. He did however put a process in place for selection of a successor. This comprised the remaining members of the ten companions promised paradise (Al-Asharatu Mubashsharun) to elect from amongst themselves a Caliph within 3 days. The result of this process following his death was Uthman ibn Affan.

Uthman ibn Affan

Uthman (in English often called Othman) also referred to as Usman or Osman in other dialects. reigned for twelve years, and during his rule, all of Iran, most of North Africa, the Caucasus and Cyprus were conquered and incorporated into the Islamic empire. His rule was characterized by increasingly centralized control of revenues from the provinces, aided by governors drawn largely from his kinsmen in the Umayyad clan. Uthman appointed many of his kinsmen as governors of the new domains. Some of his governors were accused of corruption and misrule.

Uthman is perhaps best known for forming the committee which compiled the basic text of the Qur'an as it exists today. During the end of his reign, Uthman ordered the compilation of the text. He sent copies of the sacred text to each of the Muslim cities and garrison towns, and destroyed alternative versions.

Ali ibn Abi Talib

After the death of Uthman, Medina was in political chaos for a number of days. Many of the companions approached Ali to take the role of Caliph, which he refused to do initially.

After his appointment as caliph, Ali dismissed several provincial governors, some of whom were relatives of Uthman, and replaced them with trusted aides such as Malik ibn Ashter . Ali then transferred his capital from Medina to Kufa, the Muslim garrison city in what is now Iraq. The capital of the province of Syria, Damascus, was held by Mu'awiyah, the governor of Syria and a kinsman of Uthman, Ali's slain predecessor.^[3]

His caliphate coincided with the First Fitna. The First Fitna, 656–661 CE, followed the assassination of the third caliph, Uthman Ibn Affan, continued during the caliphate of Ali, and was ended, on the whole, by Muawiyah's assumption of the caliphate. This civil war is often called the Fitna, and regretted as the end of the early unity of the Islamic ummah (nation). This civil war created permanent divisions within the Muslim community and Muslims were divided over who had the legitimate right to occupy the caliphate.^[4]

Ali is most known for his numerous sermons and sayings, many of which have been compiled in a book titled "Nahj Al-Balaghah" or "Peak of Eloquence".

According to tradition, three Muslim zealots (purists later termed Kharijites) attempted to assassinate Ali, Mu'awiyah and `Amr, as the authors of disastrous feuds among the faithful. However, only the assassination of Ali succeeded.

He died on the 21st of Ramadan in the city of Kufa (Iraq) in 661 CE.

Military expansion

During the period of the *rashidun*, Islam became the most powerful state in the Middle East. At the time of the second Rashidun caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattāb, both Sassanid Persian and Roman Empires, were defeated.

Social policies

During his reign, Abu Bakr established the *Bayt al-Mal*(state treasury). Umar expanded the treasury and established government building to administer the state finances.^[5]

Upon conquest, in almost all cases, the caliphs were burdened with the maintenance and construction of roads and bridges in return for the conquered nation's political loyalty.^[6]

Civil activities

Civil welfare in Islam started in the form of the construction and purchase of wells. During the Caliphate, the Muslims repaired many of the aging wells in the lands they conquered.^[7]

In addition to wells, the Muslims built many tanks and canals. Many canals were purchased, and new ones constructed. While some canals were excluded for the use of monks (such as a spring purchased by Talha), and the needy, most canals were open to general public use. Some canals were constructed between settlements, such as the Saad canal that provided water to Anbar, and the Abi Musa Canal to providing water to Basra.^[8]

During a famine, Umar ibn al-Khattab ordered the construction of a canal in Egypt connecting the Nile with the sea. The purpose of the canal was to facilitate the transport of grain to Arabia through a sea-route, hitherto transported only by land. The canal was constructed within a year by Amr bin al Aas, and Abdus Salam Nadiv writes, Arabia was rid of famine for all the times to come."^[9]

After four floods hit Mecca after Muhammad's death, Umar ordered the construction of two dams to protect the Kaaba. He also constructed a dam near Medina to protect its fountains from flooding.^[6]

Settlements

The area of Basra was very sparsely populated when it was conquered by the Muslims. During the reign of Umar, the Muslim army found it a suitable place to construct a base. Later the area was settled and a mosque was erected.

Upon the conquest of Madyan, it was settled by Muslims. However, soon the environment was considered harsh and Umar ordered the resettlement of the 40,000 settlers to Kufa. The new buildings were constructed from mud bricks, instead of reeds, a material that was popular in the region, but caught fire easily.

During the conquest of Egypt the area of Fustat was used by the Muslim army as a base. Upon the conquest of Alexandria, the Muslims returned and settled in the same area. Initially the land was primarily used for pasture, but later buildings were constructed.^[10]

Other already populated areas were greatly expanded. At Mosul, Harthama Arfaja, at the command of Umar, constructed a fort, few churches, a mosque and a locality for the Jewish population.^[11]

Muslim views

The first four caliphs are particularly significant to modern intra-Islamic debates: for Sunni Muslims, they are models of righteous rule; for Shia Muslims, the first three of the four were usurpers. It is prudent to note here that accepted traditions of both Sunni and Shi'a muslims detail disagreements and tensions between the four rightly guided caliphs, the most notable and prominent being those differences of opinion between Ali and the other caliphs. The contexts of these disagreements were often pertaining to religious views and interpretation of Qur'anic verses.

Sunni perspectives

They are called so because they have been seen as model Muslim leaders by Sunni Muslims. This terminology came into a general use around the world, since Sunni Islam has been the dominant Islamic tradition, and for a long time it has been considered the most authoritative source of information about Islam in the Western world.

They were all close companions of Muhammad, and his relatives: the daughters of Abu Bakr and Umar were married to Muhammad, and three of Muhammad's daughters were married to Uthman and Ali. Likewise, their succession was not hereditary, something that would become the custom after them, beginning with the subsequent Umayyad Caliphate. Council decision or caliph's choice determines the successor originally.


Shi'a tradition

According to Shi'a Islam, the first caliph should have been Ali followed by the Shi'a Imams. Shi'a Muslims support this claim with the Hadith of the pond of Khumm. Another reason for this support for Ali as the first caliph is because he had the same relationship to Muhammad as Aaron had to Moses. Starting with Muhammad to Ali to the grandsons of Muhammad, Hasan ibn Ali and Husayn ibn Ali (Muhammad had no surviving sons of his own) and so on.

The Shi'ites also argue that if all of these four caliphs were rightly guided, then there should not have been disagreements and differences between them with anything regarding religious jurisprudence and meanings.

Timeline

Please note that the years of Caliphs succession do not necessarily fall on the first day of the new year.



Notes

[1] Taraweeh: 8 or 20? (<http://www.inter-islam.org/Actions/taraweeh.htm>)

[2] (<http://www.onlineislamicstore.com/a4424.html>)

[3] Shi'a: 'Ali (<http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/SHIA/ALI.HTM>)

[4] See:

- Lapidus (2002), p.47
- Holt (1977a), pp. 70-72
- Tabatabaei (1979), pp.50-57

[5] Nadvi (2000), pg. 411

[6] Nadvi (2000), pg. 408

[7] Nadvi (2000), pg. 403-4

[8] Nadvi (2000), pg. 405-6

[9] Nadvi (2000), pg. 407-8

[10] Nadvi (2000), pg. 416-7

[11] Nadvi (2000), pg. 418

See also

- The Four Companions
- The Ten Promised Paradise
- Sunni view of the Sahaba

Rashidun Caliphate


History of the Islamic Arab States

The **Rashidun Caliphate** (Arabic: *الدولة الإسلامية الأولى*), also known as the **Rightly Guided Caliphate**, comprising the first four caliphs in Islam's history, was founded after Muhammad's death in 632, Year 10 A.H.. At its height, the Caliphate extended from the Arabian Peninsula, to the Levant, Caucasus and North Africa in the west, to the Iranian highlands and Central Asia in the east. It was the one of the largest empires in history up until that time^[1].

Origin

After Muhammad's death in 632, the Medinan Ansar debated which of them should succeed the Prophet in running the affairs of the Muslims while the household of the Prophet was busy in his burial. 'Umar (who is from the Quraysh) and Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah pledged their loyalty to Abu Bakr, with the Ansar and the Quraish soon following suit. Abu Bakr thus became the first **Khalifa Rasul Allah** (*Successor of the Messenger of God*), and embarked on campaigns to propagate the Muslim Religion and Deliver the Message of God.

First, though, he would have to subdue the Arabian tribes which had gone back on their oaths of allegiance to Islam and the Islamic community. As a Khalifa or Caliph he was not a monarch and never claimed such a title nor did his three successors do so. They lived in a humble house, milked sheep and goats and roamed in public without any guards and rested sitting beneath a tree when tired. The Umayyad and Abbasids also did not claim such a title(of monarchs) but treated themselves as such.



See also: Succession to Muhammad.

History

Succession of Abu Bakr

Troubles emerged soon after Abu Bakr's succession, threatening the unity and stability of the new community and state. Apostasy had actually begun in the lifetime of Muhammad, and the first major action of the apostasy was fought and satisfactorily concluded while Muhammad still lived. But the real and most serious danger of apostasy arose after Muhammad's death, when a wild wave of disbelief-after-belief moved across Arabia and had to be tackled by Abu Bakr.

The first major event of the apostasy occurred in Yemen and is known as the Incident of Aswad Al Ansi^[2], who was killed on May 30, 632 (the 6th of Rabi-ul-Awwal, 11 Hijri) by a Persian Muslim governor of Yemen named *Firoz*^[3]. The news of his assassination reached Medina shortly after the death of Muhammad. The chief cause of the apostasy was lack of firm Islamic faith. Most of the tribes, that had taken to Islam, converted in the ninth and tenth

years of the Hijra,.

The apostasy had become so general that it affected every tribe in Arabia with the exception of the people in Mecca and Medina and the tribe of Thaqeef in Taif. In some cases the entire tribe apostatised. Some withheld the *zakat*, the alms tax, though they did not otherwise challenge Islam. Many tribal leaders made claims to prophethood, some like Musaylima made it during the lifetime of Muhammad. The tribes claimed that they had submitted to Muhammad and that with Muhammad's death, their allegiance was ended. Abu Bakr insisted that they had not just submitted to a leader but joined the Muslim community, of which he was the new head. Apostasy is a capital offense under traditional interpretations of Islamic law, and Abu Bakr declared war on the rebels.

This was the start of the *Ridda wars* (Arabic for the Wars of Apostasy). The apostasy of central Arabia was led by self-proclaimed prophet Musaylima, while the other centers of the rebels were to the south and east in Bahrain, Oman, Mahra and Yemen. Abu Bakr planned his strategy accordingly. He divided the Muslim army into several corps. The strongest corps, and this was the primary force of the Muslims, was the corps of Khalid ibn Walid. This corps was used to fight the most powerful of the rebel forces. Other corps were given areas of secondary importance in which to bring the less dangerous apostate tribes to submission. Abu Bakr's plan was first to clear the area of West and Central Arabia (the area nearest Madinah), then tackle Malik ibn Nuwayrah, and finally concentrate against the most dangerous enemy - Musaylima. After series of successful campaigns Khalid ibn Walid finally defeated Musaylima in the Battle of Yamama^[4]. The Campaign on the Apostasy was fought and completed during the eleventh year of the Hijri. The year 12 Hijri dawned, on March 18, 633, with Arabia united under the central authority of the Caliph at Madinah. According to the Sunni Muslims, by putting down these larger insurrections and defeating the rival prophets among the Bedouin tribes, Abu Bakr was able to solidify the rest of Arabia under Islam, and basically rescue the Islamic state from collapse.

Once the rebellions had been put down, Abu Bakr began a war of conquest. Whether or not he intended a full-out imperial conquest is hard to say; he did, however, set in motion a historical trajectory that in just a few short decades would lead to one of the largest empires in history. Abu Bakr began with Iraq, the richest province of the Persian empire. He sent his most brilliant general Khalid ibn Walid to invade the Persian empire in 633. He thereafter also sent 4 armies to invade Roman Syria, but decisive operation was only undertaken when Khalid, after completing the conquest of Iraq, was transferred to the Syrian front in 634.

Succession of Umar

Abu Bakr desired Umar to be his successor and he persuaded the most powerful of the followers of Muhammad to go along. Umar was gifted both militarily and politically.

Abu Bakr	632	634
Umar	634	644
Uthman	644	656
Ali	656	661

Umar continued the war of conquests begun by Abu Bakr. He pressed into the Sassanid Persian Empire itself, but he also headed north into Syria and Byzantine territory and west into Egypt. These were some of the richest regions in the world controlled by powerful states, but a lengthy war between the Byzantines and Sassanids had left both states militarily exhausted. Islamic forces easily prevailed in war against the two states. By 640, Islamic military campaigns had brought all of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine under the control of the Rashidun Caliphate. Egypt was conquered by 642 and the entire Persian Empire by 643.

Umar, however, was one of the great political geniuses of history. While the empire was expanding at a mind-numbing rate under his leadership, he also began to build the foundations for a political structure that would hold it together. Umar did not require that non-Muslim populations convert to Islam nor did he try to centralize

government, as the Persians had done. Instead, he allowed subject populations to retain their religion, language, customs, and government relatively untouched. The only intrusion would be a governor (*amir*) and a financial officer called an *amil*.

Umar's most far-reaching innovations were in the area of building a financial structure to the empire. He understood that the most important aspect of the empire was a stable financial structure for the government. To this end, he built an efficient system of taxation and brought the military directly under the financial control of the state. He also founded the Diwan, a unique Islamic institution. The diwan consisted of individuals that were important to the Islamic faith and the Islamic world, such as the companions of Muhammad. Their contribution to the faith was so great that they were given pensions on which to live, which freed them up to pursue religious and ethical studies, and thus provide spiritual leadership to the rest of the Islamic world.

Umar established many Islamic traditions, including the process of collating the Quran. Among his most lasting traditions was the establishment of the Muslim calendar. Like the Arabian calendar, it remained a lunar calendar, but Umar set the beginning of the calendar to the year in which Muhammad emigrated to Medina. This, as far as Umar was concerned, was the turning point in Islamic history.

Umar was mortally wounded in an assassination attempt by the Persian slave Abu Lulu Fieroz, during morning prayers in 644. Before he died, Umar appointed a committee of six men to decide on the next caliph — they were charged to choose one of their own number.

Election of Uthman


All of the men, like 'Umar, were from the tribe of Quraish, the Ansar had been gradually shut out of power.

This committee would prove to be pivotal, for on its choice would eventually grow Islam's first schism. The committee narrowed down the choices to two: 'Uthman and 'Ali. 'Ali was from the Banu Hashim clan (the same clan as Muhammad) of the Quraysh tribe, and he was the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad and had been a companion to the Prophet from the inception of his mission. He may also have been named by Muhammad as a successor. Uthman was from the Umayyad clan of the Quraish, and was one of the wealthy men of his time.

Uthman, however, was a supremely practical military and political leader while 'Ali was a fervently devout religious disciple.

Uthman reigned for twelve years as caliph, during the first half of his reign he enjoyed a position of the most popular caliph among all the Rashiduns, while in the later half of his reign he met increasing opposition. This opposition was led by the Egyptians and was constellated around Ali, who would, albeit briefly, succeed Uthman as caliph. Despite internal troubles, Uthman continued the wars of conquest started by 'Umar. The Rashidun army conquered North Africa from the Byzantines and even raided Spain, conquering the coastal areas of the Iberian peninsula, as well as the islands of Rhodes, Sicily and Cyprus. The Rashidun army fully conquered the Sassanid Persian Empire, and its eastern frontiers extended up to the lower Indus River. Uthman's greatest and most lasting achievement was the formal recension of the Qur'an.

Until 'Uthman, the Qur'an was largely an oral text that was recited by followers who had memorized it. The wars of conquest, however, had thinned their ranks, and the introduction of foreign peoples into Islam threatened the integrity of the text as an Arabic text. So 'Uthman ordered that all versions, written and oral, be collected together and a definitive version written down. It is this definitive version which became the central text of Islam and the bedrock on which all Islamic history would be built. Unrest grew steadily and precipitously. His government mishandled finances in the empire. In 656, rebels entered Madinah, and a riot broke out there. The rebels then laid siege to Uthman's house.



Siege of Uthman

Uthman refused to initiate any military action, in order to avoid civil war between Muslims, and preferred negotiations. His polite attitude towards rebels emboldened them and they broke into Uthman's house and killed him while he was reading the Qur'an.

Crisis and fragmentation

After the assassination of the third Caliph, Uthman ibn Affan, the Companions of Muhammad in Medina selected Ali to be the new Caliph. Soon thereafter, Ali dismissed several provincial governors, some of whom were relatives of Uthman, and replaced them with trusted aides such as Malik al-Ashtar and Salman the Persian. Ali then transferred his capital from Medina to Kufa, the Muslim garrison city in what is now Iraq. The capital of the province of Syria, Damascus, was held by Mu'awiyah, the governor of Syria and a kinsman of Uthman, Ali's slain predecessor.^[6] Uthman's death was ironic for many reasons, including the fact that he was the first Islamic caliph to be killed by fellow Muslims. Following the assassination of Caliph Uthman ibn Affan, the first Muslim civil war started, which continued during the brief caliphate of Ali ibn Abu Talib, and ended, on the whole, by Mu'awiyah's assumption of the caliphate, an event which then laid the foundation of the Umayyad Empire. This civil war is often called the Fitna, and regretted as the end of the early unity of the Islamic ummah (nation).

In 656, after Uthman ibn Affan was murdered by a group of rebels as he sat reading the Qur'an in his home in Medina, the city fell into chaos and uproar. Citizens flocked to Ali ibn Abu Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, and a respected community leader who had been passed over for the leadership three times since the death of Muhammad. They then urged him to take the caliphate. Initially reluctant due to the circumstances of the caliph's death, he eventually chose to accept. Ali then had to fight against numerous challengers to his rule. The cry of revenge of the blood of Caliph Uthman grew, and a large army of the Muslims led by Zubayr, Talha and the widow of Muhammad, Ayesha set for revenge from the rebels. As the rebels gathered from Egypt, Kufa and Basra, their first objective was Basra. The army reached Basra and captured it, 4000 suspected seditionists were assassinated. Ali who had already transferred his capital from Madinah to Kufa, turned towards Basra and a battle was fought between the Caliph Ali's army and the army of Muslims who demanded revenge of Uthman. Though neither Ali nor the leaders of the opposing army Talha and Zubayr wanted to fight, a fight broke out suddenly at night between the two armies. It is said according to Sunni Muslim traditions that the rebels who were involved in the assassination of Uthman initiated combat as they were afraid that as a result of negotiation between Ali and

opposing army, the killers of Uthman would be hunted down and killed. The battle thus fought was the first battle between Muslims and is known as the Battle of the Camel. After the Caliphate had won and the dispute was settled, Ali sent his son Hassan ibn Ali to escort Ayesha back to Madinah. The eminent companions of Mohammad, Talha and Zubayr were killed in the battle after they withdrew from the battlefield refusing to fight against Muslims.

After this dark episode of Islamic history, another cry for revenge for the blood of Uthman rose. This time it was by Mu'awiya, kinsmen of Uthman and governor of the province of Syria. However it is regarded as more an attempt of assuming the caliphate by Mu'awiya than to take revenge for Uthman's murder from the rebels. Ali fought Uthman's kinsman Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria, at the Battle of Siffin to a stalemate and then lost a controversial arbitration; and he fought his own mutinous soldiers (the first Kharijites). Large sections of the new empire created in the twenty-four years (632-656) were lost due to the civil war, like Sicily, North Africa, the coastal areas of Spain and some forts in Anatolia. But the Byzantines tended not to re-capture their lost land, particularly areas in the western empire. According to Muslim history, Mu'awiya sent a letter to the Byzantine emperor threatening him not to reclaim Islamic lands or Mu'awiya would make peace with his kinsmen (referring to Ali) and they would both together destroy the Byzantine Empire.

In 661 CE, Ali was assassinated in the Mosque of Kufa by Ibn Muljam, a relative of one of the rebel soldiers he had defeated and killed. His last words were "Fuztu wa rabb al-Ka'bah" - meaning *By The Lord of the Ka'bah, I have succeeded*.

His son Hasan ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad, briefly assumed the caliphate upon being appointed by Ali, but realized that he could not prevail. He came to an agreement with Mu'awiya, of which various accounts are given, while Mu'awiya assumed control of the empire and founded the Umayyad Empire, with it the Rashidun Caliphate dismantled.

Military expansion

The Rashidun empire expanded gradually, with the time span of 24 years of conquest a vast territory was conquered comprising North Africa, the Middle East, Transoxiana, the Caucasus, parts of Anatolia, the whole of the Sassanid Persian empire, the Greater Khorasan, the islands of Cyprus, Rhodes and Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula was invaded, and Baluchistan was conquered, the empires eastern frontiers reaching the lower Indus river in the Indian subcontinent and western frontiers to the Atlantic Ocean.


The Islamic Invasion of Sassanid Persia resulted in the conquest of the whole Sassanid Persian empire, after the Persians declined to submit and continued to strive to re-capture their lost territory. Unlike the Sassanid Persians, the Byzantines after losing Syria, retreated back to western Anatolia and as a result, also lost Egypt, North Africa, Sicily, Cyprus and Rhodes to the invading Rashidun army, although the civil wars among the Muslims halted the war of conquest for many years and this gave time for the Byzantine Empire to recover.

Conquest of Persian empire

The first Islamic invasion of the Persian empire launched by Caliph Abu Bakr in 633 was a swift conquest in the time span of only 4 months led by legendary general Khalid ibn Walid. Abu Bakr sent his most brilliant general Khalid to conquer Mesopotamia after the Ridda wars. After entering Iraq with his army of 18,000, Khalid won decisive victories in four consecutive battles: Battle of Chains, fought in April 633; Battle of River, fought in the 3rd week of April 633; Battle of Walaja, fought in May 633 (where he successfully used a double envelopment manoeuvre), and Battle of Ullais, fought in the mid of May 633. In the last week of May 633, the capital city of Iraq fell to the Muslims after initial resistance in the Battle of Hira.



Map detailing the route of Khalid ibn Walid's conquest of Iraq.



Remains of Taq-i Kisra, palace of Sassanid Kings, Ctesiphon, Iraq.

After resting his armies, Khalid moved in June 633 towards Al Anbar, which resisted and was defeated in the Battle of Al-Anbar, and eventually surrendered after a siege of a few weeks in July 633. Khalid then moved towards the south, and conquered the city of Ein ul Tamr after the Battle of ein-ul-tamr in the last week of July, 633. By now, almost the whole of Iraq was under Islamic control. Khalid received a call of help from northern Arabia at daumat-ul-jandal, where another Muslim Arab general, Ayaz bin Ghanam, was trapped among the rebel tribes. Khalid went to Daumat-ul-jandal and defeated the rebels in the Battle

of Daumat-ul-jandal in the last week of August, 633 CE. Returning from Arabia, he received news of the assembling of a large Persian army. Within a few weeks, he decided to defeat them all separately in order to avoid the risk of defeat to a large unified Persian army. Four divisions of Persian and Christian Arab auxiliaries were present at Hanafiz, Zumi, Sanni and Muzieh.

Khalid divided his army in three units, and decided to attack these auxiliaries one by one from three different sides at night, starting from the Battle of Muzieh, then the Battle of Sanni, and finally the Battle of Zumail. In November 633 CE, Khalid defeated the enemy armies in his series of three sided attacks at night. These devastating defeats ended Persian control over Iraq. In December 633 CE, Khalid reached the border city of Firaz, where he defeated the combined forces of the Sassanid Persians, Byzantine Romans and Christian Arabs in the Battle of Firaz. This was the last battle in his conquest of Iraq.^[7]

After the conquest of Iraq, Khalid left Mesopotamia to lead another campaign at Syria against the Roman Empire, after which Mithna ibn Haris took command in Mesopotamia. The Persians once again concentrated armies to regain the lost Mesopotamia, while Mithna ibn Haris withdraw from central Iraq to the region near the Arabian desert to delay war until reinforcement came from Madinah. Caliph Umar sent reinforcements under the command of Abu Ubaidah Saqfi. With some initial success this army was finally defeated by the Sassanid army at the Battle of the Bridge in which Abu Ubaid was killed. The response was delayed until after a decisive Muslim victory against the Romans in the Levant at the Battle of Yarmuk in 636 Caliph Umar, was then able to transfer forces to the east and resume the offensive against the Sassanids. Caliph Umar dispatched 36,000 men along with 7500 troops from the


Syrian front, under the command of Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas against the Persian army. The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah followed, with the Persians prevailing at first, but on the third day of fighting, the Muslims gained the upper hand. The legendary Persian general Rostam Farrokhzad was killed during the battle. According to some sources, the Persian losses were 20,000, and the Arabs lost 10,500 men.

Following the Battle, the Arab Muslim armies pushed forward toward the Persian capital of Ctesiphon (also called Madain in Arabic), which was quickly evacuated by Yazdgird after a brief siege. After seizing the city, they continued their drive eastwards, following Yazdgird and his remaining troops. Within a short span of time, the Arab armies defeated a major Sasanian counter-attack in the Battle of Jalula', as well as other engagements at Qasr-e Shirin, and Masabadhan. By the mid-7th Century, the Arabs controlled all of Mesopotamia, including the area that is now the Iranian province of Khuzestan. It is said that Caliph Umar did not wish to send his troops through the Zagros mountains and onto the Iranian plateau. One tradition has it that he wished for a "wall of fire" to keep the Arabs and Persians apart. Later commentators explain this as a common-sense precaution against over-extension of his forces. The Arabs had only recently conquered large territories that still had to be garrisoned and administered. The continued existence of the Persian government was however an incitement to revolt in the conquered territories and unlike the Byzantine army, the Sassanid army was continuously striving to regain their lost territories. Finally Umar decided to push his forces for further conquests, which eventually resulted in the whole scale conquest of the Sassanid Persian empire. Yazdegerd, the Sassanid king, made yet another effort to regroup and defeat the invaders. By 641 he had raised a new force, which took a stand at the Battle of Nihawand, some forty miles south of Hamadan in modern Iran. The Rashidun army under the command of Umar's appointed general Nu'man ibn Muqarrin al-Muzani, attacked and again defeated the Persian forces. The Muslims proclaimed it the Victory of victories (Fath al-fotuh) as it marked the End of the Sassanids, shattering the last strongest Sassanid army. Yazdegerd was unable to raise another army and became a hunted fugitive. In 642, Caliph Umar sent the army to conquer the whole of the Persian empire. The whole of present day Iran was conquered, followed by the conquest of Greater Khorasan (which included modern Iranian Khorasan province and modern Afghanistan), Transoxania, and Balochistan, Makran, Azerbaijan, Dagestan (Russia), Armenia and Georgia, this regions were later also re-conquered during Caliph Utman's reign^[8] with further expansion to the regions which were not conquered during Umar's reign, and the Rashidun Caliphate's frontiers in the east extended up to lower river Indus and up to Oxus River in the north.

Wars against the Byzantine empire


Conquest of Byzantine Syria

After, Khalid captured Iraq and firmly took control of it, Abu Bakr sent armies to Syria on the Byzantine front. Four armies were sent under four different commanders, Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah acting as their supreme commander, Amr ibn al-As, Yazid ibn Abu Sufyan and Shurhabil ibn Hasana. These armies were all assigned their objectives. However their advance was halted by a concentration of the Byzantine army at Ajnadayn. Abu Ubaidah then send for reinforcements. Abu Bakr ordered Khalid, who by now was planning to attack Ctesiphon, to march to Syria with half of his army out of Iraq. Khalid took half of his army and rather took a unconventional route to Syria. There were 2 major routes to Syria from Iraq, one passing through Mesopotamia and the other through Dumat ul-Jandal. Khalid took a route through the Syrian Desert, and after a perilous march of 5 days, appeared in north-western Syria. The border forts of Sawa, Arak, Tadmur, Sukhnah, Qaryatayn and Hawarin were the first to fall to the invading Muslims. Khalid marched on to Bosra via the Damascus road. At Bosra, the Corps of Abu Ubaidah and Shurhabil joined Khalid, after which here as per orders of Caliph Abu Bakr, Khalid took the high command from Abu Ubaidah. Bosra was not ready for this surprise attack and siege, and thus surrendered after a brief siege in July 634, (see Battle of Bosra) this effectively ending the Ghassanid Dynasty.



Map detailing Rashidun Caliphates invasion of Levant.

From Bosra Khalid send orders to other corps comamnders to join him at Ajnadayn, where accodring to early Muslim historians, a Byzantine army of 90.000 was concentrated to push back the Muslims. These figures, however, are not reliable. The Byzantine army was defeated decisively on 30 July 634 in the Battle of Ajnadayn. It was the first major pitched battle between the Muslim army and the Christian Byzantine army and cleared the way for the Muslims to capture central Syria. Damascus, the Byzantine stronghold, was conquered shortly after on 19 September 634. After the Muslim Conquest of Damascus, the Byzantine army was given a deadline of 3 days to go as far as they can, with their families and treasures, or simply agree to stay in Damascus and pay tribute.



Map detailing the route of Khalid ibn Walid's invasion of Syria.



Byzantine temple in Idlib, Syria.

After the three days deadline was over, the Muslim cavalry under Khalid's command attacked the Roman army by catching up to them using an unknown shortcut at the battle of Maraj-al-Debaj.^[9]


On 22 August 634, Caliph Abu Bakr died, making Umar his successor. As Umar became caliph, he relieved Khalid from commanding the Islamic armies and appointed Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah as the new commander of the Muslim army. The conquest of Syria slowed down under him and Abu Ubaida relied heavily on the advices of Khalid, and he kept him beside him as much as possible.^[10]

The last large garrison of the Byzantine army was at Fahl, which was joined by survivors of Ajnadayn. With this threat at their rear

the Muslim armies could not move further north nor south, thus Abu Ubaidah decided to deal with the situation, and had this garrison defeated and routed at the Battle of Fahl on 23 January 635. This battle proved to be the "Key to Palestine". After this battle Abu Ubaidah and Khalid marched north towards Emesa, Yazid was stationed in Damascus while Amr and Shurhabil marched south to capture Palestine.^[10] While the Muslims were at Fahl, sensing the weak defense of Damascus, Emperor Heraclius sent an army to capture re-capture the city. This army however couldn't make it to Damascus and was intercepted by Abu Ubaidah and Khalid on their way to Emesa. The army was routed and destroyed in the battle of Maraj-al-Rome and the 2nd battle of Damascus. Emesa and the strategical town of Chalcis made peace with the Muslims for one year. This was, in fact, done to let Heraclius prepare for defences and raise new armies. The Muslims welcomed the peace and consolidated their control over the conquered territory. As soon as the Muslims received the news of reinforcements being send to Emesa and Chalcis, they marched against Emesa and laid siege to it in the Emesa was captured in which it was also captured in March 636.^[11]

The prisoners taken in the battle informed them about Emperor Heraclius's final effort to take back Syria. They said that an army possibly two hundred thousand (200,000) strong would soon emerge to recapture the province. Khalid stopped here on June 636. This huge army set out for their destination. As soon as Abu Ubaida herd the news, he gathered all his officers to plan their next move. Khalid suggested that they should summon all of their forces present in the province of Syria (Syria, Jordan, Palestine) and to make a powerful joint force and then move towards the plain of Yarmouk for battle.

Abu Ubaida ordered all the Muslim commanders to withdraw from all the conquered areas, return the tributes that they previously gathered, and move towards Yarmuk.^[12] Heraclius's army also moved towards Yarmuk. The Muslim armies reached it in July 636. A week or two later, around mid July, the Byzantine army arrived.^[13] Khalid's Mobile guard defeated Christian Arab auxiliaries of the Roman army in a skirmish.



Map detailing the route of Muslim's invasion of central Syria.

Nothing happened until the third week of August in which the Battle of Yarmouk was fought. The battle lasted 6 days during which Abu Ubaida transferred the command of the entire army to Khalid. The Byzantine army was defeated on October 636 CE. Abu Ubaida held a meeting with his high command officers, including Khalid to decide of future conquests. They decided to conquer Jerusalem. The siege of Jerusalem lasted four months after which the city agreed to surrender, but only to Caliph Umar Ibn Al Khattab in person. Amr ibn Al As suggested that Khalid should be sent as Caliph, because of his very strong resemblance with Caliph Umar.


Khalid was recognized and eventually, Caliph Umar ibn Al Khattab came and Jerusalem surrendered on April 637 CE. Abu Ubaida sent the commanders Amr bin al-As, Yazid bin Abu Sufyan, and Sharjeel bin Hassana back to their areas to reconquer them. Most of the areas submitted without a fight. Abu Ubaida himself along with Khalid moved to northern Syria once again to conquer it with a 17,000 men army. Khalid along with his cavalry was sent to Hazir and Abu Ubaidah moved to the city of Qasreen.

Khalid defeated a strong Byzantine army in the Battle of Hazir and reached Qasreen before Abu Ubaidah. The city surrendered to Khalid. Soon, Abu Ubaidah arrived in June 637. Abu Ubaidah then moved against Aleppo. As usual Khalid was commanding the cavalry. After the Battle of Aleppo the city finally agreed to surrender in October 637.


Occupation of Anatolia

Abu Ubaida and Khalid ibn Walid, after conquering all of northern Syria, moved north towards Anatolia conquering the fort of Azaz to clear the flank and rear from Byzantine troops. On their way to Antioch, a Roman army blocked them near a river on which there was an iron bridge. Because of this, the following battle is known as the Battle of Iron bridge. The Muslim army defeated the Byzantines and Antioch surrendered on 30 October 637 CE. Later during the year, Abu Ubaida sent Khalid and another general named Ayaz bin Ghanam at the head of two separate armies against the western part of Jazira,

most of which was conquered with out strong resistance, including parts of Anatolia, Edessa and the area up to the Ararat plain. Other columns were sent to Anatolia as far west as the Taurus Mountains, the important city of Marash and Malatya which were all conquered by Khalid in the autumn of 638 CE. During Uthman's reign, the Byzantines recaptured many forts in the region and on Uthman's orders, series of campaigns were launched to regain control of it. In 647 Muawiyah, the governor of Syria sent an expedition against Anatolia. They invaded at Cappadocia and sacked Caesarea Mazaca. In 648 the Rashidun army raided Phrygia. A major offensive into Cilicia and Isauria in 650–651 forced the Byzantine Emperor Constans II to enter into negotiations with Caliph Uthman's governor of Syria, Muawiyah. The truce that followed allowed a short respite, and made it possible for Constans II to hold on to the western portions of Armenia. In 654–655 on the orders of Caliph Uthman, an expedition was preparing to attack the Byzantine capital Constantinople but did not carry out the plan due to the civil war that broke out in 656. The



Map detailing the route of Muslim's invasion of northern Syria.



Map detailing the route of Khalid ibn Walid's invasion of Syria.

Taurus Mountains in Turkey marked the western frontiers of the Rashidun Caliphate in Anatolia during Caliph Uthman's reign.


Conquest of Egypt

At the commencement of the Muslim conquest of Egypt, Egypt was part of the Byzantine Empire with its capital in Constantinople. However, it had been occupied just a decade before by the Persian Empire under Khosrau II (616 to 629 AD). The power of the Byzantine empire was shattered during the Muslim conquest of Syria, and therefore the conquest of Egypt was much easier. In 639, some 4,000 Rashidun troops led by Amr ibn al-As, were sent by Caliph Umar to conquer the land of the ancient pharaohs. The Rashidun army crossed into Egypt from Palestine in December 639 and advanced rapidly into the Nile Delta. The imperial garrisons retreated into the walled towns, where they successfully held out for a year or more. But the Muslims sent for reinforcements and the invading army, joined by another 12,000 men in 640, defeated a Byzantine army at the Battle of Heliopolis. Amr next proceeded in the direction of Alexandria, which was surrendered to him by a treaty signed on November 8, 641. The Thebaid seems to have surrendered with scarcely any opposition.

The ease with which this valuable province was wrenched from the Byzantine Empire appears to have been due to the treachery of the governor of Egypt, Cyrus, [14], Melchite (i.e., Byzantine/Chalcedonian Orthodox, *not* Coptic) Patriarch of Alexandria, and the incompetence of the generals of the Byzantine forces, as well as due to the loss of most of the Byzantine troops in Syria against the Rashidun army. Cyrus had persecuted the local Coptic Christians. He is one of the authors of monothelism, a seventh century heresy, and some supposed him to have been a secret convert to Islam.

During the reign of Caliph Uthman, an attempt was made in the year 645 to regain Alexandria for the Byzantine empire, but it was retaken by Amr in 646. In 654 an invasion fleet sent by Constans II was repulsed. From that time no serious effort was made by the Byzantines to regain possession of the country.

The Muslims were assisted by some Copts, who found the Muslims more tolerant than the Byzantines, and of these some turned to Islam. In return for a tribute of money and food for the troops of occupation, the Christian inhabitants of Egypt were excused from military service and left free in the observance of their religion and the administration of their affairs. Others sided with the Byzantines, hoping that they would provide a defense against the Arab invaders.^[15] During the reign of Caliph Ali, Egypt was captured by rebel troops under the command of former Rashidun army general Amr ibn al-As, who killed Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr the governor of Egypt appointed by Ali.



Map detailing the route of Muslim's invasion of Egypt.



Eighteenth dynasty painting from the tomb of Theban governor Ramose in Deir el-Medina.

Conquest of North Africa



The Roman ruins of Sbeitla (Sufetula)

After the withdrawal of the Byzantines from Egypt, the Exarchate of Africa had declared its independence under its exarch, Gregory the Patrician. The dominions of Gregory extended from the borders of Egypt to Morocco. Abdullah Ibn Sa'ad used to send raiding parties to the west. As a result of these raids the Muslims got considerable booty. The success of these raids made Abdullah Ibn Sa'ad feel that a regular campaign should be undertaken for the conquest of North Africa.

Uthman gave him permission after considering it in the Majlis al Shura. A force of 10,000 soldiers was sent as reinforcement. The Rashidun army assembled in Barqa in Cyrenaica, and from there

they marched west to capture Tripoli, after Tripoli the army marched to Sufetula, the capital of King Gregory. He was defeated and killed in the battle due to superb tactics used by Abdullah ibn Zubayr. After the Battle of Sufetula the people of North Africa sued for peace. They agreed to pay an annual tribute. Instead of annexing North Africa, the Muslims preferred to make North Africa a vassal state. When the stipulated amount of the tribute was paid, the Muslim forces withdrew to Barqa. Following the First Fitna, the first Islamic civil war, Muslim forces withdraw from north Africa to Egypt. The Ummayyad Caliphate, re-invaded north Africa in 664.

Campaign against Nubia (Sudan)

A campaign was undertaken against Nubia during the Caliphate of Umar in 642, but failed after the Makurian took victory at the First Battle of Dongola. The army was pulled out of Nubia without any success. Ten years later, Uthman's governor of Egypt, Abdullah ibn Saad, sent another army to Nubia. This army penetrated deeper into Nubia and laid siege to the Nubian capital of Dongola. The Muslims damaged the cathedral in the center of the city, but the battle also went in favor of Makuria. As the Muslims were not able to overpower Makuria, they negotiated a peace with their king Qaladurut. According to the treaty that was signed, each side agreed not to make any aggressive moves against the other. Each side agreed to afford free passage to the other party through its territories. Nubia agreed to provide 360 slaves to Egypt every year, while Egypt agreed to supply grain, horses and textiles to Nubia according to demand.



At Meroë, in the Sudan, pyramids of the Kushite rulers

Conquest of the islands of the Mediterranean Sea

During Umar's reign, the governor of Syria, Muawiyah I, sent a request to build a naval force to invade the islands of the Mediterranean Sea but Umar rejected the proposal because of the risk of death of soldiers at sea. During his reign Uthman gave Muawiyah permission to build a navy after concerning the matter. In 650 AD the Arabs made the first attack on the island of Cyprus under the leadership of Muawiyah. They conquered the capital, Salamis - Constantia, after a brief siege, but drafted a treaty with the local rulers. In the course of this expedition a relative of the




The gymnasium, Salamis, Cyprus.

Prophet, Umm-Haram fell from her mule near the Salt Lake at Larnaca and was killed. She was buried in that same spot which became a holy site for both many local Muslims and Christians and, much later in 1816, the Hala Sultan Tekke was built there by the Ottomans. After apprehending a breach of the treaty, the Arabs re-invaded the island in 654 AD with five hundred ships. This time, however, a garrison of 12,000 men was left in Cyprus, bringing the island under Muslim influence.^[16] After leaving Cyprus the Muslim fleet headed towards the island of Crete and then Rhodes and plundered them without much resistance. In 652-654, the Muslims launched a naval campaign against Sicily and they succeeded in capturing a large part of the island. Soon after this Uthman was murdered, and no further expansion efforts were made, and the Muslims accordingly retreated from Sicily. In 655 Byzantine Emperor Constans II led a fleet in person to attack the Muslims at Phoinike (off Lycia) but it was defeated: 500 Byzantine ships were destroyed in the battle, and the emperor himself narrowly avoided death.

First Muslim invasion of Iberian peninsula (Spain)

In Islamic history the conquest of Spain was undertaken by forces led by Tariq ibn Ziyad and Musa ibn Nusair in 711 - 712 C.E, in the time of the Umayyad Caliph Walid ibn Abd al-Malik. According to Muslim historian Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari^[17], Spain was first invaded some sixty years earlier during the caliphate of Uthman in 653. Other prominent Muslim historians like Ibn Kathir^[18] have also quoted the same narration. According to the account of al-Tabari, when North Africa had been duly conquered by Abdullah Ibn Sa'ad, two of his generals, Abdullah ibn Nafiah ibn Husain, and Abdullah ibn Nafi' ibn Abdul Qais, were commissioned to invade coastal areas of Spain by sea. On this occasion Uthman is reported to have addressed a letter to the invading force. In the course of the letter, Uthman said:



“Constantinople will be conquered from the side of Al-Andalus. Thus if you conquer it you will have the honor of taking the first step towards the conquest of Constantinople. You will have your reward in this behalf both in this world and the next.”

No details of the campaigns in Spain during the caliphate of Uthman are given by al-Tabari or by any other historian, leaving what happened unclear. The account of al-Tabari is merely to the effect that an Arab force aided by a Berber force landed in Spain, and succeeded in conquering some coastal areas. It seems that Muslims did invade coastal areas of Spain during the caliphate of Uthman, though the account does not indicate if these conquests led to an occupation of territory or were simply military raids. The Muslims might have established some short-lived advance outposts on the coastland of southern Spain but there is no Byzantine or Visigothic account mentioning the existence of such settlements, which would probably have alarmed them.

Treatment of Conquered Peoples



Rock-face relief at Naqsh-e Rostam of Iranian emperor Shapur I (on horseback) capturing Roman emperor Valerian (kneeling) and Philip the Arab (standing), Iran.

The non-Muslim inhabitants of the conquered lands were given the status of Dhimmi according to Islamic law. Those who accepted Islam were treated in a similar manner as other Muslims, and were given equivalent rights in legal matters.

Dhimmi peoples were allowed to "practice their religion, subject to certain conditions, and to enjoy a measure of communal autonomy" and were guaranteed their personal safety and security of property in return for paying tribute and acknowledging Muslim rule.^[19] Dhimmis were also subject to pay jizya and kharaj, which was considered material proof of their subjection.^[20] Historically, the Dhimmi people were not heavily taxed. The non-Muslims were given full permission to follow their own religions and there has been no signs regarding any forced conversions to Islam. Caliph Umar was the first Caliph to

provide Allowance to non-Muslims after they reached old age. The very first Non-Muslim to receive pension from the Rashidun Administration was a Jew from the following documented record: `

Once Caliph Omar was in the streets of Madina when he saw a man begging. He went to him and asked him; "Why are you begging? Are you not receiving maintenance(allowance) from Bayt al-Mal?" The man replied; "I am a Jew and I am doing this so that I can pay the Jizya". Hearing this the Caliph Umar took him by his hand to the Bayt al-Mal and decreed "In the name of Allah, you pay Jizya all your life and then you get betrayed when you reach old age." He ordered to provide that man pension and from that day it was so ordered for all Jews and Christians and others.

Political Administration

The basic administrative system of the Dar al-Islamiyyah (The House of Islam) was laid down in the days of the Prophet. Caliph Abu Bakr stated in his sermon when he was elected: "If I order any thing that would go against the order of Allah and his Messenger; then do not obey me". This is considered to be the foundation stone of the Caliphate. Caliph Umar has been reported to have said: "O Muslims, straighten me with your hands when I go wrong", and at that instance a Muslim man stood up and said "O Amir al-Mu'minin (Leader of the Believers) if you are not straightened by our hands we will use our sword to straighten you!". Hearing this Caliph Umar said "Alhamdulillah (Praise be to Allah) I have such followers."

In the administrative field Caliph Umar was the most brilliant among the Rashidun Caliphs, it was his dazzling administrative qualities because of which the most of the administrative structure of the empire was established. Under Caliph Abu Bakr, the empire was not clearly divided into provinces, though it had many administrative districts, like:

1. Mecca
2. Medina
3. Yemen
4. Bahrain



Mount Damavand, Iran's tallest mountain is located in Alborz mountain range.

had many administrative districts, though it

5. Iraq

Under Umar the Empire was divided into a number of provinces which were as follows:

1. Arabia was divided into two provinces, Mecca and Medina;
2. Iraq was divided into two provinces, Basra and Kufa;
3. the province of Jazira was created in the upper reaches of the Tigris and the Euphrates;
4. Syria was a province;
5. Palestine was divided in two provinces: Aylya and Ramlah;
6. Egypt was divided into two provinces: Upper Egypt and Lower Egypt;
7. Persia was divided into three provinces: Khorasan, Azarbaijan, and Fars.

In his testament, Caliph Umar had instructed his successor not to make any change in the administrative set up for one year after his death. Thus for one year Uthman maintained the pattern of political administration as it stood under Umar, however latter he made some amendments. Uthman made Egypt one province and created a new province comprising North Africa. Syria, previously divided into two provinces, also become a single division. During Uthman's reign the empire was divided into twelve provinces. These were:

1. Medina
2. Mecca
3. Yemen
4. Kufa
5. Basra
6. Jazira
7. Fars
8. Azerbaijan
9. Khorasan
10. Syria
11. Egypt
12. North Africa



Fars Province landscape

Caliph Ali, during his reign, with the exception of Syria (which was under Muawiyah I's control) and Egypt (that he lost during late years of his caliphate to the rebel troops of Amr ibn Al-A's), ruled the remaining ten provinces, which kept their administrative organization as under Caliph Uthman.

The provinces were further divided into districts. The over 100 districts of the empire, along with the main cities, were administered by a Governor or Wāli. Other officers at the provincial level were:

1. *Katib*, the Chief Secretary.
2. *Katib-ud-Diwan*, the Military Secretary.
3. *Sahib-ul-Kharaj*, the Revenue Collector.

4. *Sahib-ul-Ahdath*, the Police chief.
5. *Sahib-ul-Bait-ul-Mal*, the Treasury Officer.
6. *Qadi*, the Chief Judge.

In some districts there were separate military officers, though the Governor (*Wali*) was in most cases the Commander-in-chief of the army quartered in the province.

The officers were appointed by the Caliph. Every appointment was made in writing. At the time of appointment an instrument of instructions was issued with a view to regulating the conduct of Governors. On assuming office, the Governor was required to assemble the people in the main mosque, and read the instrument of instructions before them.^[21]

Umar's general instructions to his officers were:

“Remember, I have not appointed you as commanders and tyrants over the people. I have sent you as leaders instead, so that the people may follow your example. Give the Muslims their rights and do not beat them lest they become abused. Do not praise them unduly, lest they fall into the error of conceit. Do not keep your doors shut in their faces, lest the more powerful of them eat up the weaker ones. And do not behave as if you were superior to them, for that is tyranny over them.”

During the reign of Caliph Abu Bakr, the state was economically weak, while during Umar's reign because of increase in revenues and other sources of income, the state was on its way to economic prosperity. Hence Umar felt it necessary that the officers be treated in a strict way as to prevent the possible greed for money that may lead them to corruption. During his reign, at the time of appointment, every officer was required to make the oath:

1. That he would not ride a Turkic horse (*which was a symbol of pride*).
2. That he would not wear fine clothes.
3. That he would not eat sifted flour.
4. That he would not keep a porter at his door.
5. That he would always keep his door open to the public.



Moving sand dunes in Tadrart Acacus

Caliph Umar himself followed the above postulates strictly. During the reign of Uthman the state became more economically prosperous than ever before; the allowance of the citizens was increased by 25% and the economical condition of the ordinary person was more stable, which led Caliph Uthman to revoke the 2nd and 3rd postulates of the oath. At the time of appointment a complete inventory of all the possessions of the person concerned was prepared and kept in record. If there was an unusual increase in the possessions of the office holder, he was immediately called to account, and the unlawful property was confiscated by the State. The principal officers were required to come to Mecca on the occasion of the Hajj, during which people were free to present any complaint against them. In order to minimize the chances of corruption, Umar made it a point to pay high salaries to the staff. Provincial governors received as much as five to seven thousand dirham's annually besides their share of the spoils of war (if they were also the commander in chief of the army of their sector).

Department of accountability

A special office was established for the investigation of complaints that reached the Caliph, Caliph Umar was first to establish this department. It was for the investigation of the complaints against the officers of the State. The Department was under the charge of Muhammad ibn Maslamah, a man of undisputed integrity. In important cases Muhammad ibn Maslamah was deputed by Umar to proceed to the spot, investigate the charge and take action. Sometimes an Inquiry Commission was constituted to investigate the charge. Whenever the officers raised complaints against him, they were summoned to Medina, and the case was brought before the Caliph himself. Muhammad ibn Maslamah remained at the charge of this department until the death of Caliph Uthman.

Judicial Administration

As most of the administrative structure of the Rashidun Empire was setup by Umar, the judicial administration was also established by him and the other Caliphs followed the same system without any type of basic amendment in it. In order to provide adequate and speedy justice for the people, an effective system of judicial administration was set up, hereunder justice was administered according to the principles of Islam. Qadis (Judges) were appointed at all administrative levels for the administration of justice. Umar was the first ruler in history to separate judiciary from the executive. The Qadis were chosen for their integrity and learning in Islamic law. High salaries were fixed for the Qadis so that there was no temptation to bribery. Wealthy men and men of high social status were appointed as Qadis so that they might not have the temptation to take bribes, or be influenced by the social position of any body. The Qadis were not allowed to engage in trade. Judges were appointed in sufficient number, and there was no district which did not have a Qadi.

Electing or appointing a Caliph

Fred Donner, in his book *The Early Islamic Conquests* (1981), argues that the standard Arabian practice during the early Caliphates was for the prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for this shura, or consultative assembly. Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader, but they were not necessarily his sons. Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majority Sunni view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.

This argument is advanced by Sunni Muslims, who believe that Muhammad's companion Abu Bakr was elected by the community and that this was the proper procedure. They further argue that a caliph is ideally chosen by election or community consensus, even though the caliphate soon became a hereditary office, or the prize of the strongest general.

Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani has said that the leader of the Muslims simply should be from the majority. Abu Hanifa an-Nu'man also wrote that the leader must come from the majority.^[22]

Sunni belief

Following the death of Muhammad, a meeting took place at Saqifah. At that meeting, Abu Bakr was elected caliph by the Muslim community. Sunni Muslims developed the belief that the caliph is a temporal political ruler, appointed to rule within the bounds of Islamic law (Sharia). The job of adjudicating orthodoxy and Islamic law was left to Islamic lawyers, judiciary, or specialists individually termed as Mujtahids and collectively named the Ulema. The first four caliphs are called the Rashidun, meaning the Rightly Guided Caliphs, because they are believed to have followed the Qur'an and the sunnah (example) of Muhammad in all things.

Majlis al-Shura: Parliament

Traditional Sunni Islamic lawyers agree that *shura*, loosely translated as "consultation of the people", is a function of the caliphate. The Majlis al-Shura advise the caliph. The importance of this is premised by the following verses of the Qur'an:

"...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]"^[42:38]

"...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah"^[3:159]

The majlis is also the means to elect a new caliph. Al-Mawardi has written that members of the majlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, they must have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and must have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also said in emergencies when

there is no caliphate and no majlis, the people themselves should create a majlis, select a list of candidates for caliph, then the majlis should select from the list of candidates.^[22]

Some modern interpretations of the role of the Majlis al-Shura include those by Islamist author Sayyid Qutb and by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of a transnational political movement devoted to the revival of the Caliphate. In an analysis of the shura chapter of the Qur'an, Qutb argued Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually the elite), within the general context of God-made laws that the ruler must execute. Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, writes that Shura is important and part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate, "but not one of its pillars," and may be neglected without the Caliphate's rule becoming unislamic. Non-Muslims may serve in the majlis, though they may not vote or serve as an official.

Accountability of rulers

Sunni Islamic lawyers have commented on when it is permissible to disobey, impeach or remove rulers in the Caliphate. This is usually when the rulers are not meeting public responsibilities obliged upon them under Islam.

Al-Mawardi said that if the rulers meet their Islamic responsibilities to the public, the people must obey their laws, but if they become either unjust or severely ineffective then the Caliph or ruler must be impeached via the Majlis al-Shura. Similarly Al-Baghdadi believed that if the rulers do not uphold justice, the ummah via the majlis should give warning to them, and if unheeded then the Caliph can be impeached. Al-Juwayni argued that Islam is the goal of the ummah, so any ruler that deviates from this goal must be impeached. Al-Ghazali believed that oppression by a caliph is enough for impeachment. Rather than just relying on impeachment, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani obliged rebellion upon the people if the caliph began to act with no regard for Islamic law. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said that to ignore such a situation is *haraam*, and those who cannot revolt inside the caliphate should launch a struggle from outside. Al-Asqalani used two ayahs from the Qur'an to justify this:

"...And they (the sinners on qiyama) will say, 'Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and our chiefs, and they misled us from the right path. Our Lord! Give them (the leaders) double the punishment you give us and curse them with a very great curse'..."^[33:67-68]

Islamic lawyers commented that when the rulers refuse to step down via successful impeachment through the Majlis, becoming dictators through the support of a corrupt army, if the majority agree they have the option to launch a revolution against them. Many noted that this option is only exercised after factoring in the potential cost of life.^[22]

Rule of Law

The following hadith establishes the principle of rule of law in relation to nepotism and accountability^[23]

Narrated 'Aisha: The people of Quraish worried about the lady from Bani Makhzum who had committed theft. They asked, "Who will intercede for her with Allah's Apostle?" Some said, "No one dare to do so except Usama bin Zaid the beloved one to Allah's Apostle." When Usama spoke about that to Allah's Apostle Allah's Apostle said: "Do you try to intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah's Prescribed Punishments?" Then he got up and delivered a sermon saying, "What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would inflict Allah's Legal punishment on him. By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand."

Various Islamic lawyers do however place multiple conditions, and stipulations e.g. the poor cannot be penalised for stealing out of poverty, before executing such a law, making it very difficult to reach such a stage. It is well known during a time of drought in the Rashidun caliphate period, capital punishments were suspended until the effects of the drought passed.

Islamic jurists later formulated the concept of the rule of law, the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land, where no person is above the law and where officials and private citizens are under a duty to obey the

same law. A Qadi (Islamic judge) was also not allowed to discriminate on the grounds of religion, gender, colour, kinship or prejudice. There were also a number of cases where Caliphs had to appear before judges as they prepared to take their verdict.^[24]

According to Noah Feldman, a law professor at Harvard University, the legal scholars and jurists who once upheld the rule of law were replaced by a law governed by the state due to the codification of Sharia by the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century.^[25]

Economy

During the Rashidun Caliphate there was an economical boom in the lives of the ordinary people due to the revolutionary economic policies developed by Caliph Umar and his successor Caliph Uthman. At first it was Umar who introduced these reforms on strong bases, his successor Uthman who himself was an intelligent businessman, had further reformed it. During Uthman's reign the people of the empire enjoyed a prosperous life.

Bait-ul-Maal

Bait-ul-Maal, (literally, *The house of money*) was the department that dealt with the revenues and all other economical matters of the state. In the time of Muhammad there was no permanent Bait-ul-Mal or public treasury. Whatever revenues or other amounts were received were distributed immediately. There were no salaries to be paid, and there was no state expenditure. Hence the need for the treasury at public level was not felt. In the time of Abu Bakr as well there was not treasury. Abu Bakr earmarked a house where all money was kept on receipt. As all money was distributed immediately the treasury generally remained locked up. At the time of the death of Abu Bakr there was only one dirham in the public treasury.

Establishment of Bait-ul-Maal

In the time of Umar things changed. With the extension in conquests money came in larger quantities, Umar also allowed salaries to men fighting in the army. Abu Huraira who was the Governor of Bahrain sent a revenue of five hundred thousand dirhams. Umar summoned a meeting of his Consultative Assembly and sought the opinion of the Companions about the disposal of the money. Uthman ibn Affan advised that the amount should be kept for future needs. Walid bin Hisham suggested that like the Byzantines separate departments of Treasury and Accounts should be set up.

After consulting the Companions Umar decided to establish the Central Treasury at Madinah. Abdullah bin Arqam was appointed as the Treasury Officer. He was assisted by Abdur Rahman bin Awf and Muiqib. A separate Accounts Department was also set up and it was required to maintain record of all that was spent. Later provincial treasuries were set up in the provinces. After meeting the local expenditure the provincial treasuries were required to remit the surplus amount to the central treasury at Madinah. According to Yaqubi the salaries and stipends charged to the central treasury amounted to over 30 million dirhams.

A separate building was constructed for the royal treasury by the name *bait ul maal*, which in large cities was guarded by as many as 400 guards. In most of the historical accounts it states that among the Rashidun Caliphs Uthman ibn Affan was first to struck the coins, some accounts however states that Umar was first to do so. When Persia was conquered three types of coins were current in the conquered territories, namely Baghli of 8 dang; Tabari of 4 dang; and Maghribi of 3 dang. Umar (according to some accounts Uthman) made an innovation and struck an Islamic dirham of 6 dang.



The coins were of Persian origin, and had an image of the last Persian emperor, Muslim added the sentence *Bismillah* to it.

The concepts of welfare and pension were introduced in early Islamic law as forms of *Zakat* (charity), one of the Five Pillars of Islam, since the time of the Rashidun caliph Umar in the 7th century. The taxes (including *Zakat* and *Jizya*) collected in the treasury of an Islamic government were used to provide income for the needy, including the poor, elderly, orphans, widows, and the disabled. According to the Islamic jurist Al-Ghazali (Algazel, 1058–1111), the government was also expected to stockpile food supplies in every region in case a disaster or famine occurred. The Caliphate was thus one of the earliest welfare states.^{[26] [27]}

Economic resources of the State

The economic resources of the State were:

1. *Zakat*
2. *Ushr*
3. *Jazya*
4. *Fay*
5. *Khums*
6. *Kharaj*

- **Zakat**

Zakāt (Arabic: زكاة) is the Islamic concept of luxury tax. It was taken from the Muslims in the amount of 2.5% of their dormant wealth (over a certain amount unused for a year) for use in only specified categories. Only persons whose annual wealth exceeded a minimum level (nisab) were collected from. The Nisab does not include primary residence, primary transportation, moderate amount of women jewelry, etc. Zakāt is one of the Five Pillars of Islam and it is obligation on all Muslims who qualify as wealthy enough.

- **Jizya**

jizya or **jizyah** (Arabic: جِزْيَة; Ottoman Turkish: cizye). It was a per capita tax imposed on able bodied non-Muslim men of military age since non-Muslims did not have to pay Zakat. The tax was not supposed to be levied on slaves, women, children, monks, the old, the sick,^[28] hermits and the poor,^[29]. It is important to note that not only were some non-Muslims exempt (such as sick, old), they were also given stipends by the state when they were in need.

- **Fay**

Fay was the income from State land, whether an agricultural land or a meadow, or a land with any natural mineral reserves.

- **Khums**

Ghanimah or Khums was the booty captured on the occasion of war with the enemy. Four-fifth of the booty was distributed among the soldiers taking part in the war while one-fifth was credited to the State fund.

- **Kharaj**

kharaj was a tax on agricultural land. Initially, after the first Muslim conquests in the 7th century, *kharaj* usually denoted a lump-sum duty levied upon the conquered provinces and collected by the officials of the former Byzantine and Sassanid empire or, more broadly, any kind of tax levied by Muslim conquerors on their non-Muslim subjects, dhimmis. At that time, *kharaj* was synonymous with *jizyah*, which later emerged as a poll tax paid by dhimmis. Muslims landowners, on the other hand, paid only **ushr**, a religious tithe, which carried a much lower rate of taxation.^[30]

- **Ushr**

Ushr was a reciprocal ten per cent levy on agricultural land as well as merchandise imported from states that taxed the Muslims on their products. Caliph Umar was the first Muslim ruler to levy Ushr. Ushr as the name implies was an import duty levied at ten per cent on the value of goods imported. When the Muslim traders went to foreign lands for the purposes of trade they had to pay a ten per cent tax to the foreign states. Ushr was levied on reciprocal basis

on the goods of the traders of other countries who chose to trade in the Muslim dominions. Umar issued instructions that Ushr should be levied in such a way so as to avoid hardship, that it will not effect the trade activities in the Islamic empire. The tax was levied on merchandise meant for sale. Goods imported for consumption or personal use but not for sale were not taxed. The merchandise valued at two hundred dirhams or less was not taxed. When the citizens of the State imported goods for the purposes of trade, they had to pay the customs duty or import tax at lower rates. In the case of the Dhimmis the rate was five per cent and in the case of the Muslims 2.5 per cent. In the case of the Muslims the rate was the same as that of Zakat. The levy was thus regarded as a part of Zakat and was not considered a separate tax.

Allowance

Beginning of Allowance

After the Battle of Yarmouk and Battle of al-Qadisiyyah the Muslims won heavy spoils. The coffers at Medina became full to the brim and the problem before Umar was as to what should be done with this money. Some one suggested that money should be kept in the treasury for the purposes of public expenditure only. This view was not acceptable to the general body of the Muslims. Consensus was reached on the point that whatever was received during a year should be distributed.

The next question that arose for consideration was as to what system should be adopted for distribution. One suggestion was that it should be distributed on ad hoc basis and whatever was received should be equally distributed. Against this view it was felt that as the spoils were considerable that would make the people very rich. It was therefore decided that instead of ad hoc division the amount of the allowance to the stipend should be determined before hand and this allowance should be paid to the person concerned regardless of the amount of the spoils. This was agreed to.

About the fixation of the allowance there were two opinions. There were some who held that the amount of the allowance for all Muslims should be the same. Umar did not agree with this view. He held that the allowance should be graded according to one's merit with reference to Islam.

Then the question arose as to what basis should be used for placing some above others. Suggested that a start should be made with the Caliph and he should get the highest allowance. Umar rejected the proposal and decided to start with the clan of the Muhammad.

Umar set up a Committee to compile a list of persons in nearness to Muhammad. The Committee produced the list clan wise. Bani Hashim appeared as the first clan. Then the clan of Abu Bakr was put and in the third place the clan of Umar was put. Umar accepted the first two placements but delegated his clan lower down in the scale with reference to nearness in relationship to Muhammad.

The members of the clan of Umar objected to the order of Umar but he rebuked them saying;

“You desire that you should stand on my neck and deprive me of my good deeds. I cannot permit that.”

In the final scale of allowance that was approved by Umar the main provisions were:

1. The widows of Mohammad received 12,000 dirhams each;
2. `Abbas ibn `Abd al-Muttalib, the uncle of the Mohammad received an annual allowance of 7,000 dirhams;
3. The grandsons of the Muhammad, Hasan ibn Ali and Hussain ibn Ali got 5,000 dirhams each;
4. The veterans of Battle of Badr got an allowance of 6,000 dirhams each;
5. Those who had become Muslims by the time of the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah got 4,000 dirhams each;
6. Those who became Muslims at the time of the Conquest of Mecca got 3,000 dirhams each;
7. The veterans of the Apostasy wars got 3,000 dirhams each.
8. The veterans of Battle of Yarmouk and Battle of al-Qadisiyyah got 2,000 dirhams each.

In announcing this scale Umar said:

“I have decided the scale according to merit by entry into Islam and not by position.”

In this award Umar's son Abdullah ibn Umar got an allowance of 3,000 dirhams. On the other hand Usama ibn Zaid got 4,000. Abdullah objected to this distinction and Umar said:

“I have given Usama more than you because he was dearer to Muhammad than you and his father was dearer to the Prophet than your father.”

The ordinary Muslim citizens got the allowance between 2,500 - 2000. The regular annual allowance was given only to the urban population, because they formed the backbone of the state's economic resources. The budoein living in the desert, cutting off from the states affairs having no contributions in the developments were given stipends very often. On assuming office, Caliph Uthman ibn Affan increased these stipends by 25 per cent.

Evaluation

That was an economic measure which contributed to the prosperity of the people at lot. The citizens of the Islamic empire became increasingly prosperous as trade activities increased. In turn, they contributed to the department of *bait al maal* and more and more revenues were collected.

Welfare works

The mosques were not mere places for offering prayers; these were community centers as well where the faithful gathered to discuss problems of social and cultural importance. During the caliphate of Umar as many as four thousand mosques were constructed extending from Persia in the east to Egypt in the west. The Masjid-e-Nabawi and al-Masjid al-Haram were enlarged first during the reign of Umar and then during the reign of Uthman ibn Affan who not only extended to many thousand square meters but also beautified them on a large scale. During the caliphate of Umar many new cities were founded. These included Kufa, Basra, and Fustat. These cities were laid in according with the principles of town planning. All streets in these cities led to the Friday mosque which was sited in the center of the city. Markets were established at convenient points, which were under the control of market officers who was supposed to check the affairs of market and quality of goods. The cities were divided into quarters, and each quarter was reserved for particular tribes. During the reign of Caliph Umar, there were restrictions on the building of palatial buildings by the rich and elites, this was symbolic of the egalitarian society of Islam, where under all were equal, although the restrictions was latter revoked by Caliph Uthman, because of the financial prosperity of ordinary men, and the construction of double story building was permitted, as a result many palatial buildings were constructed though out the empire, Uthman himself built a huge palace for himself in Madinah which was famous by the name *Al-Zawar*, he constructed it from his personal resources. Many buildings were built for administrative purposes. In the quarters called **Dar-ul-Amarat** Government offices and houses for the residence of officers were provided. Buildings known as **Diwans** were constructed for the keeping of official records. Buildings known as **Bait-ul-Mal** were constructed to house royal treasuries. For the lodging of persons suffering sentences as punishment, Jails were constructed for the first time in Muslim history. In important cities Guest Houses were constructed to serve as rest houses for traders and merchants coming from far away places. Roads and bridges were constructed for public use. On the road from Medina to Mecca, shelters, wells, and meal houses were constructed at every stage for the ease of the people who came for hajj. Military cantonments were constructed at strategic points. Special stables were provided for cavalry. These stables could accommodate as many as 4,000 horses. Special pasture grounds were provided and maintained for *Bait-ul-Mal* animals. Canals were dug to irrigate fields as well as provide drinking water for the people. **Abu Musa canal** (*after the name of governor of Basra Abu-Musa al-Asha'ari*) it was a nine mile (14 km) long, canal which brought water from the Tigris to Basra. Another canal known as

Maqal canal was also dug from the Tigris. A canal known as the **Amir al-Mu'minin canal** (*after the title Amir al-Mu'minin that was assumed by Caliph Umar*) was dug to join the Nile to the Red Sea. During the famine of 639 food grains were brought from Egypt to Arabia through this canal from the sea which saved the lives of millions of inhabitants of Arabia. **Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas canal** (*After the name of governor of Kufa Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas*) dug from the Euphrates brought water to Anbar. 'Amr ibn al-'As the Governor of Egypt, during the reign of Caliph Umar, even proposed the digging of a canal to join the Mediterranean to Red Sea. The proposal, however, did not materialize due to unknown reasons, and it was 1200 years later that such a canal was dug in the shape of the Suez Canal. Shuaibia was the port for Makkah. It was inconvenient. Caliph Uthman selected Jeddah as the site of the new seaport, and a new port was built there. Uthman also reformed the department of Police in cities.

Army

The Rashidun Army was the primary military body of the Islamic armed forces of the 7th century, serving alongside the Rashidun Navy. The Rashidun Army maintained a very high level of discipline, strategic prowess, organization along with motivation and self initiative of the officer corps. For much of its history this army was one of the most powerful and effective military forces in all of the region. At the height of the Rashidun Caliphate the maximum size of the army was around 100,000 troops.^[31] The Rashidun army was divided into the two basic categories of infantry and light cavalry. Reconstructing the military equipment of early Muslim armies is problematic. Compared with Roman armies or later medieval Muslim armies, the range of visual representation is very small, often imprecise and difficult to date. Physically very little material evidence has survived and again, much of it is difficult to date.^[32] The soldiers used to wear Iron and bronze segmented helmet that comes from Iraq and was of central Asian type.^[33] The standard form of protective body armor was chain mail. There are also references to the practice of wearing two coats of mail (*dir'ayn*), the one under the main one being shorter or even made of fabric or leather. Hauberks and large wooden or wickerwork shields were used as a protection in combat^[32]. The soldiers were usually equipped with Swords that were hanged in baldric. They also possessed spears and daggers.^[34] Caliph Umar was the first Muslim ruler to organize the army as a State Department. This reform was introduced in 637. A beginning was made with the Quraish and the Ansar and the system was gradually extended to the whole of Arabia and to Muslims of conquered lands. The basic strategy of early Muslim armies sent out to conquer foreign lands was to exploit every possible weakness of the enemy army in order to achieve victory. Their key strength was mobility. The cavalry had both horses and camels. The camels were used as both transport and food for long marches through the desert (Khalid bin Walid's extraordinary march from the Persian border to Damascus utilized camels as both food and transport). The cavalry was the army's main striking force and also served as a strategic mobile reserve. The common tactic used was to use the infantry and archers to engage and maintain contact with the enemy forces while the cavalry was held back till the enemy was fully engaged. Once fully engaged the enemy reserves were absorbed by the infantry and archers the Muslim cavalry was used as pincers (like modern tank and mechanized divisions) to attack the enemy from the sides or to attack enemy base camps. The Rashidun army was quality-wise and strength-wise bellow standard versus the Sassanid Persian army and the Byzantine army. Khalid ibn Walid was the first general of the Rashidun Caliphate to conquer foreign lands and to trigger the whole scale deposition of the two most powerful empires. During his campaign against the Sassanid Persian Empire (*Iraq 633 - 634*) and the Byzantine Empire (*Syria 634 - 638*) Khalid developed brilliant tactics, that he used effectively against both the Sassanid army and the Byzantine army. The Caliph Abu Bakr's way was to give his generals their mission, the geographical area in which that mission would be carried out, and the resources that, could be made available for that purpose. He would then leave it to his generals to accomplish their mission in whatever manner they chose. On the other hand Caliph Umar in the latter part of his Caliphate use to direct his generals as to where they would stay and when to move to the next target and who will be commanding the left and right wing of the army in the particular battle. This made the phase of conquest comparatively slower but provided well organized campaigns. Caliph Uthman used the same method as Abu Bakr: he would give missions to his generals and then leave it to them how they should accomplish it. Caliph Ali also followed the same method.

Religion

The state religion was Islam. The non-Muslim people were nominally allowed to practice whichever religion they wanted to follow. The Sharia Law was exercised by the state, and nominally extended only to Muslims, but in reality had jurisdiction over non-Muslims who had committed offenses against the Muslim community.

Islam was the guiding force of the Caliphate. Any act of state was first to be approved by the Qur'ān and the Traditions of Prophet Muhammed. If there were no such guidelines available, then wisdom or Hikmat was used, after which if the act would go against the established principals, norms, system etc., it was not carried on with. Christians and Jews were - and are - considered People of the Book (Arabic: *أهل الكتاب* 'Ahl al-Kitāb), an Islamic term and legal status afforded to adherents of the other Abrahamic religions.



This copy of the Qur'ān is believed to be the oldest one, compiled during Caliph Uthman's reign.

See also

- Rashidun Caliphs
- Rashidun army
- Abu Bakr
- Umar
- Uthman
- Ali
- Ridda wars
- First Fitna
- The Four Companions
- The Ten Promised Paradise

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Umayyad

The **Umayyad Caliphate** (Arabic: **دولة أمويّ**, *Banu Umayyah*) was the second of the four Islamic caliphates established after the death of Muhammad. It was ruled by the Umayyad dynasty, whose name derives from Umayya ibn Abd Shams, the great-grandfather of the first Umayyad caliph. Although the Umayyad family originally came from the city of Mecca, Damascus was the capital of their Caliphate. Eventually, it would cover more than five million square miles, making it one of the largest empires the world had yet seen,^[1] and the fifth largest contiguous empire ever to exist. After the Umayyads were overthrown by the Abbasid Caliphate, they fled across North Africa to Al-Andalus, where they established the Caliphate of Córdoba, which lasted until 1031.

Origins

History of the Islamic Arab States

According to tradition, the Umayyad family (also known as the Banu Abd-Shams) and Muhammad both descended from a common ancestor, Abd Manaf ibn Qusai and they are originally from the city of Mecca. Muhammad descended from Abd Manāf via his son Hashim, while the Umayyads descended from Abd Manaf via a different son, Abd-Shams, whose son was Umayya. The two families are therefore considered to be different clans (those of Hashim and of Umayya, respectively) of the same tribe (that of the Quraish). However Shia historians point out that Umayya was an adopted son of Abd Shams so he was not a blood relative of Abd Manaf ibn Qusai. Umayya was later discarded from the noble family.^[2]

While the Umayyads and the Hashimites may have had bitterness between the two clans before Muhammad, the rivalry turned into a severe case of tribal animosity after the Battle of Badr. The battle saw three top leaders of the Umayyad clan (Utba ibn Rabi'ah, Walid ibn Utba and Shaybah) killed by Hashimites (Ali, Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib and Ubaydah) in a three-on-three melee.^[3] This fueled the opposition of Abu Sufyan ibn Harb, the grandson of Umayya, to Muhammad and to Islam. Abu Sufyan sought to exterminate the



Dome of the Rock built by Umayyad caliph



Great Mosque of Córdoba in Spain built by Banu Ummaya

adherents of the new religion by waging another battle with Muslims based in Medina only a year after the Battle of Badr. He did this to avenge the defeat at Badr. The Battle of Uhud is generally believed by scholars to be a defeat for the Muslims, as they had incurred greater losses than the Meccans. After the battle, Abu Sufyan's wife Hind, who was also the daughter of Utba ibn Rabi'ah is reported to have cut open the corpse of Hamza, taking out his liver which she then attempted to eat.^[4] Within five years of the Battle of Uhud however, Muhammad took control of Mecca^[5] and announced a general amnesty for all. Impressed by this show of magnanimity, Abu Sufyan, embraced Islam on the eve of the conquest of Mecca, as did his son (the future caliph Muawiyah I) and his wife Hind. The Conquest of Mecca while overwhelming for the Umayyads for the time being, further fueled their hatred towards the Hashmites; this would later result in battles between Muawiyah I and Ali and then killing of Husayn ibn Ali along with his family and a few friends on the orders of Yazid ibn Muawiyah at the Battle of Karbala.^[6]

Most historians consider Caliph Muawiyah (661-80) to have been the second ruler of the Umayyad dynasty, even though he was the first to assert the Umayyads' right to rule on a dynastic principle. It was really the caliphate of Uthman Ibn Affan (644-656), a member of Umayyad clan himself, that witnessed the revival and then the ascendancy of the Umayyad clan to the corridors of power. Uthman, during his reign, placed some of the notorious members of his clan at prominent and strong positions throughout the state. Most notable was the appointment of Marwan ibn al-Hakam, Uthman's first cousin, as his top advisor, which created a stir amongst the companions of Muhammad, as Marwan along with his father Al-Hakam ibn Abi al-'As had been permanently exiled from Medina by Muhammad during his life time. Uthman also appointed Walid ibn Uqba, Uthman's half-brother, as the governor of Kufah, who allegedly led prayer while under the influence of alcohol.^[7] Uthman also consolidated Muawiyah's Governorship of Syria by granting him control over a larger area^[8] and appointed his foster brother Abdullah ibn Saad as the Governor of Egypt. However, since Uthman never named an heir, he cannot be considered the founder of a dynasty.

After the assassination of Uthman in 656, Ali, a member of the Hashimite clan and a cousin of Muhammad, was elected as the caliph. He soon met with resistance from several factions, instigated primarily by Muawiyah. To avoid any blood shed in the holy city, Ali moved his capital from Medina to Kufa. The resulting conflict, which lasted from 656 until 661, is known as the First Fitna ("time of trial").

Ali was first opposed by an alliance led by Aisha, the wife of Muhammad, and Talhah and Al-Zubayr, two of the companions of Muhammad. The two sides clashed at the Battle of the Camel in 656, where Ali won a decisive victory.

Following this battle, Ali fought a battle against Muawiyah, known as the Battle of Siffin. For reasons that remain obscure,^[9] the battle was stopped before either side had achieved victory, and the two parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute. Both the terms and the result of the arbitration, however, are subjects of contradictory and sometimes confused reports.

Following the battle, a large group of Ali's soldiers, who resented his decision to submit the dispute to arbitration, broke away from Ali's force, rallying under the slogan, "arbitration belongs to God alone." This group came to be known as the Kharijites ("those who leave").

In 659 Ali's forces and the Kharijites met in the Battle of Nahrawan. Although Ali won the battle, the constant conflict had begun to affect his standing, and in the following years some Syrians seem to have acclaimed Muawiyah as a rival caliph.

Ali was assassinated in 661, apparently by a Kharijite partisan. Muawiyah marched to Kufa, where he persuaded a number of Ali's supporters to acclaim him as caliph instead of Ali's son, Hasan. Following his elevation, Muawiyah moved the capital of the caliphate to Damascus. Syria would remain the base of Umayyad power until the end of the dynasty in 750 AD. However, this Dynasty became reborn in Cordoba (Al Andalus, today's Portugal and Spain) in the form of an Emirate and then a Caliphate, lasting until 1031 AD. Muslim rule continued in Iberia for another 500 years in several forms: Taifas, Berber kingdoms, and under the Kingdom of Granada until the 16th century AD.

In the year 712, Muhammad bin Qasim, an Umayyad general sailed from the khaleej into Sindh and conquered both the Sindh and the Punjab regions along the Indus river. The conquest of Sindh and Punjab were major gains for the Umayyad Caliphate.


During the later period of its existence and particularly from 1031 AD under the Ta'ifa system of Islamic Emirates (Princdoms) in the southern half of Iberia, the Emirate/Sultanate of Granada maintained its independence largely due to the payment of Tributes to the northern Christian Kingdoms which began to gradually expand south at its expense from 1031.

Muslim rule in Iberia came to an end on January 2, 1492 with the conquest of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada. The last Muslim ruler of Granada, Muhammad XII, better known as Boabdil, surrendered his kingdom to Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile, the Catholic Monarchs, los Reyes Católicos.

History

Sufyanids

Muawiyah's personal dynasty, the "Sufyanids" (descendants of Abu Sufyan), reigned from 661 to 684, until his grandson Muawiyah II. The reign of Muawiyah I was marked by internal security and external expansion. On the internal front, only one major rebellion is recorded, that of Hujr ibn Adi in Kufa. Hujr ibn Adi supported the claims of the descendants of Ali to the caliphate, but his movement was easily suppressed by the governor of Iraq, Ziyad ibn Abi Sufyan.



Muawiyah also encouraged peaceful coexistence with the Christian communities of Syria, and one of his closest advisers was Sarjun, the father of John of Damascus. At the same time, he waged unceasing war against the Byzantine Empire. During his reign, Rhodes and Crete were occupied, and several assaults were launched against Constantinople. Muawiyah also oversaw military expansion in North Africa (the foundation of Kairouan) and in Central Asia (the conquest of Kabul, Bukhara, and Samarkand).

Following Muawiyah's death in 680, he was succeeded by his son, Yazid I. The hereditary accession of Yazid was opposed by a number of prominent Muslims, most notably Abd-Allah ibn al-Zubayr, son of one of the companions of Muhammad, and Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of Muhammad and younger son of Ali. The resulting conflict is known as the Second Fitna.

In 680 Ibn al-Zubayr and Husayn fled Medina for Mecca. While Ibn al-Zubayr would stay in Mecca until his death, Husayn decided to travel on to Kufa to rally support. However, on the instructions of Yazid, a large Umayyad army (traditions mention 70,000) intercepted and mercilessly slaughtered Husayn, his family members and companions at the Battle of Karbala. Husayn and his party numbered 128 including women, children and the elderly. 73 were killed including Husayn and his infant son of six months.

Following the death of Husayn, Ibn al-Zubayr, although remaining in Mecca, was associated with two opposition movements, one centered in Medina and the other around Kharijites in Basra and Arabia. In 683, Yazid dispatched an army to subdue both. This army suppressed the Medinese opposition at the Battle of al-Harra, and continued on to lay siege to Mecca. At some point during the siege, the Kaaba was badly damaged in a fire. The destruction of the

Kaaba became a major cause for censure of the Umayyads in later histories of the period.

Yazid died while the siege was still in progress, and the Umayyad army returned to Damascus, leaving Ibn al-Zubayr in control of Mecca. Yazid was succeeded at first by his son, Muawiya II (683-84), but he seems never to have been recognized as caliph outside of Syria. Two factions developed within Syria: the Confederation of Qays, who supported Ibn al-Zubayr, and the Quda'a, who supported Marwan, a descendant of Umayya via Wa'il ibn Umayyah. The partisans of Marwan triumphed at a battle at Marj Rahit, near Damascus, in 684, and Marwan became caliph shortly thereafter.

First Marwanids

Marwan's first task was to assert his authority against the rival claims of Ibn al-Zubayr, who was at this time recognized as caliph throughout most of the Islamic world. Marwan recaptured Egypt for the Umayyads, but died in 685, having reigned for only nine months.

Marwan was succeeded by his son, Abd al-Malik (685-705), who reconsolidated Umayyad control of the caliphate. The early reign of Abd al-Malik was marked by the revolt of Al-Mukhtar, which was based in Kufa. Al-Mukhtar hoped to elevate Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, another son of Ali, to the caliphate, although Ibn al-Hanafiyyah himself may have had no connection to the revolt. The troops of al-Mukhtar engaged in battles both with the Umayyads, in 686, at the river Khazir near Mosul: an Umayyad defeat, and with Ibn al-Zubayr, in 687, at which time the revolt of al-Mukhtar was crushed. In 691, Umayyad troops reconquered Iraq, and in 692 the same army captured Mecca. Ibn al-Zubayr was killed in the attack.



Coin of the Umayyad Caliphate, based on a Sassanian prototype, 695 CE.

The second major event of the early reign of Abd al-Malik was the construction of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. Although the chronology remains somewhat uncertain, the building seems to have been completed in 692, which means that it was under construction during the conflict with Ibn al-Zubayr. This had led some historians, both medieval and modern, to suggest that the Dome of the Rock was built to rival the Kaaba, which was under the control of Ibn al-Zubayr, as a destination for pilgrimage.

Abd al-Malik is credited with centralizing the administration of the caliphate, and with establishing Arabic as its official language. He also introduced a uniquely Muslim coinage, marked by its aniconic decoration, which supplanted the Byzantine and Sasanian coins that had previously been in use.

Following Abd al-Malik's death, his son, Al-Walid I (705-15) became caliph. Al-Walid was also active as a builder, sponsoring the construction of Al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina and the Great Mosque of Damascus.

A major figure during the reigns of both al-Walid and Abd al-Malik was the Umayyad governor of Iraq, Al-Hajjaj bin Yousef. Many Iraqis

remained resistant to Umayyad rule, and al-Hajjaj imported Syrian troops to maintain order, whom he housed in a new garrison town, Wasit. These troops became crucial in the suppression of a revolt led by an Iraqi general, Ibn al-Ash'ath, in the early eighth century.

Al-Walid was succeeded by his brother, Sulayman (715-17), whose reign was dominated by a protracted siege of Constantinople. The failure of the siege marked the end of serious Arab ambitions against the Byzantine capital. However, the first two decades of the eighth century witnessed the continuing expansion of the caliphate, which pushed into the Iberian Peninsula in the west, and into Central Asia and northern India in the east.

Sulayman was succeeded by his cousin, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (717-20), whose position among the Umayyad caliphs is somewhat unique. He is the only Umayyad ruler to have been recognized by subsequent Islamic tradition as a genuine caliph (*khalifa*) and not merely as a worldly king (*malik*).



Coin of the Umayyad Caliphate, based on a Sassanian prototype, copper falus, Aleppo, Syria, circa 695 CE.

Umar is honored for his attempt to resolve the fiscal problems attendant upon conversion to Islam. During the Umayyad period, the majority of people living within the caliphate were not Muslim, but Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, or otherwise. These religious communities were not forced to convert to Islam, but were subject to a tax (*jizyah*) which was not imposed upon Muslims. This situation may actually have made widespread conversion to Islam undesirable from the point of view of state revenue, and there are reports that provincial governors actively discouraged such conversions. It is not clear how Umar attempted to resolve this situation, but the sources portray him as having insisted on like treatment of Arab and non-Arab (mawali) Muslims, and on the removal of obstacles to the conversion of non-Arabs to Islam.

After the death of Umar, another son of Abd al-Malik, Yazid II (720-24) became caliph. Yazid is best known for his "iconoclastic edict", which ordered the destruction of Christian images within the territory of the caliphate. In 720, another major revolt arose in Iraq, this time led by Yazid ibn al-Muhallab.

Hisham and the limits of military expansion

The final son of Abd al-Malik to become caliph was Hisham (724-43), whose long and eventful reign was above all marked by the curtailment of military expansion.

Hisham established his court at Resafa in northern Syria, which was closer to the Byzantine border than Damascus, and resumed hostilities against the Byzantines, which had lapsed following the failure of the last siege of Constantinople. The new campaigns resulted in a number of successful raids into Anatolia, but also in a major defeat (the Battle of Akroinon), and did not lead to any significant territorial expansion.

Hisham's reign furthermore witnessed the end of expansion in the west, following the defeat of the Arab army by the Franks at the Battle of Tours in 732. In 739 a major Berber Revolt broke out in North Africa, which was subdued only with difficulty.

Hisham suffered still worse defeats in the east, where his armies attempted to subdue both Tokharistan, with its center at Balkh, and Transoxiana, with its center at Samarkand. Both areas had already been partially conquered, but remained difficult to govern.

Once again, a particular difficulty concerned the question of the conversion of non-Arabs, especially the Sogdians of Transoxiana. Ashras ibn 'Abd Allah al-Sulami, governor of Khorasan, promised tax relief to those Sogdians who converted to Islam, but went back on his offer when it proved too popular and threatened to reduce tax revenues. In 734, al-Harith ibn Surayj led a revolt on behalf of the Sogdians, capturing Balkh but failing to take Merv. After this defeat, al-Harith's movement seems to have been dissolved, but the problem of the rights of non-Arab Muslims would continue to plague the Umayyads.



North gate of the city of Resafa, site of Hisham's palace and court.

Third Fitna



Fresco from the palace of Qusayr Amra, possibly built by Al-Walid II, depicting a concubine. Umayyad harems maintained concubines who were trained in vocal arts and dances

Hisham was succeeded by Al-Walid II (743-44), the son of Yazid II. Al-Walid is reported to have been more interested in earthly pleasures than in religion, a reputation that may be confirmed by the decoration of the so-called "desert palaces" (including Qusayr Amra and Khirbat al-Mafjar) that have been attributed to him. He quickly attracted the enmity of many, both by executing a number of those who had opposed his accession, and by persecuting the Qadariyya.

In 744, Yazid III, a son of al-Walid I, was proclaimed caliph in Damascus, and his army tracked down and killed al-Walid II. Yazid III has received a certain reputation for piety, and may have been sympathetic to the Qadariyya. He died a mere six months into his reign.


Yazid had appointed his brother, Ibrahim, as his successor, but Marwan II (744-50), the grandson of Marwan I, led an army from the northern frontier and entered Damascus in December of 744, where he was proclaimed caliph. Marwan immediately moved the capital north to Harran, in present-day Turkey. A rebellion soon broke out in Syria, perhaps due to resentment over the relocation of the capital, and in 746 Marwan razed the walls of Homs and Damascus in retaliation.

Marwan also faced significant opposition from Kharijites in Iraq and Iran, who put forth first Dahhak ibn Qays and then Abu Dulaf as rival caliphs. In 747, Marwan managed to reestablish control of Iraq, but by this time a more serious threat had arisen in Khorasan.


Insurrection

The Hashimiyya movement (a sub-sect of the Kaysanites Shia), led by the Abbasid family, overthrew the Umayyad caliphate. The Abbasids were members of the Hashim clan, rivals of the Umayyads, but the word "Hashimiyya" seems to refer specifically to Abu Hashim, a grandson of Ali and son of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya. According to certain traditions, Abu Hashim died in 717 in Humeima in the house of Muhammad ibn Ali, the head of the Abbasid family, and before dying named Muhammad ibn Ali as his successor. This tradition allowed the Abbasids to rally the supporters of the failed revolt of Mukhtar, who had represented themselves as the supporters of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya.

Beginning around 719, Hashimiyya missions began to seek adherents in Khurasan. Their campaign was framed as one of proselytism (dawah). They sought support for a "member of the family" of Muhammad, without making explicit mention of the Abbasids. These missions met with success both among Arabs and non-Arabs (mawali), although the latter may have played a particularly important role in the growth of the movement.



Ivory (circa 8th century) discovered in the Abbasid homestead in Humeima, Jordan. The style indicates an origin in north-eastern Iran, the base of Hashimiyya military power.^[10]




Map of the world in 750 AD before the Battle of the Zab, which caused the fall of the dynasty.

Around 746, Abu Muslim assumed leadership of the Hashimiyya in Khurasan. In 747, he successfully initiated an open revolt against Umayyad rule, which was carried out under the sign of the black flag. He soon established control of Khurasan, and dispatched an army westwards. Kufa fell to the Hashimiyya in 749, and in November of the same year Abu al-Abbas was recognized as the new caliph in the mosque at Kufa.

At this point Marwan mobilized his troops from Harran and advanced toward Iraq. In January of 750 the two forces met in the Battle of the Zab, and the Umayyads were defeated. Damascus fell to the Abbasids in April, and in August Marwan was killed in Egypt.

The victors desecrated the tombs of the Umayyads in Syria, sparing only that of Umar II, and most of the remaining members of the Umayyad family were tracked down and killed. One grandson of Hisham, Abd ar-Rahman I, survived and established a kingdom in Al-Andalus (Moorish Iberia), proclaiming his family to be the Umayyad Caliphate revived.



Previté-Orton argues that the reasons for the decline of the Umayyads was the rapid expansion of Islam. During Umayyad period, mass conversions brought Persians, Berbers, Copts, and Aramaics to Islam. These *mawalis* (clients) were often better educated and more civilised than their Arab masters. The new converts, on the basis of equality of all Muslims, transformed the political landscape. Previté-Orton also argues that the feud between Syria and Iraq, further weakened the empire.^[11]

Umayyad Administration

Central Diwans

To assist the Caliph in administration there were six Boards at the Centre: Diwan al-Kharaj (the Board of Revenue), Diwan al-Rasa'il (the Board of Correspondence), Diwan al-Khatam (the Board of Signet), Diwan al-Barid (the Board of Posts), Diwan al-Qudat (Board of Justice) and Diwan al-Jund (the Military Board)

Diwan al-Kharaj

The Central Board of Revenue administered the entire finance of the empire, it also imposed and collected taxes and disbursed revenue.

Diwan al-Rasa'il

A regular Board of Correspondence was established under the Umayyads. It issued state missives and circulars to the Central and Provincial Officers. It co-ordinated the work of all Boards and dealt with all correspondence as the chief secretariat.

Diwan al-Khatam

In order to check forgery Diwan al-Khatam (Bureau of Registry) a kind of state chancellery was instituted by Mu'awiyah. It used to make and preserve a copy of each official document before sealing and despatching the original to its destination. Thus in the course of time a state archive developed in Damascus by the Umayyads under Abd al-Malik. This department survived till the middle of the Abbasid period.

Diwan al-Barid

Mu'awiyah introduced postal service. Abd al-Malik extended it throughout his empire and Walid made full use of it. The Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik developed a regular postal service. Umar bin Abdul-Aziz developed it further by building caravanserais at stages along the Khurasan highway. Relays of horses were used for the conveyance of dispatches between the caliph and his agents and officials posted in the provinces. The main highways were divided into stages of 12 miles (19 km) each and each stage had horses, donkeys or camels ready to carry the post. Primarily the service met the needs of Government officials but travellers and their important dispatches were also benefitted by the system. For swift transport of troops also the postal carriages were used. They were able to carry fifty to a hundred men at a time. Under it Governor Yusuf bin Umar, the postal department of Iraq cost 4,000,000 dirhams a year.

Diwan al-Qudat

In the early period of Islam justice was administered by Muhammad and the orthodox Caliphs in person. After the expansion of the Islamic State Umar al-Faruq had to separate judiciary from the general administration and appointed the first qadi in Egypt as early as 23H/643AD. After 661AD a series of judges succeeded one after another in Egypt under the Umayyad Caliphs, Hisham and Walid II.

Diwan al-Jund

The Diwan of Umar(rali) assigning annuities to all Arabs and to the Muslim soldiers of other races underwent a change in the hands of the Umayyads. The Umayyads meddled with the register and the recipients regarded pensions as the subsistence allowance even without being in active service. Hisham reformed it and paid only to those who participated in battle. On the pattern of the Byzantine system the umayyads reformed their army organization in general and divided it into five corps: the centre, two wings, vanguards and rearguards while on march or in a battle field following the same formation. Marwan II (740-50) abandoned the old division and introduced Kurdus (cohort) a small compact body. The Umayyad troops were divided into three divisions: infantry, cavalry and artillery. Arab troops were dressed and armed in Greek fashion. The Umayyad cavalry used plain and round saddles. The artillery used arradah (ballista), manjaniq (the mangonel) and dabbabah or kabsh (the battering ram). The heavy engines, siege machines and baggage were carried on camels behind the army.

Legacy

Historical significance

History of the Levant
Stone Age
Kebaran culture · Natufian culture Halafian culture · Ghassulian culture · Jericho
Ancient history
Sumerians · Ebla · Akkadian Empire Canaan · Phoenicians · Amorites Aramaeans · Edomites · Hittites Nabataeans · Palmyra · Philistines Israel and Judah Assyrian Empire · Babylonian Empire Achaemenid Empire · Seleucid Empire Hasmonean kingdom Roman Empire · Byzantine Empire
Middle Ages

Rashidun · Umayyads Abbasids · Fatimids Crusades · Ayyubids · Mamluks
Modern history
Ottoman Empire British Mandate of Palestine Cyprus Syria · Lebanon · Jordan · Iraq Israel · Palestinian territories

The Umayyad caliphate was marked both by territorial expansion and by the administrative and cultural problems that such expansion created. Despite some notable exceptions, the Umayyads tended to favor the rights of the old Arab families, and in particular their own, over those of newly converted Muslims (*mawali*). Therefore they held to a less universalist conception of Islam than did many of their rivals. As G.R. Hawting has written, "Islam was in fact regarded as the property of the conquering aristocracy."^[12]

According to one common view, the Umayyads transformed the caliphate from a religious institution (during the *rashidun*) to a dynastic one.^[13] However, the Umayyad caliphs do seem to have understood themselves as the representatives of God on earth, and to have been responsible for the "definition and elaboration of God's ordinances, or in other words the definition or elaboration of Islamic law."^[14]

During the period of the Umayyads, Arabic became the administrative language. State documents and currency were issued in the language. Mass conversions brought a large influx of Muslims to the caliphate. The Umayyads also constructed famous buildings such as the Dome of the Rock at Jerusalem, and the Umayyad Mosque at Damascus.^[13]

The Umayyads have met with a largely negative reception from later Islamic historians, who have accused them of promoting a kingship (*mulk*, a term with connotations of tyranny) instead of a true caliphate (*khilafa*). In this respect it is notable that the Umayyad caliphs referred to themselves, not as *khalifat rasul Allah* ("successor of the messenger of God", the title preferred by the tradition) but rather as *khalifat Allah* ("deputy of God"). The distinction seems to indicate that the Umayyads "regarded themselves as God's representatives at the head of the community and saw no need to share their religious power with, or delegate it to, the emergent class of religious scholars."^[15]

In fact, it was precisely this class of scholars, based largely in Iraq, that was responsible for collecting and recording the traditions that form the primary source material for the history of the Umayyad period. In reconstructing this history, therefore, it is necessary to rely mainly on sources, such as the histories of Tabari and Baladhuri, that were written in the Abbasid court at Baghdad.

Modern Arab nationalism regards the period of the Umayyads as part of the Arab Golden Age which it sought to emulate and restore. This is particularly true of Syrian nationalists and the present-day state of Syria, centered like that of the Umayyads on Damascus. White, one of the four Pan-Arab colors which appear in various combinations on the flags of most Arab countries, is considered as representing the Umayyads.

Theological disputes concerning the Umayyads

Sunni opinions

Sunni opinions of the Umayyad dynasty after Muawiyah are typically dim, viewing many of the rulers as sinners and the cause of great tribulation in the Ummah. For example, in the section concerning Quran 17:60^[16] in the exegesis by al-Suyuti entitled *Dur al-Manthur*, the author writes that there exist traditions which describe the Umayyads as "the cursed tree". There are some exceptions to this -- Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz is commonly praised as one of the greatest Muslim rulers after the four Rightly Guided Caliphs.

Shi'a opinions

The negative view of the Umayyads of Shiites is briefly expressed in the Shi'a book "Sulh al-Hasan".^[17] ^[18] According to some sources Ali described them as the worst Fitna.^[19]

Bahá'í standpoint

In Some Answered Questions, `Abdu'l-Bahá asserts that the Umayyad dynasty was the "great red dragon, having seven heads and ten horns, and seven crowns upon his heads" and that the Umayyads "rose against the religion of Prophet Muhammad and against the reality of Ali".^[20]

The seven heads of the dragon is symbolic of the seven provinces of the lands dominated by the Umayyads; Damascus, Persia, Arabia, Egypt, Africa, Andalusia, and Transoxania. The ten horns represent the ten names of the leaders of the Umayyad dynasty; Abu Sufyan, Muawiya, Yazid, Marwan, Abd al-Malik, Walid, Sulayman, Umar, Hisham, and Ibrahim. Some names were re-used as in the case of Yazid II and Yazid III were not counted for this interpretation.

Leaders


Political

Umayyad Caliphs at Damascus

- Muawiyah I ibn Abi Sufyan, 661–680
- Yazid I ibn Muawiyah, 680–683
- Muawiyah II ibn Yazid, 683–684
- Marwan I ibn al-Hakam, 684–685
- Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, 685–705
- al-Walid I ibn Abd al-Malik, 705–715
- Suleiman ibn Abd al-Malik, 715–717
- Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, 717–720
- Yazid II ibn Abd al-Malik, 720–724
- Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, 724–743
- al-Walid II ibn Yazid II, 743–744
- Yazid III ibn al-Walid, 744
- Ibrahim ibn al-Walid, 744
- Marwan II ibn Muhammad (ruled from Harran in the Jazira) 744–750

Umayyad Emirs of Córdoba

- Abd ar-Rahman I, 756–788
- Hisham I, 788–796
- al-Hakam I, 796–822
- Abd ar-Rahman II, 822–852
- Muhammad I of Córdoba, 852–886
- Al-Mundhir, 886 - 888
- Abdallah ibn Muhammad, 888–912
- Abd ar-Rahman III, 912–929



Umayyad Caliphs at Córdoba

- Abd ar-Rahman III, as caliph, 929–961
- Al-Hakam II, 961–976
- Hisham II, 976–1008
- Mohammed II, 1008–1009
- Suleiman, 1009–1010
- Hisham II, restored, 1010–1012
- Suleiman, restored, 1012–1017
- Abd ar-Rahman IV, 1021–1022
- Abd ar-Rahman V, 1022–1023
- Muhammad III, 1023–1024
- Hisham III, 1027–1031

Religious Umayyad

- Marwan ibn al-Hakam
- Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan
- Abu Sufiyan ibn Harb


See also

- Timeline of the Muslim presence in the Iberian peninsula
- al-Andalus
- Umayya ibn Abd Shams
- Caliphate of Córdoba
- History of Islam
- Caliphate
- List of Sunni Muslim dynasties

Further reading

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756–1039 Omayyads of Córdoba	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caliphate of Córdoba • Al-Mansur Ibn Abi Aamir 	
1039–1085 Taifas	
1085–1145 Almoravids	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Almoravid conquest • Battle of Sagrajas 	
1147–1238 Almohads	
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connected articles	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Map of Al-Andalus • Reconquista 	

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- [17] Sulh al-Hasan (http://www.balagh.net/english/ahl_bayt/sulh_al-hasan/)
- [18] (http://www.balagh.net/english/ahl_bayt/sulh_al-hasan/24.htm) Chapter 24
- [19] Sermon 92 (<http://www.nahjulbalagha.org/SermonDetail.php?Sermon=92>)
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External links

- Umayyads (<http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/itl/denise/umayyads.htm>)
- Umayyads - First caliphate dynasty (<http://www.islamicarchitecture.org/dynasties/umayyads.html>)

Abbasid

For the Caliphate of Córdoba (Al-Andalus) dynasty see Abbadids; for the south-west Arabia Muslim sect, see Abādites.

History of the Islamic Arab States

The **Abbasid caliphate** or, more simply, the **Abbasids** (Arabic: نَوَّابِيسَاغَلَا / ISO 233: al-'abbāsīyūn), was the third of the Islamic caliphates. It was ruled by the Abbasid dynasty of caliphs, who built their capital in Baghdad after overthrowing the Umayyad caliphs from all but the Al Andalus region.

The Abbasid caliphate was founded by the descendants of the Islamic prophet Muhammad's youngest uncle, Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, in Harran in 750 CE and shifted its capital in 762 to Baghdad. It flourished for two centuries, but slowly went into decline with the rise to power of the Turkish army it had created, the Mamluks. Within 150 years of gaining control of Persia, the caliphs were forced to cede power to local dynastic emirs who only nominally acknowledged their authority. The caliphate also lost the Western provinces of Al Andalus, Maghreb and Ifriqiya to an Umayyad prince, the Aghlabids and the Fatimids, respectively.

The Abbasids' rule was briefly ended for three years in 1258, when Hulagu Khan, the Mongol khan, sacked Baghdad, resuming in Mamluk Egypt in 1261, from where they continued to claim authority in religious matters until 1519, when power was formally transferred to the Ottomans and the capital relocated to Constantinople.

Rise

The Abbasid caliphs descended from Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib (566 – 662), one of the youngest uncles of Muhammad, because of which they considered themselves the true successor of Muhammad as opposed to the Umayyads. The Umayyads were descended from Umayya, and were a clan separate from Muhammad's in the Quraish tribe. They won the backing of Shiites (i.e. the Hashimiyya sub-sect of the Kaysanites Shia) against the Umayyads by temporarily converting to Shia Islam and joining their fight against Umayyad rule.



Coin of the Abbasids, Baghdad, Iraq, 765.

The Abbasids also distinguished themselves from the Umayyads by attacking their moral character and administration in general. According to Ira Lapidus, "The Abbasid revolt was supported largely by Arabs, mainly the aggrieved settlers of Marw with the addition of the Yemeni faction and their Mawali".^[1] The Abbasids also appealed to non-Arab Muslims, known as *mawali*, who remained outside the kinship-based society of the Arabs and were perceived as a lower class within the Umayyad empire. Muhammad ibn 'Ali, a great-grandson of Abbas, began to campaign for the return of power to the family of Muhammad, the Hashimites, in Persia during the reign of Umar II.

During the reign of Marwan II, this opposition culminated in the rebellion of Ibrahim the Imam, the fourth in descent from Abbas. Supported by the province of Khorasan, Iran, he achieved considerable


success, but was captured in the year 747 and died in prison; some hold that he was assassinated. The quarrel was taken up by his brother Abdallah, known by the name of Abu al-'Abbas as-Saffah, who defeated the Umayyads in 750 in the Battle of the Zab near the Great Zab and was subsequently proclaimed caliph.

Immediately after their victory Abu al-'Abbas as-Saffah sent his forces to North Africa and Central Asia, where his forces fought against Tang expansion during the Battle of Talas (the Abbasids were known to their opponents as the: "Black robed ones"). After the battle many captive Chinese craftsmen introduced the world's first recorded paper mill in Baghdad, thus beginning a new era of intellectual rebirth in the Abbasid domain. Within 10 years the Abbasids built another renowned paper mill in the Umayyad capital of Córdoba in Spain.

Political situation

Consolidation and schisms

The first change the Abbasids made was to move the empire's capital from Damascus, in Syria, to Baghdad in Iraq. This was to both appease as well to be closer to the Persian *mawali* support base that existed in this region more influenced by Persian history and culture, and part of the Persian mawali demand for less Arab dominance in the empire. Baghdad was established on the Tigris River in 762. A new position, that of the vizier, was also established to delegate central authority, and even greater authority was delegated to local emirs. Eventually, this meant that many Abbasid caliphs were relegated to a more ceremonial role than under the Umayyads, as the viziers began to exert greater influence, and the role of the old Arab aristocracy was slowly replaced by a Persian bureaucracy.^[2]



The Abbasids had depended heavily on the support of Persians [see 'Abbasid Dynasty article in Britannica] in their overthrow of the Umayyads. Abu al-'Abbas' successor, Al-Mansur, moved their capital from Damascus to the new city of Baghdad and welcomed non-Arab Muslims to their court. While this helped integrate Arab and Persian cultures, it alienated many of their Arab supporters, particularly the Khorasanian Arabs who had supported them in their battles against the Umayyads.

These fissures in their support led to immediate problems. The Umayyads, while out of power, were not destroyed. The only surviving member of the Umayyad royal family, which had been all but annihilated, ultimately made his way to Spain where he established himself as an independent Emir (Abd ar-Rahman I, 756). In 929, Abd ar-Rahman III assumed the title of Caliph, establishing Al Andalus from Córdoba as a rival to Baghdad as the legitimate capital of the Islamic Empire.

Rift with the Shia Muslims

The Abbasids also found themselves at odds with the Shia Muslims, most of whom had supported their war against the Umayyads, since the Abbasids and the Shias claimed legitimacy by their familial connection to Muhammad. Once in power, the Abbasids embraced Sunni Islam and disavowed any support for Shi'a beliefs. That led to numerous conflicts, culminating in an uprising in Mecca in 786, followed by widespread bloodshed and the flight of many Shi'a to the Maghreb, where the



Abbasid coins during Al-Mu'tamid's reign

survivors established the Idrisid kingdom. The Abbasids also executed the direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad who were also the Shia Imams, which includes Imam Jafar Sadiq and other respected nobles. Shortly thereafter, Berber Kharijites set up an independent state in North Africa in 801. Within 50 years the Idrisids in the Maghreb and Aghlabids of Ifriqiya and a little later the Tulunids and Ikshidids of Misr were effectively independent in Africa.

Communication with provinces

The Abbasid leadership had to work hard in the last half of the eighth century (750–800), under several competent caliphs and their viziers to overcome the political challenges created by the far flung nature of the empire, and the limited communication across it and usher in the administrative changes to keep order.^[3] While the Byzantine Empire was fighting Abbasid rule in Syria and Anatolia, military operations during this period were minimal, as the caliphate focused on internal matters as local governors, who, as a matter of prodecure, operated mostly independently of central authority. The problem that the caliphs faced was that these governors had begun to exert greater autonomy, using their increasing power to make their positions hereditary.^[2]

At the same time, the Abbasids faced challenges closer to home. Former supporters of the Abbasids had broken away to create a separate kingdom around Khorosan in northern Persia. Harun al-Rashid (786 – 809) turned on the Barmakids, a Persian family that had grown significantly in power within the administration of the state and killed most of the family.^[4] During the same period, several factions, or opposing groups, began either to leave the empire for other lands or to take control of distant parts of the empire away from the Abbasids.



Abbasid Shahi-inspired coin, Iraq 908-930.
British Museum.

Golden Age

"Arab Muslims now studied astronomy, alchemy, medicine and mathematics with such success that, during the ninth and tenth centuries, more scientific discoveries had been achieved in the Abbasid empire than in any previous period of history."

—Karen Armstrong^[5]

The Islamic Golden Age was inaugurated by the middle of the 8th century by the ascension of the Abbasid Caliphate and the transfer of the capital from Damascus to Baghdad.^[6] The Abbassids were influenced by the Qur'anic injunctions and hadith such as "the ink of a scholar is more holy than the



A manuscript written during the Abbasid Era.

blood of a martyr" stressing the value of knowledge.^[6] During this period the Muslim world became the unrivaled intellectual center for science, philosophy, medicine and education as the Abbasids championed the cause of knowledge and established the House of Wisdom in Baghdad; where both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars sought

to translate and gather all the world's knowledge into Arabic.^[6] Many classic works of antiquity that would otherwise have been lost were translated into Arabic and Persian and later in turn translated into Turkish, Hebrew and Latin.^[6] During this period the Muslim world was a cauldron of cultures which collected, synthesized and significantly advanced the knowledge gained from the ancient Roman, Chinese, Indian, Persian, Egyptian, North African, Greek and Byzantine civilizations.^[6]

Science

The reigns of Harun al-Rashid (786 – 809) and his successors fostered an age of great intellectual achievement. In large part, this was the result of the schismatic forces that had undermined the Umayyad regime, which relied on the assertion of the superiority of Arab culture as part of its claim to legitimacy, and the Abbasids' welcoming of support from non-Arab Muslims. It is well established that the Abbasid caliphs modeled their administration on that of the Sassanids.^[7] Harun al-Rashid's son, Al-Ma'mun (whose mother was Persian), is even quoted as saying:

"The Persians ruled for a thousand years and did not need us Arabs even for a day. We have been ruling them for one or two centuries and cannot do without them for an hour."^[8]

A number of medieval thinkers and scientists living under Islamic rule played a role in transmitting Islamic science to the Christian West. They contributed to making Aristotle known in Christian Europe. In addition, the period saw the recovery of much of the Alexandrian mathematical, geometric and astronomical knowledge, such as that of Euclid and Claudius Ptolemy. These recovered mathematical methods were later enhanced and developed much further by other Islamic scholars, notably by Persian scientists Al-Biruni and Abu Nasr Mansur.

Algebra was also pioneered by Persian Scientist Muhammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī during this time in his landmark text, *Kitab al-Jabr wa-l-Muqabala*, from which the term *algebra* is derived. He is thus considered to be the father of algebra.^[9] The terms algorism and algorithm are also derived from the name of al-Khwarizmi, who was responsible for introducing the Arabic numerals and Hindu-Arabic numeral system beyond the Indian subcontinent.

Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) developed an early scientific method in his *Book of Optics* (1021). The most important development of the scientific method was the use of experiments to distinguish between competing scientific theories set within a generally empirical orientation, which began among Muslim scientists. Ibn al-Haytham is also regarded as the father of optics, especially for his empirical proof of the intromission theory of light. Bradley Steffens described Ibn al-Haytham as the "first scientist"^[10] for his development of scientific method.^{[11] [12]}

Medicine in medieval Islam was an area of science that advanced particularly during the Abbasids' reign. During the ninth century, Baghdad contained over 800 doctors, and great discoveries in the understanding of anatomy and diseases were made. The clinical distinction between measles and smallpox was discovered during this time. Famous Persian scientist Ibn Sina (known to the West as Avicenna) produced treatises and works that summarized the vast amount of knowledge that scientists had accumulated, and is often known as the father of modern medicine for his encyclopedias, *The Canon of Medicine* and *The Book of Healing*. The work of him and many others directly influenced the research of European scientists during the Renaissance and even later.

Astronomy in medieval Islam was advanced by Al-Battani, who improved the precision of the measurement of the precession of the Earth's axis. The corrections made to the geocentric model by al-Battani, Averroes, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Mo'ayyeddin Urdu and Ibn al-Shatir were later incorporated into the Copernican heliocentric model. The



Mustansiriya University in Baghdad.

astrolabe, though originally developed by the Greeks, was perfected by Islamic astronomers and engineers, and was subsequently brought to Europe.

Muslim chemists and alchemists played an important role in the foundation of modern chemistry. Scholars such as Will Durant and Alexander von Humboldt regard Muslim chemists to be the founders of chemistry. In particular, Jābir ibn Hayyān (Geber) is considered the "father of chemistry". The works of Arab chemists influenced Roger Bacon (who introduced the empirical method to Europe, strongly influenced by his reading of Arabic writers), Isaac Newton, among many others. A number of chemical processes such as distillation techniques and the production of alcohol were developed in the Muslim world and then spread to Europe.

Literature

The most well known fiction from the Islamic world was *The Book of One Thousand and One Nights* (*Arabian Nights*). The original concept is derived from pre-Islamic Iranian (Persian) prototype with reliance on Indian elements. It also includes stories from the rest of the Middle-Eastern and North African nations. The epic took form in the 10th century and reached its final form by the 14th century; the number and type of tales have varied from one manuscript to another.^[13] All Arabian fantasy tales were often called "Arabian Nights" when translated into English, regardless of whether they appeared in *The Book of One Thousand and One Nights*.^[13] This epic has been influential in the West since it was translated in the 18th century, first by Antoine Galland.^[14] Many imitations were written, especially in France.^[15] Various characters from this epic have themselves become cultural icons in Western culture, such as Aladdin, Sinbad and Ali Baba.



"Ali Baba" by Maxfield Parrish.

A famous example of Persian poetry on romance is *Layla and Majnun*,^[16] dating back to the Umayyad era in the 7th century. It is a tragic story of undying love much like the later *Romeo and Juliet*, which was itself said to have been inspired by a Latin version of *Layli and Majnun* to an extent.^[17]

Arabic poetry reached its greatest heights in the Abbasid era, especially before the loss of central authority and the rise of the Persianate dynasties. Writers like Abu Tammam and Abu Nuwas were closely connected to the caliphal court in Baghdad during the early 9th century, while others such as al-Mutanabbi received their patronage from regional courts.

Philosophy

One of the common definitions for "Islamic philosophy" is "the style of philosophy produced within the framework of Islamic culture."^[18] Islamic philosophy, in this definition is neither necessarily concerned with religious issues, nor is exclusively produced by Muslims.^[18] Their works on Aristotle was a key step in the transmission of learning from ancient Greeks to the Islamic world and the West. They often corrected the philosopher, encouraging a lively debate in the spirit of *ijtihad*. They also wrote influential original philosophical works, and their thinking was incorporated into Christian philosophy during the Middle Ages, notably by Thomas Aquinas.

Three speculative thinkers, al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Avicenna, combined Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism with other ideas introduced through Islam, and Avicennism was later established as a result. Other influential Muslim philosophers in the Caliphates include al-Jahiz, a pioneer in evolutionary thought, and Ibn al-Haytham (Alhacen), a pioneer of phenomenology and the philosophy of science and a critic of Aristotelian physics and Aristotle's concept

of place (topos).

Technology

In technology, the Muslim world adopted papermaking from China.^[19] The knowledge of gunpowder was also transmitted from China via Islamic countries, where the formulas for pure potassium nitrate and an explosive gunpowder effect were first developed.^{[20] [21]}

Advances were made in irrigation and farming, using new technology such as the windmill. Crops such as almonds and citrus fruit were brought to Europe through al-Andalus, and sugar cultivation was gradually adopted by the Europeans. Arab merchants dominated trade in the Indian Ocean until the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century. Hormuz was an important center for this trade. There was also a dense network of trade routes in the Mediterranean, along which Muslim countries traded with each other and with European powers such as Venice, Genoa and Catalonia. The Silk Road crossing Central Asia passed through Muslim states between China and Europe.



Coin of the Abbasids, Baghdad, Iraq, 1244.

Muslim engineers in the Islamic world made a number of innovative industrial uses of hydropower, and early industrial uses of tidal power, wind power, steam power,^[22] fossil fuels such as petroleum, and early large factory complexes (*tiraz* in Arabic).^[23] The industrial uses of watermills in the Islamic world date back to the 7th century, while horizontal-wheeled and vertical-wheeled water mills were both in widespread use since at least the 9th century. A variety of industrial mills were being employed in the Islamic world, including early fulling mills, gristmills, hullers, sawmills, shipmills, stamp mills, steel mills, sugar mills, tide mills and windmills. By the 11th century, every province throughout the Islamic world had these industrial mills in operation, from al-Andalus and North Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia.^[19] Muslim engineers also invented crankshafts and water turbines, employed gears in mills and water-raising machines, and pioneered the use of dams as a source of water power, used to provide additional power to watermills and water-raising machines.^[24] Such advances made it possible for many industrial tasks that were previously driven by manual labour in ancient times to be mechanized and driven by machinery instead in the medieval Islamic world.^[25]

A number of industries were generated during the Arab Agricultural Revolution, including early industries for astronomical instruments, ceramics, chemicals, distillation technologies, clocks, glass, mechanical hydropowered and wind powered machinery, matting, mosaics, pulp and paper, perfumery, petroleum, pharmaceuticals, rope-making, shipping, shipbuilding, silk, sugar, textiles, water, weapons, and the mining of minerals such as sulfur, ammonia, lead and iron. Early factories (*tiraz*) were built for many industries, and knowledge of these industries were later transmitted to medieval Europe, especially during the Latin translations of the 12th century. For example, the first glass factories in Europe were founded in the 11th century by Egyptian craftsmen in Greece.^[26] The agricultural and handicraft industries also experienced high levels of growth during this period.^[27]

Fracture of central authority

The Loss of Power to Autonomous Dynasties

Even by 820, the Samanids had begun the process of exercising independent authority in Transoxiana and Greater Khorasan, as had the Shia Hamdanids in Northern Syria, and the succeeding Tahirid and Saffarid dynasties of Iran. By the early 10th century, the Abbasids almost lost control of Iraq to various amirs, and the caliph al-Radi was forced acknowledge their power by creating the position of "Prince of Princes" (*amir al-umara*). Shortly thereafter,

the Persian faction known as the Buwayhids from Daylam swept into power and assumed control over the bureaucracy in Baghdad. According to the history of Miskawayh, they began distributing iqtas (fiefs in the form of tax farms) to their supporters.

Outside Iraq, all the autonomous provinces slowly took on the characteristic of de facto states with hereditary rulers, armies, and revenues and operated under only nominal caliph suzerainty, which may not necessarily be reflected by any contribution to the treasury, such as the Soomro Emirs that had gained control of Sindh and ruled the entire province from their capitol of Mansura.

^[3] Mahmud of Ghazni took the title of sultan, as opposed to the "amir" that had been in more common usage, signifying the Ghaznavid Empire's independence from caliphal authority, despite Mahmud's ostentatious displays of Sunni orthodoxy and ritual submission to the caliph. In the 11th century, the loss of respect for the caliphs continued, as some Islamic rulers no longer mentioned the caliph's name in the Friday khutba, or struck it off their coinage.^[3]

The Ismaili Fatimid dynasty of Cairo contested the Abbasids for even the titular authority of the Islamic ummah. They commanded some support in the Shia sections of Baghdad (such as Karkh), although Baghdad was the city most closely connected to the caliphate, even in the Buwayhid and Saljuq eras. The Fatimids' white banners contrasted with Abbasids' black, and the challenge of the Fatimids only ended with their downfall in the 12th century.

Despite the power of the Buwayhid amirs, the Abbasids retained a highly ritualized court in Baghdad, as described by the Buwayhid bureaucrat Hilal al-Sabi', and they retained a certain influence over Baghdad as well as religious life. As Buwayhid power waned after the death of Baha' al-Daula, the caliphate was able to regain some measure of strength. The caliph al-Qadir, for example, led the ideological struggle against the Shia with writings such as the Baghdad Manifesto. The caliphs kept order in Baghdad itself, attempting to prevent the outbreak of fitna s in the capital, often contending with the ayyarun.

Abbasid Relations with the Saljuq Dynasty

With the Buwayhid dynasty on the wane, a vacuum was created that was eventually filled by the dynasty of Oghuz Turks known as the Saljuqs. When the amir and former slave Basasiri took up the Shia Fatimid banner in Baghdad in 1058, the caliph al-Qa'im was unable to defeat him without outside help. Toghril Beg, the Saljuq sultan, restored Baghdad to Sunni rule and took Iraq for his dynasty. Once again, the Abbasids were forced to deal with a military power that they could not match, though the Abbasid caliph remained the titular head of the Islamic community. The succeeding sultans Alp Arslan and Malikshah, as well as their vizier Nizam al-Mulk took up residence in Persia, but held power over the Abbasids in Baghdad. When the dynasty began to weaken in the 12th century, the Abbasids gained greater independence once again.

Late Revival of Military Strength, 1118-1258

While the Caliph al-Mustarshid was the first caliph to build an army capable of meeting a Saljuq army in battle, he was nonetheless defeated in 1135 and assassinated. The Caliph al-Muqtafi was the first Abbasid Caliph to regain the full military independence of the Caliphate, with the help of his vizier Ibn Hubayra. After nearly 250 years of subjection to foreign dynasties, he successfully defended Baghdad against the Saljuqs in the siege of Baghdad (1157), thus securing Iraq for the Abbasids. The reign of al-Nasir (d. 1225) brought the caliphate to power throughout Iraq, based in large part on the Sufi futuwwa organizations that the caliph headed. Al-Mustansir built the Mustansiriya School, in an attempt to eclipse the Saljuq-era Nizamiyya built by Nizam al-Mulk.

The end of the dynasty

Hulagu Khan sacked Baghdad on February 10, 1258, causing great loss of life. Muslims feared that a supernatural disaster would strike if the blood of Al-Musta'sim, a direct descendant of Muhammad's uncle^[28] and the last reigning Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, was spilled. The Learned Shiites of Persia stated that no such calamity had happened after the deaths of the Shiite Imam (leader) Hussein; nevertheless, as a precaution and in accordance with a Mongol taboo which forbade spilling royal blood, Hulagu had Al-Musta'sim wrapped in a carpet and trampled to death by horses on February 20, 1258. The Al-Musta'sim family was also executed, with the lone exceptions of his youngest son who was sent to Mongolia, and a daughter who became a slave in the harem of Hulagu.^[29] According to Mongolian historians, the surviving son married and fathered children.

The Abbasids continued to maintain the presence of authority, yet it was confined to religious matters in Egypt, under the Mamluks. The dynasty finally ended with Al-Mutawakkil III, who was taken away as a prisoner, by Selim I, to Constantinople where he had a ceremonial role until his death in 1543.

Role of the Mamluks

In the 9th century, the Abbasids created an army loyal only to their caliphate, drawn mostly from Turkish slaves, known as Mamluks, with some Slavs and Berbers participating as well. This force, created in the reign of al-Ma'mun (813 – 833), and his brother and successor al-Mu'tasim (833 – 842), prevented the further disintegration of the empire.

The Mamluk army, though often viewed negatively, both helped and hurt the caliphate. Early on, it provided the government with a stable force to address domestic and foreign problems. However, creation of this foreign army and al-Mu'tasim's transfer of the capital from Baghdad to Samarra created a division between the caliphate and the peoples they claimed to rule. In addition, the power of the Mamluks steadily grew until al-Radi (934 – 941) was constrained to hand over most of the royal functions to Mahommed bin Raik. In the following years, the Buwayhids, who were Shi'ites, seized power over Baghdad, ruling central Iraq for more than a century.


List of Abbasid Caliphs

- Abu'l Abbas As-Saffah 750 – 754

Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad

- Al-Mansur 754 – 775
- Al-Mahdi 775 – 785
- Al-Hadi 785 – 786
- Harun al-Rashid 786 – 809
- Al-Amin 809 – 813
- Al-Ma'mun 813 – 833
- Al-Mu'tasim 833 – 842
- Al-Wathiq 842 – 847
- Al-Mutawakkil 847 – 861
- Al-Muntasir 861 – 862
- Al-Musta'in 862 – 866
- Al-Mu'tazz 866 – 869
- Al-Muhtadi 869 – 870
- Al-Mu'tamid 870 – 892
- Al-Mu'tadid 892 – 902
- Al-Muktafi 902 – 908
- Al-Muqtadir 908 – 932
- Al-Qahir 932 – 934
- Ar-Radi 934 – 940
- Al-Muttaqi 940 – 944
- Al-Mustakfi 944 – 946
- Al-Muti 946 – 974
- At-Ta'i 974 – 991
- Al-Qadir 991 – 1031

- Al-Qa'im 1031–1075
- Al-Muqtadi 1075–1094
- Al-Mustazhir 1094–1118
- Al-Mustarshid 1118–1135
- Ar-Rashid 1135–1136
- Al-Muqtafi 1136–1160
- Al-Mustanjid 1160–1170
- Al-Mustadi 1170–1180
- An-Nasir 1180–1225
- Az-Zahir 1225–1226
- Al-Mustansir 1226–1242
- Al-Musta'sim 1242–1258



Abbasid Caliphs in Cairo

- Al-Mustansir 1261–1262
- Al-Hakim I (Cairo) 1262–1302
- Al-Mustakfi I of Cairo 1303–1340
- Al-Wathiq I 1340–1341
- Al-Hakim II 1341–1352
- Al-Mu'tadid I 1352–1362
- Al-Mutawakkil I 1362–1383
- Al-Wathiq II 1383–1386
- Al-Mu'tasim 1386–1389
- Al-Mutawakkil I (restored) 1389–1406
- Al-Musta'in 1406–1414
- Al-Mu'tadid II 1414–1441
- Al-Mustakfi II 1441–1451
- Al-Qa'im 1451–1455
- Al-Mustanjid 1455–1479
- Al-Mutawakkil II 1479–1497
- Al-Mustamsik 1497–1508
- Al-Mutawakkil III 1508–1517

See also

- List of Sunni Muslim dynasties
- Iranian Intermezzo

Notes

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- [5] Karen Armstrong(1993). *A History of God*. Ballantine Books. p. 171
- [6] Vartan Gregorian, "Islam: A Mosaic, Not a Monolith", Brookings Institution Press, 2003, pg 26–38 ISBN 0-8157-3283-X
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- [9] Ron Eglash(1999), p.61
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- [11] Gorini, Rosanna (October 2003). "Al-Haytham the man of experience. First steps in the science of vision" (<http://www.ishim.net/ishimj/4/10.pdf>) (pdf). *Journal of the International Society for the History of Islamic Medicine* **2** (4): 53–55. . Retrieved 2008-09-25. "According to the majority of the historians al-Haytham was the pioneer of the modern scientific method. With his book he changed the meaning of the term optics and established experiments as the norm of proof in the field. His investigations are based not on abstract theories, but on experimental evidences and his experiments were systematic and repeatable.".
- [12] Robert Briffault (1928), *The Making of Humanity*, p. 190–202, G. Allen & Unwin Ltd:

“What we call science arose as a result of new methods of experiment, observation, and measurement, which were introduced into Europe by the Arabs. [...] Science is the most momentous contribution of Arab civilization to the modern world, but its fruits were slow in ripening. [...] The debt of our science to that of the Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries or revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab culture, it owes its existence...The ancient world was, as we saw, pre-scientific. [...] The Greeks systematized, generalized and theorized, but the patient ways of investigations, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observation and experimental inquiry were altogether alien to the Greek temperament.”

- [13] John Grant and John Clute, *The Encyclopedia of Fantasy*, "Arabian fantasy", p 51 ISBN 0-312-19869-8
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- [26] Ahmad Y Hassan, Transfer Of Islamic Technology To The West, Part 1: Avenues Of Technology Transfer (<http://www.history-science-technology.com/Articles/articles 7.htm>)
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- [29] Annals of history: Invaders: Destroying Baghdad (http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050425fa_fact4) by Ian Frazier, in The New Yorker 25 April 2005

External links

- Abbasids (750-1517) (<http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/itl/denise/abbasids.htm>)
- Abbasids the 2nd dynasty of caliphs (<http://www.islamicarchitecture.org/dynasties/abbasids.html>)
- Abbasid Caliphs (In Our Time, Radio 4) (http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20060202.shtml), in Streaming RealAudio
- An On-Going Detailed Account of the History of the Abbasids from an Islamic perspective. Most of the narrations have been sifted through to avoid "biased" theories regardless if the historians as mentioned are Shiite or Sunni. (<http://synkronzyzer.wordpress.com/tag/islamic-history/>)
- Abbasid Caliphate (<http://www.iranica.com/newsite/articles/v1f1/v1f1a052.html>) entry in Encyclopaedia Iranica (<http://www.iranica.com/newsite/>)
- ABBASIDS (http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0001_0_00087.html)
- The Abassid Caliphate (758-1258) (<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Abassid.html>)

Fatimid Caliphate

History of the Islamic Arab States

The **Fatimid Caliphate** or **al-Fātimiyyūn** (Arabic **نوي م ط ا ف ل**) was an Arab Shi'a Muslim caliphate first centered in Tunisia and later in Egypt that ruled over varying areas of the Maghreb, ((Sudan)), Sicily, Malta, the Levant, and Hijaz from 5 January 909 to 1171. The caliphate was ruled by the Fatimids, who established the Tunisian city of Mahdia and made it their capital city, before conquering the Egyptian city of Cairo in 969, which thereafter became their capital. The 4th century AH /10th century CE has been called by Louis Massignon 'the Ismaili century in the history of Islam'.^[1] The term *Fatimite* is sometimes used to refer to the citizens of this caliphate. The ruling elite of the state belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shi'ism. The leaders of the dynasty were also Shia Ismaili Imams, hence, they had a religious significance to Ismaili Muslims. They are also part of the chain of holders of the office of Caliph, as recognized by some Muslims. Therefore, this constitutes a rare period in history in which the descendants of Ali (hence the name Fatimid, referring to Ali's wife Fatima) and the Caliphate were united to any degree, excepting the final period of the Rashidun Caliphate under Ali himself.

The caliphate was reputed to exercise a degree of religious tolerance towards non-Ismaili sects of Islam as well as towards Jews, Maltese Christians, and Coptic Christians.^[2]

Rise of the Fatimids

The Fatimids had their origins among the Kutama Berbers of eastern Algeria (modern Jijel Province). The dynasty was founded in 909 by 'Abdullāh al-Mahdī Billah, who in the late 9th century started a movement among the Kutama and managed to convert them to shi'a Isam. Ubayd Allah legitimised his claim through his supposed descent from Muhammad by way of his daughter Fātima as-Zahra and her husband 'Alī ibn-Abī-Tālib, the first Shi'a Imām, hence the name *al-Fātimiyyūn* "Fatimid". For the first half of its existence the empire's power rested primarily on the Kutama Berbers and their strength, with a Berber army conquering northern Africa, Palestine, Syria and, for a short time, Baghdad. Their role within the Fatimid state was so central that Ibn Khaldun counted the Fatimids among the Berber dynasties.


Abdullāh al-Mahdi's control soon extended over all of central Maghreb, an area consisting of the modern countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, which he ruled from Mahdia, his newly built capital in Tunisia.

The Fatimids entered Egypt in the late 10th century, conquering the Ikhshidid dynasty, and founding a new capital at *al-Qāhira* (Cairo) in 969.^[3] The name was a reference to the planet Mars, "The Subduer", which was prominent in the sky at the moment that city construction started. Cairo was intended as a royal enclosure for the Fatimid caliph and his army, though the actual administrative and economic capital of Egypt was in cities such as Fustat until 1169. After Egypt, the Fatimids continued to conquer the surrounding areas until they ruled from Tunisia to Syria, and even ruling Sicily, and southern parts of the Italian Peninsula.

Under the Fatimids, Egypt became the center of an empire that included at its peak North Africa, Sicily, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, the Red Sea coast of Africa, Hejaz, and Yemen. Egypt flourished, and the Fatimids developed an extensive trade network in both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Their trade and diplomatic ties extended all the way to China and its Song Dynasty, which eventually determined the economic course of Egypt during the High Middle Ages.



Mosque of Al-Hakim, the sixth Caliph



Map of the Fatimid Caliphate also showing cities.

Unlike other governments in the area, Fatimid advancement in state offices was based more on merit than on heredity. Members of other branches of Islam, like the Sunnis, were just as likely to be appointed to government posts as Shiites. Tolerance was extended to non-Muslims such as Christians, and Jews, who occupied high levels in government based on ability. However, it is important to note here that Jews in particular were part of a larger scheme to gain monetary leverage for trade in Europe. And tolerance was set into place to ensure the flow of money from all those who were non-Muslims too in order to finance the Fatimids Caliphs' large army of Mamluks brought in from Circassia by Genoese merchants. There were, however, exceptions to this general attitude of tolerance, most notably Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah although this has been highly debated.



Al-Azhar Mosque, Marble paved interior courtyard added during the Fatimid period

The Fatimids were also known to a great extent for their exquisite arts. A type of ceramic, lustreware, was prevalent during the Fatimid period. Glassware and metalworking was also popular. Many traces of Fatimid architecture exist in Cairo today, the most defining examples include the Al Azhar University and the Al Hakim mosque. The Al Azhar University was the first university in the East and perhaps the oldest in history. It was founded by Caliph Muizz and was one of the highest educational facilities of the Fatimid Empire.

The Fatimid palace was two parts. it used to be in the Khan el-Khalili area at Bin El-Quasryn street.^[4]

Military system

The Fatimids military was originally based largely on the Kutama Berber tribesmen it brought with them on their march to Egypt, and they remained an important part of the Fatimid military even after Tunisia itself began to break away.^[5]

After their successful establishment in Egypt, local forces were also incorporated into their army, though they remained a relatively minor part of the Fatimid (and in fact, succeeding dynasties as well) forces.

A fundamental change occurred when the Fatimid Caliph attempted to push into Syria in the later half of the 10th century, here they were faced with the now Turkish dominated forces of the Abbasid Caliph and the powerful Byzantium armies, and began to realize the limits of their current military, thus during the reign of Abu Mansoor Nizar al-Aziz Billah and Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah the Caliph began incorporating armies of Turks and later Black Africans. (even later, other groups such as Armenians were also used)^[6]

The army units were generally separated along ethnic lines, thus the Berbers were usually the light cavalry / foot skirmishers, while the Turks would be the horse archers or heavy cavalry (known as Mamluks), and the black Africans, Syrians, and Arabs generally acted as the heavy infantry and foot archers. This ethnic based army system,

along with the partial slave status of many of the imported ethnic fighters, would remain fundamentally unchanged in Egypt many centuries after the Fatimid caliph's fall.

Civil war and decline

While the ethnic based army was generally successful on the battlefields, they began to have negative effects on the Fatimid's internal politics, traditionally the Berber element of the army had the strongest sway over political affairs, but as the Turkish element grew more powerful they began to challenge this, and eventually by 1020 serious riots began to break out among the Black African troops who was fighting back against a Berber/ Turks Alliance against them.

By 1060s, the tentative balance between the different ethnics within the Fatimid army collapsed as Egypt was suffering through a serious span of drought and famine, the declining resources acceratlled the problems between the different ethnic factions and outright civil war began, primarily the Turks and Black African troops were fighting each other while the Berbers shifted alliance in between.^[7] The Turksish forces of the Fatimid army would end up seizing most of Cairo held the city and Caliph at ransom while the Berbers troops and remaining Sudanese forces roam the other parts of Egypt, making an already bad situation much worse.

By 1072 the Fatimid Caliph Abū Tamīm Ma'ad al-Mustansir Billah in a desperate attempt to save Egypt recalled the Armenian general Badr al-Jamali whom was at the time the governor of Acre, Badr al-Jamali lead his troops into Egypt was able to successfully suppress the different groups of the rebelling armies, and largely purging the Turks in the process.

Although the Caliph was saved from immediate destruction, the decade long rebellion devastated Egypt and it was never able to regain much power, as a result of this event, Badr al-Jamali was also made into the vizier of the Fatimid caliph, becoming one of the first military viziers that would dominate the late Fatimid politics, as they effectively became the head of state and the Caliph himself was reduced to the role of a figure head.

Decay and fall

In the 1040s, the Zirids (governors of North Africa under the Fatimids) declared their independence from the Fatimids and their recognition of the Sunni Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, which led the Fatimids to launch devastating Banū Hilal invasions. After about 1070, the Fatimid hold on the Levant coast and parts of Syria was challenged first by Turkic invasions, then the Crusades, so that Fatimid territory shrank until it consisted only of Egypt.

The reliance on the Iqta system also ate into Fatimid central authority, as more and more the military officers at the further ends of the empire became semi-independent and were often a source of problems.

After the decay of the Fatimid political system in the 1160s, the Zengid ruler Nūr ad-Dīn had his general Shirkuh, seize Egypt from the vizier Shawar in 1169. Shirkuh died two months after taking power, and the rule went to his nephew, Saladin.^[8] This began the Ayyubid Sultanate of Egypt and Syria.


Fatimid caliphs

1. Abū Muḥammad 'Abdu l-Lāh ('Ubaydu l-Lāh) al-Mahdī bi'llāh (909-934) founder Fatimid dynasty
2. Abū l-Qāsim Muḥammad al-Qā'im bi-Amr Allāh (934-946)
3. Abū Ṭāhir Ismā'il al-Manṣūr bi-llāh (946-953)
4. Abū Tamīm Ma'add al-Mu'izz li-Dīn Allāh (953-975) Egypt is conquered during his reign
5. Abū Manṣūr Nizār al-'Azīz bi-llāh (975-996)
6. Abū 'Alī al-Manṣūr al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh (996-1021)
7. Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Zāhir li-I'zāz Dīn Allāh (1021–1036)
8. Abū Tamīm Ma'add al-Mustanṣir bi-llāh (1036–1094)
9. al-Musta'li bi-llāh (1094–1101) Quarrels over his succession led to the Nizari split.
10. al-Āmir bi-Aḥkām Allāh (1101–1130) The Fatimid rulers of Egypt after him are not recognized as Imams by Mustaali/Taiyabi Ismailis.
11. 'Abd al-Majīd al-Ḥāfiẓ (1130–1149)

12. al-Zāfir (1149–1154)
13. al-Fā'iz (1154–1160)
14. al-'Āḍid (1160–1171).

Table of Fatimid & Islam

The table below shows Fatimid Calipha/Imam along with their ancestor and after Shia /fatimid /Mustaali Imam and follower. This also shows Caliphate of the other era of Islam:



Abdul Mutallib + Fatema(wife)							ABU QUHAFAH	AFFAN	BANU UMAYYAH	[ABDUL MUTALLIB+ MUTAYATA(WIFE)]
ABU TALIB	ABDULLAH									
	MOHAMMAD 632								ABU SUFYAN	AL ABBAS
<SHIA	I-	-M-	-A-	-MA-	-T->	<CHALI-		-F-	-A-	-T>
Ali	+ wife Fatima						ABU BAKAR 632–634			
^							OMMAR			
^								USMAN 644–656		
HASAN									MUAWWIYAH (Damascus) UMAYYAD	
HUSAYN 669–680									^	
ALI ZAYNUL ABIDIN									MARWAN -I 684–685	
MUHAMMAD AL-BAQIR					Zayd ibn Ali				^	
JA'FAR AL-SADIQ 731–765					^					
ISMAIL [Ismaili Imam]				MUSA AL KAZIM,	^				MARWAN-II 744–750	SAFFAH 750–754,ABBASID BAGHDAD
MOHAMMAD			SEVENER(follow up to Ismail)	TWELVER IMAM	^					Harun-al- Rashid(d.809)
ABDULLAH			^	^	^					MA'MUN (d.833)
AHMAD			^	^	^					MU'TASIM (d.842)
HUSAYN			^	^	^					MUTAWAKIL 847–861, Mutadid, Muktafi (Muqtadar d.908)
Imamat+ [[== FATIMID CALIPHATE ==]]			^	^	^					^
ABDULLAH 909– 934 (ifriqiya)			^	^	^					^
AL QAIM (d.946)			^	^	^					^
AL MANSUR			^	^	^					^
AL-MU'IZ (EGYPT) (d.975)			^	^	^					^
AL-AZIZ			^	^	^					^
AL-HAAKIM			^	^	^					^
AL-ZAHIR			^	^	^					^
AL-MUSTANSIR (d.1094)			^	^	^					^

[MUSTALI (d.1101)		NIZAR,	^	^	^					^
AMIR- (d.1130)		^	^	^	^					^
TAYYIB , Hurrat al-Malaika / Dai-al-Mutlaq,Yemen		^	^	^	^	HAFIZ-1130,Cairo till Al Adid (1171 AD) (last Hafizi), SALAHUDDIN AYYUBID-1170 onward				AL-ZAHIR ,Al Mutasim 1258, Abbasid Baghdad
Dai-al-Mutlaq,Yemen		^	^	^	Zaydi (Imam +Caliphate), Yemen	EGYPTIAN ABBASID (Mustansir 1261,...Mutawakil III 1517)				
Dai-al-Mutlaq, Bohra,India		^	^	^	^	^				
Bohras / Dawoodi Bohra		AGHA KHANI	Sevener (almost extinct)	Ithna ashari / Twelwer	Zaydi/Fiver	Hafizi (no trace,extincted)				

May please see the List of Ismaili Imams ,for the details about above Fatimid Imams.

Fatimid at Present

Fatimid tradition continued after Imam Amir/Taiyab by Fatimid/Taiyabi/Dawoodi Bohra Dai(pl. see:Main article: List of Dai of Dawoodi Bohra) instituted by Sulayhid queen of Yemen Arwa al-Sulayhi.

After caliph Hafiz, Hafizi could not survive due to further rule of Saladin etc. Nizari are survived in the form of Agha khani at present.

See also

- Emirate of Sicily
- List of Shi'a Muslims dynasties
- List of Ismaili Imams
- List of Dai of Dawoodi Bohra
- Ismaili
- Mustali
- Taiyabi
- Dawoodi Bohra
- Arwa al-Sulayhi
- North Africa Arabization

Notes

- [1] In his "Mutanabbi devant le siècle ismaïlien de l'Islam", in Mém. de l'Inst Français de Damas, 1935, p.
- [2] Wintle, Justin (May 2003). *History of Islam*. London: Rough Guides Ltd. pp. 136–7. ISBN 184353018X.
- [3] Beeson, Irene (September/October 1969). "Cairo, a Millennial" (<http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/196905/cairo-a-millennial.htm>). *Saudi Aramco World*: 24, 26–30. . Retrieved 2007-08-09.
- [4] http://www.oldroads.org/pastblogs/pastingles2007/Cairo_of_the_mind.htm
- [5] Cambridge history of Egypt vol 1 page 154
- [6] Cambridge history of Egypt Vol 1 page 155
- [7] Cambridge history of Egypt vol 1 page 155
- [8] Amin Maalouf (1984). *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*. Al Saqi Books. pp. 160–170. ISBN 0-8052-0898-4.

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External links

- Fatimids entry in the *Encyclopaedia of the Orient*. (<http://lexicorient.com/e.o/fatimids.htm>)
- Institute of Ismaili Studies London. (<http://www.iis.ac.uk/home.asp?l=en>)
- The Shia Fatimid Dynasty in Egypt (<http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=574>)


Ottoman Caliphate

The **Ottoman Caliphate**, under the Ottoman Dynasty of the Ottoman Empire inherited the responsibility of the Caliphate from the Mamluks of Egypt.

During the period of Ottoman growth, Ottoman rulers beginning with Mehmed II claimed the caliphal authority. His grandson Selim I, through conquering and unification of Muslim lands, became the defender of the holiest places in Islam. The demise of the Ottoman Caliphate took place in part because of a slow erosion of power in relation to Europe and end of the state in consequence of partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. Abdul Mejid II, who lost the Sultanate, kept the Caliph position for a couple of years, but with Atatürk's reforms, the caliph position was abolished.

Insignia

A chief symbol of the Ottoman Caliphate was the "Great Banner of the Caliphs," a large green banner embroidered with texts from the Qur'an and with the name of Allah emblazoned on it 28,000 times in golden letters. It was passed down in the Ottoman dynasty from father to son and only carried into battle if the Sultan himself or his specifically designated representative was there in person.





Flag of the Caliphate (1517–1844)



Flag of the Caliphate (1844–1923)

History

1517-1875

For the last 400 years of its existence, the Caliphate was claimed by the Turkish Sultans of the Ottoman Empire. Though the Ottomans actively used the title only sporadically, from 1517 onwards the Ottoman Sultan came to be viewed as the *de facto* leader and representative of the Islamic world. From Constantinople (now Istanbul), the Ottomans ruled over an empire that, at its peak, covered Anatolia, most of the Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and extended deep into Eastern Europe.

Strengthened by the Peace of Westphalia, the Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution, European powers regrouped and challenged Ottoman dominance. Owing largely to poor leadership, archaic political norms, and an inability to keep pace with technological progress in Europe, the Ottoman Empire could not respond effectively to Europe's resurgence and gradually lost its position as a pre-eminent superpower.

By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's problems had evolved into crises. Territorial losses in conflicts such as the Russo-Turkish Wars substantially reduced Ottoman strength and influence, and years of financial mismanagement came to a head when the Empire defaulted on its loans in 1875.

Abdul-Hamid II, 1876-1909

Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, who ruled 1876-1909, felt that the Empire's desperate situation could only be remedied through strong and determined leadership. He distrusted his ministers and other officials that had served his predecessors and gradually reduced their role in his regime, concentrating absolute power over the Empire's governance in his own hands. Taking a hard-line against Western involvement in Ottoman affairs, he emphasized the Empire's "Islamic" character, reasserted his status as the Caliph, and called for Muslim unity behind the Caliphate.

Abdul-Hamid strengthened the Empire's position somewhat and succeeded briefly in reasserting Islamic power, by building numerous schools, reducing the national debt, and embarking on projects aimed at revitalizing the Empire's decaying infrastructure. His autocratic style of governance created a backlash that led to the end of his reign.

Western-inclined Turkish military officers opposed to Abdul-Hamid's rule had steadily organized in the form of secret societies within and outside Turkey. By 1906, the movement enjoyed the support of a significant portion of the army, and its leaders formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), informally known as the Young Turk Party. The Young Turks sought to remodel administration of the Empire along Western lines. Their ideology was nationalist in character, and was a precursor of the movement that would seize control of Turkey following World War I. Though privately disdainful of Islam and the religious establishment, CUP leaders presented their ideas to the public as a revival of true Islamic principles. Under the leadership of Enver Pasha, a Turkish military officer, the

CUP launched a military coup against the Sultan in 1908, proclaiming a new regime on July 6. Though they left Abdul-Hamid on his throne, the Young Turks compelled him to restore the parliament and constitution he had suspended thirty years earlier, thereby creating a constitutional monarchy and stripping the Caliphate of its authority.

Countercoup and 31 March Incident

A counter-coup launched by soldiers loyal to the Sultan threatened the new government but ultimately failed. After nine months into the new parliamentary term, discontent and reaction found expression in a fundamentalist movement, the counter-revolutionary 31 March Incident, which actually occurred on 13 April 1909. Many aspects of this revolt, which started within certain sections of the mutinying army in Istanbul, are still yet to be analyzed. Its generally admitted perception of a 'reactionary' movement has sometimes been challenged, given the results and effects on the young political system.

Abdul-Hamid was deposed on April 13, 1909. He was replaced by his brother Rashid Effendi, who was proclaimed Sultan Mehmed V on April 27.

Mehmed V, 1909 - 1918

With Libya

In 1911 Italy warred with the Ottomans over Libya, and Turkey's failure to defend these regions demonstrated the weakness of the Ottoman military. In 1912 Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece formed the Balkan League, an anti-Turkish alliance that subsequently launched a joint attack on the Ottoman Empire. The ensuing Balkan Wars eliminated what little presence the Ottomans had left in Europe, and only infighting between the Balkan League allies prevented them from advancing into Anatolia.

Internally, the Ottomans continued to be troubled by political instability. Nationalist uprisings that had plagued the Empire sporadically for the past fifty years intensified. The masses were growing frustrated with chronic misgovernance and Turkey's poor showing in military conflicts. In response, the CUP led a second coup d'état in 1913 and seized absolute control of the government. For the next five years, the Empire was a one-party state ruled by the CUP under the leadership of Enver Pasha (who returned to Istanbul after having served Turkey abroad in various military and diplomatic capacities since the initial coup), Minister of the Interior Talat Pasha, and Minister of the Navy Cemal Pasha. Though the Sultan was retained, he made no effort to exercise power independent of the Young Turks and was effectively their puppet. The Caliphate was thus held nominally by Mehmed V, but the authority attached to the office rested with the Young Turks.

World War I

As World War I broke out in Europe, the Young Turks struck an alliance with Germany, a move that would have disastrous consequences. The Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in November 1914, and Britain, France, and Russia immediately declared war on Ottoman Empire. As the development of the war, the empire's position continued to deteriorate, and even in the Middle East—the very heartland of the Islamic world—would soon be lost.

Call for Jihad

Though the Young Turks had compelled the Sultan in his capacity as the Caliph to declare a global jihad urging all Muslims to resist Allied encroachment on their lands, the effort was largely unsuccessful. The Young Turk government resigned en masse and Enver, Talat, and Cemal fled Turkey aboard a German warship. Sultan Mehmed VI, who was proclaimed Sultan after his brother Mehmed V died of a heart attack in July, agreed to an armistice. The Armistice of Mudros formalizing Ottoman surrender was signed aboard a British warship on October 30, 1918. Allied troops arrived in Istanbul and occupied the Sultan's palace shortly thereafter. see:Proclamation of the Sherif of Mecca ^[1]

Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire

By the end of the war, the Ottomans had lost virtually their entire Empire. Hoping to keep his throne and preserve the Ottoman dynasty in some form or another, the Sultan agreed to cooperate with the Allies, see Occupation of Constantinople. He dissolved parliament and allowed an Allied military administration to replace the government vacated by the Young Turks.

Khilafat Movement

The Khilafat movement (1919–1924) was a political campaign launched mainly by Muslims in India to influence the British government to protect the Caliphate during the Aftermath of World War I.

The defeat of the Ottomans and the Allied occupation of Istanbul left the Ottoman state and the Caliphate with no solid basis. The Khilafat movement sought to remedy this. The movement gained force after the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, which codified the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.^[2] In some regions, Khilafat cause was perceived as Islamic fundamentalism based on a pan-Islamic agenda.

Abolition

The Turkish national movement, as the details explained in Turkish War of Independence forms a Turkish Grand National Assembly, secured formal recognition of the nation's independence and new borders on July 23, 1923 through the Treaty of Lausanne. The National Assembly declared Turkey a republic on October 29 and proclaimed Ankara its new capital. After nearly 700 years, the Ottoman Empire had officially ceased to exist. However, under Allied direction, the Sultan pledged to suppress such movements and secured an official fatwa from the Sheikh ul-Islam declaring them to be un-Islamic. But the nationalists steadily gained momentum and began to enjoy widespread support. Many sensed that the nation was ripe for revolution. In an effort to neutralize this threat, the Sultan agreed to hold elections, with the hope of placating and co-opting the nationalists. To his dismay, nationalist groups swept the polls, prompting him to again dissolve parliament in April 1920.



The last Caliph Abdul Mejid II

Initially, the National Assembly seemed willing to allow a place for the Caliphate in the new regime, agreeing to the appointment of Mehmed's cousin Abdul Mejid II as Caliph upon Mehmed's departure. But the position had been stripped of any authority, and Abdul Mejid's purely ceremonial reign would be short lived. Mustafa Kemal had been a vocal critic of the Ottoman House and its Islamic orientation. When Abdul Mejid was declared Caliph, Kemal refused to allow the traditional Ottoman ceremony to take place, bluntly declaring,

The Khalifa has no power or position except as a nominal figurehead.

In response to Abdul Mejid's petition for an increase in his allowance, Kemal wrote,

Your office, the Khalifate, is no more than an historic relic. It has no justification for existence. It is a piece of impertinence that you should dare write to any of my secretaries!

Still, for all the power he had already wielded in Turkey, Kemal did not dare to abolish the Caliphate outright, as it still commanded a considerable degree of support from the common people.

Then an event happened which was to deal a fatal blow to the Caliphate. Two Indian brothers, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali, leaders of the Indian-based Khilafat Movement, distributed pamphlets calling upon the Turkish people to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate for the sake of Islam. Under Turkey's new nationalist government, however, this was construed as foreign intervention, and any form of foreign intervention was labeled an insult to

Turkish sovereignty, and worse, a threat to State security. Kemal promptly seized his chance. On his initiative, the National Assembly abolished the Caliphate on March 3, 1924. Abdul Mejid was sent into exile along with the remaining members of the Ottoman House, marking the official end of the "Ottoman Caliphate".

See also

- Ottoman Caliphate ^[3]
- Caliph
- Ottoman Empire
- Caliphate
- List of Ottoman Empire territories
- Timeline of the Ottoman Empire


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- [1] http://books.google.com/books?vid=0AAZldl8k4G5MNLeIG&id=trmPvyYVRhgC&pg=PA17&as_brr=1
- [2] Encyclopaedia Britannica
- [3] <http://www.waitmeturkey.com/ottoman-caliphate.html>

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Sokoto Caliphate

Sokoto Caliphate	
— Traditional state —	
<div><div></div><div>Flag</div></div>	
<div></div> <div>Sokoto Caliphate in 1893</div>	
Coordinates: 11°04'N 7°42'E	
Country	<div><div></div><div></div>Nigeria</div>
State	
Government	
- Sultan	Sa'adu Abubakar

The **Sokoto Caliphate** is an Islamic spiritual community in Nigeria, led by the Sultan of Sokoto, Sa'adu Abubakar. Founded during the Fulani Jihad in 1809 by Usuman dan Fodio^[1], it was one of the most powerful empires in sub-Saharan Africa prior to European conquest and colonization. The caliphate remained extant through the colonial period and afterwards, though with reduced power.

Background

The Fulani are traditionally a nomadic, pastoral community, herding cattle, goats and sheep, populating grasslands between the towns throughout West Africa. With increasing trade, a good number of Fulani also have settled in towns, forming a distinct minority.

The Fulani became mostly Muslims, as were the rulers of most of the states in the region the Fulani inhabit. The Islam of the rulers of these states was quite fragile, however, and they quickly reverted to the nationalistic animist religions when threatened. Over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Fulani began to launch scattered uprisings against rulers who were oppressing them. These established a number of small, and usually briefly lived, emirates in the west of the Sahel.

The most powerful states in the region were the city-states of Hausaland. They had large Fulani populations, who were generally considered second class citizens. Over the centuries, however, the Hausa and Fulani had become quite integrated. One of the more marginal Hausa states was that of Gobir. Poor and on the periphery of Hausaland, it was ruled by a remnant of the defunct Songhai Empire. This rule was noted for its despotism towards both the Fulani and the Hausa peasants.

Fulani Jihad

One of the most revered religious scholars of the region, Usman dan Fodio, an urbanized Fulani, lived in Gobir. With the initial approval of Bawa, the ruler of Gobir, he was allowed to found a religious community at Degel. In exchange, dan Fodio blessed the monarchy and educated Bawa's nephew and heir Yunfa. When Yunfa became ruler, however, he decided to revoke the autonomy of dan Fodio's community and have dan Fodio assassinated.

Degel was defended, but unable to stand up to the army of Yunfa - dan Fodio and his followers retreated to Gudu. From exile dan Fodio called for a jihad against oppressors throughout the region that became the Fulani War. As a result, dan Fodio was joined by large numbers of Fulani and also many Hausa, this sparked a general uprising in Hausaland and most of the region's governments quickly fell. Dan Fodio was proclaimed as ruler of the new caliphate.

Growth of the caliphate

From this base in Hausaland the Fulani rapidly spread throughout the region. The open plains to the west were annexed, to the south the Fulani captured the northern section of Yorubaland. They were blocked in the east by the kingdom of Kanem-Bornu in 1810. Since Fulani strength was centered on powerful cavalry they could not expand very far southwards, however, as the horses were ineffective in the forests of the region and could not withstand the diseases of those latitudes. It became the largest state in Africa stretching from what is today Burkina Faso to Cameroon.

The new empire was organized into a series of emirates that were loosely controlled by dan Fodio. Under him the empire was split into two divisions, one ruled by his brother, the other by his son. In 1815 dan Fodio retired from the Sultanate and the empire passed to his son Muhammed Bello. He built up the new capital at Sokoto, turning it into a major centre. The empire in the nineteenth century is often referred to as the **Sokoto Caliphate**. Dan Fodio's brother Abdullahi dan Fodio continued to rule in the west, and this position, known as the Gwandu Emirate, was passed to his heirs but remained subordinated to Sokoto.

In addition to its military prowess, the empire became known for its scholarship. Bello, Abdullahi, and dan Fodio were all considered great scholars and despite ruling such a vast state, all three continued to produce a sizable output of poetry, and texts on religion, politics, and history. While scholarship continued in the empire after Bello's death it became divorced from political life. Over time, the empire also became far more Hausa in character, with the Hausa language becoming the official language.

The empire continued to be an economic success. Hausaland, now unified, reached a level of unprecedented prosperity and the region remained safe from raids by Saharan nomads.

While the Sultan of Sokoto was paramount, the Emirs controlling the other cities, especially Kano, steadily increased in power during the nineteenth century. In 1893 a crisis of the succession saw the rulers of Kano rise to preeminence.

Decline and fall

The empire began to collapse under pressure from European colonialism that destroyed traditional trading patterns and armed neighbouring states. When the French explorer Parfait-Louis Monteil visited Sokoto in 1891, the Caliph was at war with the Emir of Argungu, defeating Argungu the next year. Monteil claimed that Fulani power was tottering, but he was probably over-impressed by temporary unrest caused by the war and by the recent accession of the unpopular Caliph Abdul Rahman.^[2] However, in 1903 both Sokoto and Kano were sacked and the Empire collapsed, being divided between the French and British.

Colonization and modern caliphate

The colonizers preserved the Fulani emirate system as the local rulers were given considerable autonomy by the British. The Sultan of Sokoto remains to this day the main religious leader of Nigerian Muslims, and the position is still held by descendants of dan Fodio.

Notes

- [1] McKay, Hill, Buckler, Ebrey, Beck, Crowston, Weisner-Hanks. *A History of World Societies*. 8th edition. Volume C - From 1775 to the Present. 2009 by Bedford/St. Martin's. ISBN-13: 978-0-312-68298-9. "*The most important of these revivalist states, the enormous Sokoto caliphate, illustrates the general pattern. It was founded by Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817), an inspiring Muslim teacher who first won zealous followers among both the Fulani herders and Hausa peasants in the Muslim state of Gobir in the northern Sudan.*" p. 736.
- [2] Claire Hirshfield (1979). *The diplomacy of partition: Britain, France, and the creation of Nigeria, 1890-1898* (<http://books.google.ca/books?id=vDGCuqGon0gC&pg=PA37>). Springer. p. 37ff. ISBN 9024720990. . Retrieved 2010-10-10.

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External links

- (<http://www.africanholocaust.net/africankingdoms.htm#sokoto>)
- British Sokoto Conquest - 1903 (<http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/sierra/sokotocaliphate1903.htm>)

Geographical coordinates: 11°04′14″N 7°34′50″E

Khilafat Movement

The **Khilafat movement** (1919-1924) was a pan-Islamic, political campaign launched by Muslims in British India to influence the British government and to protect the Ottoman Empire during the aftermath of World War I. The position of Caliph after the Armistice of Mudros of October 1918 with the military occupation of Istanbul and Treaty of Versailles (1919) fell into a disambiguation along with the Ottoman Empire's existence. The movement gained force after the Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) which solidified the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire^[1].

In India, although mainly a Muslim religious movement, the movement became a part of the wider Indian independence movement. The movement was a topic in Conference of London (February 1920).



Khilafat activists leading a procession.

History

The Caliphate is an Islamic system of governance in which the state rules under Islamic law. Caliph literally means "successor" or "representative" and emphasizes religious authority for the head of state. It was adopted as a title by the Umayyad Caliphs and then by the Abbasid Caliphs, as well as by the Fatimid Caliphs of North Africa, the Almohad Caliphs of North Africa and Spain and the Ottoman Dynasty. Most historical Muslim rulers were sultans or amirs, and gave token obedience to a caliph who often had very little real authority. Moreover, the Muslim clergy, the ulema and the various Sufi orders, exercised more religious influence than the Caliph. In the Turkish Ottoman Empire though, the emperor himself was the Caliph.

Ottoman Caliphate

Ottoman emperor Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) had launched his Pan-Islamic program in a bid to protect the Ottoman empire from Western attack and dismemberment, and to crush the Westernizing democratic opposition in Turkey. He sent an emissary, Jamaluddin Afghani, to India in the late 19th century. The cause of the Ottoman monarch evoked religious passion and sympathy amongst Indian Muslims. Being a Caliph, the Ottoman emperor was the supreme religious and political leader of all Sunni Muslims across the world (although this authority was titular in practice).

A large number of Muslim religious leaders began working to spread awareness and develop Muslim participation on behalf of the Caliphate. Muslim religious leader Maulana Mehmud Hasan attempted to organise a national war of independence against the British with support from the Ottoman Empire. He was overthrown by a secretive nationalist group called the 'Young Turks.' Abdulhamid was succeeded by his brother Mehmed VI (1844-1918) but real power lay with the nationalists.

Partitioning

The Ottoman empire, having sided with the Central Powers during World War I, suffered a major military defeat. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) reduced its territorial extent and diminished its political influence but the victorious European powers promised to protect the Ottoman emperor's status as the Caliph. However, under the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), territories such as Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt severed from the empire.

Within Turkey, a pro-Western nationalist movement arose, Turkish national movement. During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1924) led by one of the Turkish revolutionaries, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, abolished the Treaty of Sèvres with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Pursuant to Atatürk's Reforms, the Republic of Turkey abolished the position of Caliphate in 1924 and transferred its powers within Turkey to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

Khilafat in South Asia

Although political activities and popular outcry on behalf of the caliphate emerged across the Muslim world, the most prominent activities took place in India. A prominent Muslim cleric and journalist, Maulana Mohammad Ali Jouhar had spent four years in prison for preaching resistance to the British and support for the caliphate. At the onset of the Turkish war of independence, Muslim religious leaders feared for the caliphate, which the European powers were reluctant to protect.

Ali and his brother Maulana Shaukat Ali joined with other Muslim leaders such as Sheikh Shaukat Ali Siddiqui, Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, Raees-ul-Muhajireen Barrister Jan Muhammad Junejo, Hasrat Mohani, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Dr. Hakim Ajmal Khan to form the All India Khilafat Committee. The organization was based in Lucknow, India at Hathe Shaukat Ali, the compound of Landlord Shaukat Ali Siddiqui. They aimed to build political unity amongst Muslims and use their influence to protect the caliphate. In 1920, they published the Khilafat Manifesto, which called upon the British to protect the caliphate and for Indian Muslims to unite and hold the British accountable for this purpose.

In 1920 an alliance was made between Khilafat leaders and the Indian National Congress, the largest political party in India and of the nationalist movement. Congress leader Mohandas Gandhi and the Khilafat leaders promised to work and fight together for the causes of Khilafat and *Swaraj*. Seeking to increase pressure on the British, the Khilafatists became a major part of the Non-cooperation movement — a nationwide campaign of mass, peaceful civil disobedience. The support of the Khilafatists helped Gandhi and the Congress ensure Hindu-Muslim unity during the struggle. Khilafat leaders such as Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan also grew personally close to Gandhi. These leaders founded the Jamia Millia Islamia in 1920 to promote independent education and social rejuvenation for Muslims.

The non-cooperation campaign was at first successful. Massive protests, strikes and acts of civil disobedience spread across India. Hindus and Muslims collectively offered resistance, which was largely peaceful. Gandhi, the Ali brothers and others were imprisoned by the British. However, the Congress-Khilafat alliance began withering soon. The Khilafat campaign had been opposed by other political parties such as the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. Many Hindu religious and political leaders identified the Khilafat cause as Islamic fundamentalism based on a pan-Islamic agenda.

Collapse

In wake of these disturbances, the Ali brothers began distancing themselves from Gandhi and the Congress. The Ali brothers criticised Gandhi's commitment to non-violence and severed their ties with them after he suspended all non-cooperation movement after the killing of 22 policemen at Chauri Chaura in 1922. Although holding talks with the British and continuing their activities, the Khilafat struggle weakened as Muslims were divided between working for the Congress, the Khilafat cause and the Muslim League.

The final blow came with the victory of Mustafa Kemal's forces, who overthrew the Ottoman rule to establish a pro-Western, secular republic in independent Turkey. The Khilafat leadership fragmented on different political lines. Leaders such as Dr. Ansari, Maulana Azad and Hakim Ajmal Khan remained strong supporters of Gandhi and the Congress. The Ali brothers joined the Muslim League. They would play a major role in the growth of the League's popular appeal and the subsequent Pakistan movement. There was, however, a Caliphate Conference in Jerusalem in 1931 following Turkey's abolition of the Khilafat, to determine what should be done about the caliphate.^[2]

Legacy

The Khilafat struggle evokes controversy and strong opinions. It is regarded as a political agitation based on a pan-Islamic, fundamentalist platform and being largely indifferent to the cause of Indian independence. Critics of the Khilafat see its alliance with the Congress as a marriage of convenience. Proponents of the Khilafat see it as a major milestone in improving Hindu-Muslim relations, while advocates of Pakistan and Muslim separatism see it as a major step towards establishing the separate Muslim state. The Ali brothers are regarded as founding-fathers of Pakistan, while Azad, Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan are widely celebrated as national heroes in India.

The cause of establishing an Islamic State by reviving the caliphate system has been adopted by organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami umbrella groups in South Asia, founded in 1941 by Maulana Maududi, Hizb ut Tahrir, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

See also

- Moplah Riots
- Pakistan Movement

References

- Khilafat Movement ^[3]
- Banglapedia article ^[4]

Notes

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[2] Nasr, Vali, *The Shia Revival*, Norton, (2006), p.106

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
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Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire

The **Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire** was a political event that occurred after World War I. The huge conglomeration of territories and peoples formerly ruled by the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire was divided into several new nations.^[1]

The partitioning was planned from the early days of the war,^[2] though the Ottoman Empire's opponents, called the Allies, disagreed over their contradictory post-war aims and made several dual and triple agreements.^[3] After the occupation of Istanbul by British and French troops in November, 1918, the Ottoman government collapsed completely and signed the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. However, the Turkish War of Independence forced the former Allies to return to the negotiating table before the treaty could be ratified. The Allies and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey signed and ratified the new Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, superseding the Treaty of Sèvres and solidifying most of the territorial issues. One unresolved issue was later negotiated under the League of Nations (see Mosul (1925)).

The partitioning brought the creation of the modern Arab world and the Republic of Turkey. The League of Nations granted France mandates over Syria and Lebanon and granted the United Kingdom mandates over Mesopotamia and Palestine (which was later divided into two regions: Palestine and Transjordan). Parts of the Ottoman Empire on the Arabian Peninsula became parts of what are today Saudi Arabia and Yemen.



Overview

The Ottoman Empire had been the leading Islamic state in geopolitical, cultural and ideological terms. The partitioning of the Ottoman Empire led to the rise in the "Middle East" of Western powers, such as Britain and France. The earliest resistance to the influence of these powers came from the Turkish national movement, and became more widespread in the post-Ottoman Middle East after World War II.

The partition was planned by Western powers in several agreements concerning the Ottoman Empire made during the war by the Allies. The British and French partitioned the eastern part of the Middle East (also called "Greater Syria") between them with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Other secret agreements were concluded with Italy and Russia (see map).^[4] The Balfour Declaration encouraged the international Zionist movement to push for a Jewish homeland in the Palestine region, which was the site of the ancient Kingdom of Israel and at the time had a significant Jewish minority population with respect to a majority of Arab-Muslim population. The tsarist regime also had wartime agreements with the Triple Entente on the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire but after the Russian Revolutions, Russia did not participate in the actual partitioning.

Modern Arab states

The Treaty of Sèvres formally acknowledged the new League of Nations mandates in the Middle East, the independence of Yemen, and British sovereignty over Cyprus.

French mandates

Syria became a French protectorate (thinly disguised as a League of Nations Mandate), with the Christian coastal areas split off to become Lebanon.

Mandate of Lebanon

Greater Lebanon was the name of a territory created by France. It was the precursor of modern Lebanon. It existed between 1 September 1920 and 23 May 1926. France carved its territory from the Levantine land mass (mandated by the League of Nations) in order to create a "safe haven" for the Maronite Christian population. Maronites gained self-rule and secured their position in the independent Lebanon in 1943.

French intervention on behalf of the Maronites had begun with the capitulations of the Ottoman Empire, agreements made during the 16th to the 19th centuries. In 1866, when Youssef Karam led a Maronite uprising in Mount Lebanon, a French-led naval force arrived to help, making threats against the governor, Dawood Pasha, at the Sultan's Porte and later removing Karam to safety.

British mandates

Iraq and Palestine became British mandated territories, with one of Sheriff Hussein's sons, Faisal, installed as King of Iraq. Palestine was split in half, with the eastern half becoming Transjordan to provide a throne for another of Hussein's sons, Abdullah. The western half of Palestine was placed under direct British administration, and the Jewish population was allowed to increase, initially under British protection. Most of the Arabian peninsula fell to another British ally, Ibn Saud, who created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Issue of Mosul

Great Britain and Turkey disputed control of the former Ottoman province of Mosul in the 1920s. Under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne Mosul fell under the British Mandate of Mesopotamia, but the new Turkish republic claimed the province as part of its historic heartland. A three-person League of Nations committee went to the region in 1924 to study the case and in 1925 recommended the region remain connected to Iraq, and that the UK should hold the mandate for another 25 years, to assure the autonomous rights of the Kurdish population. Turkey rejected this decision. Nonetheless, Britain, Iraq and Turkey made a treaty on 5 June 1926, that mostly followed the decision of the League Council. Mosul stayed under British Mandate of Mesopotamia until Iraq was granted independence in 1932 by the urging of King Faisal, though the British retained military bases and transit rights for their forces in the country.



Mandate of Palestine

During the war, Britain made three conflicting promises regarding the eventual fate of Palestine. Britain had promised, through British intelligence officer T. E. Lawrence (aka: *Lawrence of Arabia*), independence for a united Arab state covering most of the Arab Middle East in exchange for Arab support of the British during the war. Britain had also promised to create and foster a Jewish national home in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Lastly, the British promised via the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence that the Hashemite family would have lordship over most land in the region -in return for their support in the Great Arab Revolt.

The Arab Revolt, which was in part orchestrated by Lawrence, resulted in British forces under General Allenby defeating the Ottoman forces in 1917 and occupying Palestine and Syria. The land was administered by the British for the remainder of the war.

The United Kingdom was granted control of Palestine by the Versailles Peace Conference which established the League of Nations in 1919. Herbert Samuel, a former Postmaster General in the British cabinet who was instrumental in drafting the Balfour Declaration, was appointed the first High Commissioner in Palestine. In 1920 at the San Remo conference, in Italy, the League of Nations mandate over Palestine was assigned to Britain. In 1923 Britain transferred a part of the Golan Heights to the French Mandate of Syria, in exchange for the Metula region.



The surrender of Jerusalem to the British on December 9th, 1917 after the Battle of Jerusalem.

Independence movements

When the Ottomans departed, the Arabs proclaimed an independent state in Damascus, but were too weak, militarily and economically, to resist the European powers for long, and Britain and France soon re-established control.

During the 1920s and '30s Iraq, Syria and Egypt moved towards independence, although the British and French did not formally depart the region until after World War II. But in Palestine, the conflicting forces of Arab nationalism and Zionism created a situation which the British could neither resolve nor extricate themselves from. The rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany created a new urgency in the Zionist quest to create a Jewish state in Palestine. (For a detailed account of this, see the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the History of Palestine.)

Anatolia

The Russians, British, Italians, French, Greeks, Armenians and Turks all made claims to Anatolia, based on a welter of wartime promises, military actions, secret agreements, and treaties.

Russia

The tsarist regime wanted to replace the Muslim residents of Northern Anatolia and Istanbul with Cossack settlers. In March, 1915, Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov told British Ambassador George Buchanan and French Ambassador Maurice Paléologue that a lasting postwar settlement demanded Russian possession of "the city of Constantinople, the western shore of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmara, and Dardanelles, as well as southern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line," and "a part of the Asiatic coast between the Bosphorus, the Sakarya River, and a point to be determined on the shore of the Bay of İzmit."^[5] These documents were made public by the Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* in November 1917, to gain the support of the Armenian public for the revolution.^[6] However, the Russian revolution took the Russians out of the secret plans.

Britain

The British sought control over the straits of Marmara, and occupied Istanbul (along with the French) from November 13, 1918 to September 23, 1923. After the Turkish War of Independence and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the troops left the city.

Italy

Under the 1917 Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne between France, Italy and the United Kingdom, Italy was to receive all southwestern Anatolia except the Adana region, including İzmir. However, in 1919 the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, obtained the permission of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 to occupy İzmir, overriding the provisions of the agreement.

France

Under the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the French obtained Hatay, Lebanon and Syria and expressed a desire for part of South-Eastern Anatolia. The 1917 Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne between France, Italy and the United Kingdom allotted France the Adana region.

The French army occupied parts of Anatolia from 1919 to 1921, including coal mines, railways, the Black Sea ports of Zonguldak and Karadeniz Ereğli, İstanbul (along with the British), Uzunköprü in Eastern Thrace and the region of Cilicia. France eventually withdrew from all these areas, after the Accord of Ankara, the Armistice of Mudanya, the Treaty of Ankara and the Treaty of Lausanne. These conflicts were also called the Cilicia war (French: La guerre en Cilicie, Turkish: Güney Cephesi - the southern front).

Greece

The western Allies, particularly British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, promised Greece territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire if Greece entered the war on the Allied side. The promised territories included eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), and parts of western Anatolia around the city of İzmir.

In May 1917, after the exile of Constantine, Greek prime minister Eleuthérios Venizélos returned to Athens and allied with the Entente. Greek military forces (though divided between supporters of the monarchy and supporters of Venizélos) began to take part in military operations against the Bulgarian army on the border. That same year, İzmir was promised to Italy under the Agreement of St.-Jean-de-Maurienne between France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

At the 1918 Paris Peace Conference, based on the wartime promises, Venizélos lobbied hard for an expanded Hellas (the Megali Idea)) that would include the large Greek communities in Northern Epirus, Thrace (including Constantinople) and Asia Minor. In 1919, despite Italian opposition, he obtained the permission of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 for Greece to occupy İzmir.



South West Caucasian Republic

The South West Caucasian Republic was an entity established on Russian territory in 1918, after the withdrawal of Ottoman troops to the pre-WWI border as a result of the Armistice of Mudros. It had a nominally independent provisional government headed by Fakhr al-Din Pirioghlu and based in Kars.



After fighting broke out between it and both Georgia and Armenia, British High Commissioner Admiral Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe occupied Kars on April 19, 1919, abolishing its parliament and arresting 30 members of its government. He placed Kars province under Armenian rule.

Armenia


In the later years of the war, the Armenians established a provisional government, then a republic. Military conflicts between the Turks and Armenians both during and after the war eventually determined the borders of the Armenian state.

Administration for Western Armenia

In April, 1915, Russia supported the establishment of the Armenian provisional government under governor Aram Manougian, the leader of Van Resistance. The Armenian national liberation movement hoped that Armenia could be liberated from the Ottoman regime in exchange for helping the Russian army. However, the tsarist regime had secret wartime agreements with the Triple Entente about the eventual fate of several Anatolian territories.^[7] These plans were made public by the revolutionaries in 1917 to gain the support of the Armenian public.^[8]

In the meantime, the provisional government had become more stable, as more Armenians moved into its territory. In 1917, 150,000 Armenians relocated to the provinces of Erzurum, Bitlis, Mush and Van.^[9] And Armen Garo (known as Karekin Pastirmacyan) and other Armenian leaders asked for the Armenian regulars in the European theatre to be transferred to the Caucasian front.

The Russian revolution left the front in eastern Turkey in a state of flux. In December 1917 a truce was signed by representatives of



the Ottoman Empire and the Transcaucasian Commissariat. However, the Ottoman Empire began to reinforce its Third Army on the eastern front. Fighting began in mid-February 1918. Armenians, under heavy pressure from the Ottoman army and Kurdish irregulars, were forced to withdraw from Erzincan to Erzurum and then to Kars, eventually evacuating even that city on 25 April. As a response to the Ottoman advances, the Transcaucasian Commissariat evolved into the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation; its disintegration resulted in Armenians forming the Democratic Republic of Armenia on 30 May 1918. The Treaty of Batum, signed on the 4th June, reduced the Armenian republic to an area of only 11,000 square km.

Wilsonian Armenia

At the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, the Armenian Diaspora and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation argued that Historical Armenia, the region which had remained outside the control of the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1918, should be part of the Democratic Republic of Armenia. Arguing from the principles in Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech, the Armenian Diaspora argued Armenia had "the ability to control the region", based on the Armenian control established after the Russian Revolution. The Armenians also argued that the dominant population of the region was becoming more Armenian as Turkish inhabitants were moving to the western provinces. Boghos Nubar, the president of the Armenian National Delegation added: "In the Caucasus, where, without mentioning the 150,000 Armenians in the Imperial Russian Army, more than 40,000 of their volunteers contributed to the liberation of a portion of the Armenian vilayets, and where, under the command of their leaders, Antranik and Nazerbekoff, they, alone among the peoples of the Caucasus, offered resistance to the Turkish armies, from the beginning of the Bolshevik withdrawal right up to the signing of an armistice."^[10]

President Wilson accepted the Armenian arguments for drawing the frontier and wrote: "The world expects of them (the Armenians), that they give every encouragement and help within their power to those Turkish refugees who may desire to return to their former homes in the districts of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis remembering that these peoples, too, have suffered greatly."^[11] The conference agreed with his suggestion that the Democratic Republic of Armenia should expand into present-day eastern Turkey.

Republic of Turkey

Between 1918 and 1923, Turkish resistance movements led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk forced the Greeks and Armenians out of Anatolia, while the Italians never established a presence. The Turkish revolutionaries also suppressed Kurdish attempts to become independent in the 1920s. After the Turkish resistance gained control over Anatolia, there was no hope of meeting the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres.

Before joining Soviet Union, Democratic Republic of Armenia signed the Treaty of Alexandropol, on December 2, 1920, agreeing to the current borders between the two countries. Afterwards Armenia became an integral part of the Soviet Union. These borders were ratified again with the Treaty of Moscow (1921) with which the Bolsheviks ceded the already Turkish occupied provinces of Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan, and Artvin to Turkey in exchange for Adjara region with capital Batumi.

Turkey and the newly-formed Soviet Union, along with Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic ratified the Treaty of Kars on September 11, 1922, establishing the north-eastern border of Turkey and bringing peace to the region. Finally, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, formally ended all hostilities and led to the creation of the modern Turkish republic.

See also

- Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire

Notes

- [1] Roderic H. Davison; Review "From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920. by Paul C. Helmreich" in *Slavic Review*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Mar., 1975), pp. 186-187
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 - [3] Herbert Henry Asquith, (1923) *The genesis of the war*. p 82
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 - [5] Armenia on the Road to Independence,' 1967, pg. 59
 - [6] The Republic of Armenia, Hovannisian, R.G.
 - [7] Armenia on the Road to Independence,' 1967, pg. 59
 - [8] The Republic of Armenia, Hovannisian, R.G.
 - [9] The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth... By Richard G. (EDT) Hovannisian
 - [10] letter to French Foreign Office - December 3, 1918
 - [11] President Wilson's Acceptance letter for drawing the frontier given to the Paris Peace Conference, Washington, November 22, 1920.
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Atatürk's Reforms

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (series)	
Personal life	Birth date · Name · Early life (Education) · Family · Character · Religious beliefs · Will · Publications
Military career	Early period · Gallipoli · Caucasus · Sinai and Palestine
Independence War	Establishment · Conflicts · Peace
Atatürk's Reforms & Kemalist ideology	
Gallery: Picture, Sound, Video	

Atatürk's Reforms (Turkish: *Atatürk Devrimleri*) were a series of political, legal, cultural, social and economic reforms that were designed to modernize the new Republic of Turkey into a democratic and secular nation-state. They were implemented under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in accordance with Kemalist ideology.

The reform movement began with the modernization of the constitution, including enacting the new Constitution of 1924, and the adaptation of European laws and jurisprudence to the needs of the new republic. This was followed by a thorough secularization and modernization of the administration, with particular focus on the education system. The development of industry was promoted by strategies such as import substitution and the founding of state enterprises and state banks^[1]. Central to these reforms were the belief that Turkish society would have to Westernize itself both politically and culturally in order to modernize.^[2]

Political reforms

Until the moment the republic was formally proclaimed, the Ottoman Empire was still in existence, with its heritage of religious and dynastic authority. The dynasty was abolished by the Ankara Government, but its traditions and cultural symbols remained active among the people (though less so among the elite). Atatürk's political reforms involved a number of fundamental institutional changes that would see the end of these traditions, and a carefully planned program of political change was implemented to unravel the complex system that had developed over the centuries.^[3]



Departure of Mehmed VI, the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 1922

Not only were all the social institutions of Turkish society reorganized, but the social and political values of the state were replaced as well.^[4] This new, secular state ideology was to become known as Kemalism, and it is the basis of the democratic Turkish republic. Since the establishment of the republic the Turkish military has perceived itself as the guardian of Kemalism, and it has intervened in Turkish politics to that end on several occasions, including the overthrow of civilian governments by coup d'état. While this may seem contrary to democratic ideals, it was argued by military authorities and secularists as necessary in the light of Turkish history, ongoing efforts to maintain secular government, and the fact that the reforms were implemented at a time when the military occupied 16.9% of the professional job positions (the corresponding figure today is only 3%).^[4]

Establishment of the Republic

The most fundamental reforms allowed the Turkish nation to exercise popular sovereignty through representative democracy. This involved dissolving the two main offices that had claims over the sovereignty of the people; the Ottoman Dynasty on November 1, 1922, and the Caliphate on March 3, 1924. Following the latter, the Sultan and his family were declared *personae non gratae* of Turkey and exiled.

Those ancient institutions were replaced by the Turkish Republic ("Türkiye Cumhuriyeti") that was proclaimed on October 29, 1923 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly by a law, and subsequently by adoption of the Constitution of 1924. The bicameral system of the Ottoman Empire — composed of an Upper House of *viziers*, assigned by the Sultan, and a Lower House of *deputies* selected by two-level elections — was dissolved, which had already been defunct since the Allied Invasion of Istanbul in 1920 and consequently, the foundation of the Turkish Grand National Assembly the same year. The new system, which gave primacy to national independence and popular sovereignty, established the offices of Prime Minister and President while placing legislative power within a unicameral Grand National Assembly. The Assembly was elected by direct election using a type of proportional representation.

The establishment of the Republic did not mean the end of reform, as Atatürk and his fellow 'revolutionaries' continually presented their reform agenda before the National Assembly, the only body with authority to approve the necessary laws.


The direct involvement of the executive at this level of the legislative process may have been contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the new constitution (and the concept of the separation of power expected within a representative democracy), but it was legitimised by the ongoing approval of the electorate. Through this, at least at the legislative level, the fledgling democracy developed while awaiting the true multi-party elections that were to take place in 1946.

Secularism

The establishment of popular sovereignty involved confronting centuries-old traditions. As such, the reform process was characterized by a struggle between progressives and conservatives; on one side Atatürk and his reform-minded liberal elite, on the other the broad mass of uneducated, conservative common people.

The changes meant the end of the millet system of religious/ethnic communities. The people of each millet had traditionally enjoyed a degree of autonomy, with their own leadership, collecting their own taxes and living according to their own system of religious/cultural law. Under the Kemalist reforms official recognition of the Ottoman millets was withdrawn. It was replaced by a common, secular authority. Many of the religious communities failed to adjust to the new regime. This was exacerbated by the emigration or impoverishment, due to deteriorating economic conditions, of families that hitherto had financially supported community institutions such as hospitals and schools.

The secularism of the Kemalism is not antitheistic or anti-Islamic. In fact, the Kemalist state's support for Islam was demonstrated by the establishment of Directorate for Religious Affairs (Turkish: *Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*), created "to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion,



President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk leaves the Turkish Parliament in Ankara after a meeting. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü is to the left of the frame.

and administer the sacred worshipping places". This is also true for other religions. It acted firmly against anti-religious acts. The government asserted the equality of religions and free worship rights of all Turkish citizens in their own private space to the protection of the Republic. The state protected freedom of worship while itself standing aloof of any form of religious influence. Kemalist ideology targeted political Islam, but it posed a threat to the independence of the state and its ability to govern with equal concern for all.

The changes were both conceptually radical and culturally significant. The religious education system was replaced by a national education system on March 3, 1924, and the office of caliphate, held by the Ottomans since 1517, was abolished on the same day. The Islamic courts and Islamic canon law gave way to a secular law structure based on the Swiss Civil Code.

Milestones


November 1, 1922	Abolition of the office of the Ottoman Sultan.
October 29, 1923	Proclamation of the Republic - Republic of Turkey.
March 3, 1924	Abolition of the office of Caliphate held by the Ottoman Caliphate.

Social reforms

The Kemalist reforms brought effective social change on education, by establishing a public education system, and women's suffrage. However, attempts to reform the Ottoman system of feudalism (Turkish: *Ağalık*) were less well-received. Some social institutions had religious overtones, and held considerable influence over public life.

Religious insignia

The Ottoman Empire had a social system based on religious affiliation and religious insignia extended to every social function. It was common to wear clothing that identified the person with their own particular religious grouping and accompanied headgear which distinguish "rank", "profession" throughout the Ottoman Empire. The turbans, fezes, bonnets and head-dresses surmounting Ottoman styles show the "sex", "rank" and "profession" (both civil and military). These styles were accompanied with a strict regulation beginning with the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. Sultan Mahmud II followed on the example of Peter the Great in Russia in modernizing the Empire and used the dress code of 1826 which developed the symbols (classifications) of feudalism among the public. Kemalist view of change, like the Reforms of Peter I of Russia or Sultan Mahmud II, was achieved through introduction of the progressive customs by decrees, while banning the traditional customs. The view of their social change proposed; if the permanence of secularism was to be assured by removal of persistence of traditional cultural values (the religious insignia), a considerable degree of cultural receptivity by the public to the further social change could be achieved. The "dress code" give a chance for removal of persistence of traditional values in the society.



Kemalists defined a non-civilized (non-scientific, non-positivist) person as one who functioned within the boundaries of superstition. The ulema was not a scientific group, and it was acting according to superstitions

developed throughout centuries. Their name was "*Gerici*". On February 25, 1925 parliament passed a law stating that religion was not to be used as a tool in politics. The question became how this law could be brought to life in a country whose scholars are dominated by the ulema. Kemalist ideology waged a war against superstition by banning the practices of the ulema and promoting the civilized way ("westernization"), with establishing lawyers, teachers, doctors. The ban on the ulema's social existence came in the form of "dress code." The strategic goal was to change the large influence of the ulema over politics by removing them from the social arena. However, there was the danger of being perceived as anti-religious. Kemalists defended themselves by stating "Islam viewed all forms of superstition (non-scientific) nonreligious". The ulema's power was established during the Ottoman Empire with the conception that secular institutions were all subordinate to religion; the ulema were emblems of religious piety, and therefore rendering them powerful over state affairs.^[5] Kemalists claimed "the state will be ruled by positivism not superstition." A good example was the practice of medicine. Kemalists wanted to get rid of superstition extending to herbal medicine, potion, and religious therapy for mental illness, all of which were practised by the ulema. They excoriated those who used herbal medicine, potions, and balms, and instituted penalties against the religious men who claimed they have a say in health and medicine. On September 1, 1925, the first Turkish Medical Congress was assembled, which was only four days after Mustafa Kemal was seen on August 27 at Inebolu wearing a modern hat and one day after the Kastamonu speech on August 30.

Official measures were gradually introduced to eliminate the wearing of religious clothing and other overt signs of religious affiliation. Beginning in 1923, a series of laws progressively limited the wearing of selected items of traditional clothing. Mustafa Kemal first made the hat compulsory to the civil servants.^[6] The guidelines for the proper dressing of students and state employees (public space controlled by state) was passed during his lifetime. After most of the relatively better educated civil servants adopted the hat with their own he gradually moved further. The Hat Law of 1925 introduced the use of Western style hats instead of the fez. Legislation did not explicitly prohibit veils or headscarves and focused instead on banning fezzes and turbans for men.

Another control on the dress was passed in 1934 with the law relating to the wearing of 'Prohibited Garments'. It banned religion-based clothing, such as the veil and turban, while actively promoting western-style attire.

Convents and dervish lodges

Social change also included centuries old religious social structures that has been deeply rooted within the society, some are established within the state organisation of the Ottoman Empire. The abolishment of caliphate position removed the highest religious-political position at the government level, but left the Muslim brotherhoods (Muslim associations for any purpose, working as a society of Muslim believers) who were institutionalized under convents and dervish lodges, which were the official establishment of the extension of political power among the society without any organizing structure. By enactment of the law related to religious covenants and dervish lodges, such institutions declared totally illegal.

Women's rights

The reforms in the Turkish civil code, including those affecting women's suffrage, were "breakthroughs not only within the Islamic world but also in the western world".^[7]

Legal equality between the sexes was instituted between 1926–1934 with changes to a multitude of rules and regulations. Women gained many rights for the first time, including the rights to vote.

Turkish women's rights campaigners differed from their sisters (and sympathetic brothers) in other countries. Rather than fighting directly for their basic rights and equality, they saw their best chance in the promotion and maintenance of Kemalist reform, with its espousal of secular values and equality for all, including women.^[8]

Turkish women are now free to cover their heads or not. Despite this now longstanding freedom, many women, especially older women, still feel compelled to cover their heads. Georgia Scott, an American magazine art director who spent a year surveying women's head coverings, offers the following quote to illustrate the generational differences in attitude towards headware in modern Turkey:

"My mother and grandmother covered every day. They could never go outside and feel the air, or go on a boat and feel the mist. My mother still covers. I hate it, and I would never want to like that."^[9]



Eighteen female MPs joined the Turkish Parliament with the 1935 general elections, at a time when women in a significant number of other European countries had no voting rights. In 1993 Tansu Çiller became the first female Prime Minister of Turkey.

Milestones

November 25, 1925	Change of headgear and dress
November 30, 1925	Closure of religious convents and dervish lodges.
June 21, 1934	Law on family names.
November 26, 1934	Abolition of titles and by-names.

Legal reforms

The Ottoman Empire was a religious empire in which each religious community enjoyed a large degree of autonomy (See Millet). Each millet had an internal system of governance based upon its religious law, such as Sharia, Catholic Canon law, or Jewish Halakha.



Atatürk during a visit at the Law School of Istanbul University



Atatürk at the library of the Çankaya Presidential Residence in Ankara



Atatürk at the Istanbul University, the first modern university in Turkey

The leading legal reforms instituted by Mustafa Kemal included a secular constitution (laïcité) with the complete separation of government and religious affairs, the replacement of Islamic courts and Islamic canon law with a secular civil code based on the Swiss model, and a penal code based on that of Italy (1924–37). The reforms also instituted legal equality and full political rights for both sexes December 5, 1934, well before several other European nations.

In 1920, and today, the Islamic Law does not contain provisions regulating the sundry relationships of "political institutions" and "commercial transactions".^[10] The Ottoman Empire dissolved not only because of its outdated systems, but also its traditions were

not applicable to the demands of its time. For example, the rules relating to "criminal cases" which were shaped under Islamic Law were limited in serving their purpose adequately.^[10] Beginning with the 19th century, the Ottoman Islamic codes and legal provisions generally were impracticable in dealing with the wider concept of social systems. The non-Muslim millet affected with the Age of Enlightenment in Europe modernized the Christian Law. Islamic Law and Christian Law^[11] became drastically different. Polygamy has not been practiced by law-abiding citizens of Turkey after Atatürk's reforms, in contrast to the former rules of the Megelle.^[12] There were thousands of articles in the Megelle which were not used due to their inapplicability.

Legal reforms of Kemal could be perceived as the last step of a failed history of modernization in Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire tried to modernize the code with the reforms of 1839 (Hatt-i Sharif). Hatt-i Sharif tried to end the confusion in the judicial sphere by extending the legal equality to all citizens. In 1841 a criminal code was drawn up. When the Empire dissolved, there was still no legislation with regard to family and marital relationships^[10]. The adaptation of laws relating to family and marital relationships is an important step which is attributed to Mustafa Kemal.


Milestones

December 5, 1934	Full political rights to women, to vote and be elected.
March 1, 1926	Introduction of the new penal law modeled after the Italian penal code.
October 4, 1926	Introduction of the new civil code modeled after the Swiss civil code.
February 5, 1937	The inclusion of the principle of laïcité in the constitution.

Educational reforms


The educational reforms combined with the opening of *People's Houses* throughout the country and the active encouragement of people by Atatürk himself with many trips to the countryside teaching the new alphabet. However, "its effect on the struggle against illiteracy was disappointing".^[13]

The literacy reform was also supported by strengthening the private publishing sector with a new *Law on Copyrights* and congresses for discussing the issues of copyright, public education and scientific publishing.



Unification

The unification of education had two important features. The first one was the democratization and the second one was to activate secularism in the field of education. Unification came with the Law on Unification of National Education, which introduced three regulations:^[14] First, all medreses and schools administered by private foundations or the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency for Religious Affairs) were connected to the Ministry of National Education. Second, the money allocated to schools and medreses from the budget of the Diyanet was transferred to the education budget. Third, the Ministry of Education had to open a religious faculty for training higher religious experts within the system of higher education, and separate schools for training imams and hatips.



With the unification of education, along with the closure of the old-style universities, applied a large-scale program of science transfer from Europe. One of the corner stone of educational

institutions, the University of Istanbul, accepted German and Austrian scientists who the National Socialist regime in Germany had considered 'racially' or politically undesirable. This political decision was accepted as the building the nucleus of science as a modern institution in Turkey^[1]. The reform aimed to break away the traditional dependency [since the Ottoman Empire] on the transfer of science and technology by foreign experts^[1].

Language reforms

On November 1, 1928, the new Turkish alphabet was introduced by the *Language Commission* at the initiative of Atatürk, replacing the previously used Perso-Arabic script. The adoption of the Latin alphabet and the purging of foreign loanwords was part of Mustafa Kemal's program of modernization.^[15]

The removal of Arabic script was defended on the ground that it was not appropriate for the authentic Turkish phonology, which needs a new set of symbols to be correctly represented.^[15] The Ottoman Perso-Arabic script was an abjad, which made it too ambiguous for the Turkish language, in which vowels are far more important than in Arabic. A well-known example of the deficiency of the Arabic script is the phrase *ودلوا اشاپ دمحم*, which can represent either *Mehmet Paşa oldu* (Muhammad became a Pasha) or *Mehmet Paşa öldü* (Muhammad Pasha died). Ottoman writers had to work around such ambiguities via circumlocutions, usually of Persian or Arabic origin.

The abandonment of the Arabic script was not merely a symbolic expression of secularization by breaking the link to Ottoman Islamic texts to which only a minor group of ulema had access; but also Latin script would make reading and writing easier to learn and consequently improve the literacy rate.

Adaptation of technical vocabulary was another step of modernization, which was tried thoroughly. Non-technical Turkish was vernacularized and simplified on the ground that the language of Turkish people should be comprehensible by the people. A good example is the Turkish word "Bilgisayar" (*bilgi* = "information", *sayar* = "counter"), which was adapted for the word "Computer".

Another important part of Atatürk's reforms encompassed his emphasis on the Turkish language and history, leading to the establishment of Turkish Language Association and Turkish Historical Society for research on Turkish language and history, during the years 1931–2.

Milestones



Atatürk introducing the new Turkish alphabet at the central Anatolian city of Sivas on September 20, 1928

March 3, 1924	The unification of education
November 1, 1928	Adoption of the new Turkish alphabet
1931	Establishment of Turkish Language Association for regulating the Turkish language
1932	Establishment of Turkish Historical Society for research on history
January 1, 1928	Establishment of Turkish Education Association for supporting children in financial need and contributing to the educational life.
(May 31, 1933)	Regulation of the university education

Economic reforms

Economic reforms included the establishment of many state-owned factories throughout the country for the agriculture, machine making and textile industries.

Many of these grew into successful enterprises and were privatized during the latter part of 20th century.

Atatürk considered the development of a national rail network as another important step for industrialization. In 1927 he established the Turkish State Railways, developing an extensive rail network in a relatively short timespan.

Milestones

24 July 1923	Abolition of the capitulations with the Treaty of Lausanne
1927	Establishment of the Turkish State Railways
1924	The Weekend Act (Workweek: Monday to Friday become work days)
1925	Establishment of model farms; Atatürk Orman Çiftliği
1925	The International Time and Calendar System (Gregorian calendar, Time zone)
1926	The Obligation Law
1926	The Commercial Law
1933	The System of Measures (International System of Units)
1933	First Five Year Development Plan (Planned economy)
1937	Second Five Year Development Plan (Planned economy)

Criticism

Source

The reforms were guided by educational and scientific progress, and based on the principles of positivist and rationalist enlightenment. Members of Republican People's Party, mostly graduates of the 'modern schools' that were established during Tanzimat era, applied their western-inspired modernization to all areas of government.^[1]

Effectiveness

Some people thought that the pace of change under Atatürk was too rapid as, in his quest to modernize Turkey, he effectively abolished centuries-old traditions. Nevertheless, the bulk of the population willingly accepted the reforms, even though some were seen as reflecting the views of the urban elites at the expense of the generally illiterate inhabitants of the rural countryside, where religious sentiments and customary norms tended to be stronger.^[16]

Probably the most controversial area of reform was that of religion. The policy of state secularism ("active neutrality") met with opposition at the time and it continues to generate a considerable degree of social and political tension. However, any political movement that attempts to harness religious sentiment at the expense of Turkish secularism is likely to face the opposition of the armed forces, which has always regarded itself as the principal and most faithful guardian of secularism. Some assert that a historical example is the case of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who was overthrown by the military in 1960.^[17] He and two of his Ministers were hanged by the Military Tribunal. However, their charges were not for being anti-secular. Although Menderes did relax some restrictions on religion he also banned the millet party which was avowedly Islamist. Further, the charges at the Military Tribunal did not involve antisecular activities and it can be concluded that Menderes was overall in favour of the secular system.

Reform or Revolution

The Turkish name for Atatürk's Reforms literally means "Atatürk's Revolutions", as, strictly speaking, the changes were too profound to be described as mere 'reforms'. It also reflects the belief that those changes, implemented as they were during the Single-Party period, were more in keeping with the attitudes of the country's progressive elite than with a general populace accustomed to centuries of Ottoman stability – an attempt to convince a people so-conditioned of the merits of such far-reaching changes would test the political courage of any government subject to multi-party conditions.

See also

- Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
- History of the Republic of Turkey
- Modernization

Notes

- [1] Regine ERICHSEN, «Scientific Research and Science Policy in Turkey», in Cemoti, n° 25 - Les Ouïgours au vingtième siècle, [En ligne], mis en ligne le 5 décembre 2003.
- [2] S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and Analytical Remarks," in J. Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, 3–16.
- [3] Jacob M. Landau "Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey" page 57.
- [4] Ali Arslan "The evaluation of parliamentary democracy in turkey and Turkish political elites" HAOL, núm. 6 (invierno, 2005), 131–141.
- [5] Inalcik, Halil. 1973. "Learning, the Medrese, and the Ulemas." In *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600*. New York: Praeger, pp. 171.
- [6] İğdemir, *Atatürk*, 165–170
- [7] Necla Arat in Marvin Howe's *Turkey today*, page 18.
- [8] Nüket Kardam "Turkey's Engagement With Global Women's Human Rights" page 88.
- [9] Georgia Scott 2003 *Headwraps: A Global Journey*, page 89.
- [10] TIMUR, Hıfzı. 1956. "The Place of Islamic Law in Turkish Law Reform", *Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul*. Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası.
- [11] For the law system used by the Christian millets, see Millet (Ottoman Empire).
- [12] Dr. Ayfer Altay "Difficulties Encountered in the Translation of Legal Texts: The Case of Turkey", *Translation Journal* volume 6, No. 4.
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- [16] Kinross, p. 503.
- [17] Kinross, p. 504.

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External links

 Media related to Atatürk's Reforms at Wikimedia Commons

- Ministry of National Education and Culture, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (<http://www.mebnet.net/ataturk/inlilaplar.htm>) (**Turkish**)

Political aspects of Islam

Political aspects of Islam are derived from the Qur'an, the Sunna (the sayings and living habits of Muhammad), Muslim history, and sometimes elements of political movements outside Islam.

Traditional political concepts in Islam include leadership by successors to the Prophet known as Caliphs, (Imamate for Shia); the importance of following Islamic law or Sharia; the duty of rulers to seek Shura or consultation from their subjects; and the importance of rebuking unjust rulers but not encouraging rebellion against them.^[1] A sea change in the Islamic world was the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, which some believed meant an end to the Islamic state both in "symbolic and practice terms".^[2]

In the 19th and 20th century a common theme has been resistance to Western imperialism, particularly the British Empire, and sometimes the perceived racist policies that discriminated against some Muslims. The defeat of Arab armies in the Six Day War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism as a viable alternative with the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War has increased the appeal of Islamism and Islamic fundamentalist movements, especially in the context of popular dissatisfaction with ruling regimes in the Muslim world.

Introduction

Islam is a religion that has existed for over fourteen centuries, in many different countries. As such, diverse political movements in many different contexts have used the banner of Islam to lend legitimacy to their causes. Not surprisingly, many aspects of Islamic politics are subject to much disagreement and contention between different interpretations, particularly between conservative Islamists and liberal movements within Islam.

Islamist or Islamic parties exist in almost every democracy with a Muslim majority. This term has many different meanings which this article will explore, along with links to other political trends.

The controversial term Islamofascism has also been coined by some non-Muslims to describe the political and religious philosophies of some militant Islamic groups. Both terms lump together a large variety of groups with varying histories and contexts. The articles on militant Islamic groups, Islamic parties and modern Islamic philosophy explain some of their actual views in detail.

Muhammad, the Medinan state and Islamic political ideals

Islamists claim that the origins of Islam as a political movement are to be found in the life and times of Islam's prophet, Muhammad and his successors, (depending on the Islamist). In 622 CE, in recognition of his claims to prophethood, Muhammad was invited to rule the city of Medina. At the time the local Arab tribes of Aus and Khazraj dominated the city, and were in constant conflict. Medinans saw in Muhammad an impartial outsider who could resolve the conflict. Muhammad and his followers thus moved to Medina, where Muhammad drafted the Medina Charter. This document made Muhammad the ruler, and recognized him as the Prophet of Allah. The laws Muhammad established during his rule, based on the revelations of the Quran and doing of Muhammad, are considered by Muslims to be Sharia or Islamic law, which Islamic movements seek to replicate in the present day. Muhammad gained a widespread following and an army, and his rule expanded first to the city of Mecca and then spread through the Arabian peninsula through a combination of diplomacy and military conquest.

Early Caliphate and political ideals

After death of Muhammad, his community needed to appoint a new leader, giving rise to the title Caliph, meaning "successor". Thus the subsequent Islamic empires were known as Caliphates. Alongside the growth of the Umayyad empire, the major political development within Islam in this period was the **sectarian split between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims**; this had its roots in a dispute over the succession of the Caliphate. Sunni Muslims believed the caliphate was elective, and any member of the Prophet's tribe, Quraysh, might serve as one. Shi'ites, on the other hand, believed the caliphate should be hereditary in the line of the Prophet, and thus all the caliphs, with the exception of Ali, were usurpers.^[3] However, the Sunni sect emerged as triumphant in most of the Muslim world, and thus most modern Islamic political movements (with the exception of Iran) are founded in Sunni thought.

Muhammad's closest companions, the four "rightly guided" Caliphs who succeeded him, continued to expand the state to encompass Jerusalem, Ctesiphon, and Damascus, and sending armies as far as the Sindh.^[4] The Islamic empire stretched from Al-Andalus (Muslim Spain) to Persia under the reign of the Umayyad dynasty. The conquering Arab armies took the system of Sharia laws and courts to their new military camps and cities, and built mosques for Friday jam'at (community prayers) as well as Madrasahs to educate local Muslim youth. These institutions resulted in the development of a class of ulema (classical Islamic scholars) who could serve as qadis (Sharia-court judges), imams of mosques and madrasah teachers. These classical scholars - who lived and earned their livelihoods in the expansionist Islamic empire - gave legal and religious sanction to militarist interpretations of jihad. The political terminology of the Islamic state was all the product of this period. Thus, medieval legal terms such as khalifa, sharia, fiqh, maddhab, jizya, and dhimmi all remain part of modern Islamic vocabulary.

Since the scholarly and legal traditions of the ulema were well-established by the time of the Abbasids, the later Middle Eastern empires and kingdoms (including the Ayyubid, Seljuk, Fatimid, Mamluk and Mongol) had little impact on modern Islamist political ideals.

One Islamic concept concerning the structure of ruling is shura, or consultation, which is the duty of rulers mentioned in two verses in the Quran, 3:153, and 42:36, and contrasted by Muslims with arbitrary personal rule. It is mentioned by Islamic traditionalists, commentators, and contemporary writers but is not commanded by Islamic law only recommended.^[5]

One type of ruler not part of the Islamic ideal was the king, which was disparaged in Quran's mentions of the Pharaoh, "the prototype of the unjust and tyrannical ruler" (18:70, 79) and elsewhere. (28:34)^[6]

Election or appointment

Al-Mawardi, a Muslim jurist of the Shafii school, has written that the caliph should be Qurayshi. Abu Bakr Al-Baqillani, an Ashari Islamic scholar and Maliki lawyer, wrote that the leader of the Muslims simply should be from the majority. Abu Hanifa an-Nu'man, the founder of the Sunni Hanafi school of fiqh, also wrote that the leader must come from the majority.^[7] Western scholar of Islam, Fred Donner,^[8] argues that the standard Arabian practice during the early Caliphates was for the prominent men of a kinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for this shura, or consultative assembly. Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader but they were not necessarily his sons. Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majority Sunni view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.

Majlis ash-Shura

Traditional Sunni Islamic lawyers agree that *shura*, loosely translated as 'consultation of the people', is a function of the caliphate. The Majlis ash-Shura advise the caliph. The importance of this is premised by the following verses of the Quran:

“...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]”^[42:38]

“...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah”^[3:159]

The majlis is also the means to elect a new caliph. Al-Mawardi has written that members of the majlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, they must have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and must have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also said in emergencies when there is no caliphate and no majlis, the people themselves should create a majlis, select a list of candidates for caliph, then the majlis should select from the list of candidates.^[7] Some modern interpretations of the role of the Majlis ash-Shura include those by Islamist author Sayyid Qutb and by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, the founder of a transnational political movement devoted to the revival of the Caliphate. In an analysis of the shura chapter of the Quran, Qutb argued Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually the elite), within the general context of God-made laws that the ruler must execute. Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, writes that Shura is important and part of the "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate, "but not one of its pillars," and may be neglected without the Caliphate's rule becoming un-Islamic. Non-Muslims may serve in the majlis, though they may not vote or serve as officials.

Rulers, ulama and the traditional Islamic state

One scholar argues that for hundreds of years until the twentieth century, Islamic states followed a system of government based on the coexistence of sultan and ulama following the rules of the sharia law. This system resembled to some extent some Western governments in possessing an unwritten constitution (like the United Kingdom), and possessing separate, countervailing branches of government (like the United States) — which provided Separation of powers in governance. While the United States (and some other systems of government) has three branches of government — executive, legislative and judicial — Islamic states had two — the sultan and ulama. A symbol of the success of this system is the current popularity of the Islamist movement which seeks to restore the Islamist state.^[9]

Separation of religion and state

Some Muslims argue that unlike Christianity, Islam does not separate religion from state, and that for example it is apolitical Islam not political Islam that requires explanation and that is an historical fluke of the "shortlived heyday of secular Arab nationalism between 1945 and 1970."^[10]

In contrast, scholar Olivier Roy argues that "a defacto separation between political power" of sultans and emirs and religious power of the caliph was "created and institutionalized ... as early as the end of the first century of the hegira," what has been lacking in the Muslim world is "political thought regarding the autonomy of this space." No positive law was developed outside of sharia. The sovereign's religious function was to defend the Islamic community against its enemies, institute the sharia, ensure the public good (*maslaha*). The state was instrument to enable Muslims to live as good Muslims and Muslims were to obey the sultan if he did so. The legitimacy of the ruler was "symbolized by the right to coin money and to have the Friday prayer (*Jumu'ah khutba*) said in his name."^[11]

Shi'a tradition

In Shia Islam three attitudes towards rulers predominated — political cooperation with the ruler, political activism challenging the ruler, and aloofness from politics — with "writings of Shi'i ulama through the ages" showing "elements of all three of these attitudes."^[12]

Qur'an

According to scholar Moojan Momen, "One of the key statements in the Qur'an around which much of the exegesis" on the issue of what Islamic doctrine says about who is in charge is based on the verse

`O believers! Obey God and obey the Apostle and those who have been given authority [uulaa al-amr] among you` (Qur'an 4:59).

For Sunnis, uulaa al-amr are the rulers (Caliphs and kings) but for Shi'is this expression refers to the Imams."^[13]

According to scholar Bernard Lewis, this Qur'anic verse has been

elaborated in a number of sayings attributed to Muhammad. But there are also sayings that put strict limits on the duty of obedience. Two dicta attributed to the Prophet and universally accepted as authentic are indicative. One says, "there is no obedience in sin"; in other words, if the ruler orders something contrary to the divine law, not only is there no duty of obedience, but there is a duty of disobedience. This is more than the right of revolution that appears in Western political thought. It is a duty of revolution, or at least of disobedience and opposition to authority. The other pronouncement, "do not obey a creature against his creator," again clearly limits the authority of the ruler, whatever form of ruler that may be."^[14]

However, Ibn Taymiyyah -- an important scholar of the Hanbali school — says in Tafseer for this verse "there is no obedience in sin"; that people should ignore the order of the ruler if it would disobey the divine law and shouldn't use this as excuse for revolution because it will spell Muslims bloods.

Accountability

Sunni Islamic lawyers have commented on when it is permissible to disobey, impeach or remove rulers in the Caliphate. This is usually when the rulers are not meeting public responsibilities obliged upon them under Islam. Al-Mawardi said that if the rulers meet their Islamic responsibilities to the public, the people must obey their laws, but if they become either unjust or severely ineffective then the Caliph or ruler must be impeached via the Majlis ash-Shura. Similarly Al-Baghdadi believed that if the rulers do not uphold justice, the ummah via the majlis should give warning to them, and if unheeded then the Caliph can be impeached. Al-Juwayni argued that Islam is the goal

of the ummah, so any ruler that deviates from this goal must be impeached. Al-Ghazali believed that oppression by a caliph is enough for impeachment. Rather than just relying on impeachment, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani obliged rebellion upon the people if the caliph began to act with no regard for Islamic law. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said that to ignore such a situation is *haram*, and those who cannot revolt inside the caliphate should launch a struggle from outside. Al-Asqalani used two ayahs from the Qur'an to justify this:

"...And they (the sinners on qiyama) will say, 'Our Lord! We obeyed our leaders and our chiefs, and they misled us from the right path. Our Lord! Give them (the leaders) double the punishment you give us and curse them with a very great curse'..."^[33:67-68]

Islamic lawyers commented that when the rulers refuse to step down via successful impeachment through the Majlis, becoming dictators through the support of a corrupt army, if the majority agree they have the option to launch a revolution against them. Many noted that this option is only exercised after factoring in the potential cost of life.^[7]

Rule of law

The following hadith establishes the principle of rule of law in relation to nepotism and accountability^[15]

Narrated 'Aisha: The people of Quraish worried about the lady from Bani Makhzum who had committed theft. They asked, "Who will intercede for her with Allah's Apostle?" Some said, "No one dare to do so except Usama bin Zaid the beloved one to Allah's Apostle." When Usama spoke about that to Allah's Apostle Allah's Apostle said: "Do you try to intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah's Prescribed Punishments?" Then he got up and delivered a sermon saying, "What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would inflict Allah's Legal punishment on him. By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her hand."

Various Islamic lawyers do however place multiple conditions, and stipulations e.g. the poor cannot be penalised for stealing out of poverty, before executing such a law, making it very difficult to reach such a stage. It is well known during a time of drought in the Rashidun caliphate period, capital punishments were suspended until the effects of the drought passed.

Islamic jurists later formulated the concept of the rule of law, the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land, where no person is above the law and where officials and private citizens are under a duty to obey the same law. A Qadi (Islamic judge) was also not allowed to discriminate on the grounds of religion, race, colour, kinship or prejudice. There were also a number of cases where Caliphs had to appear before judges as they prepared to take their verdict.^[16]

According to Noah Feldman, a law professor at Harvard University, the legal scholars and jurists who once upheld the rule of law were replaced by a law governed by the state due to the codification of Sharia by the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century.^[17]

How the scholars lost their exalted status as keepers of the law is a complex story, but it can be summed up in the adage that partial reforms are sometimes worse than none at all. In the early 19th century, the Ottoman empire responded to military setbacks with an internal reform movement. The most important reform was the attempt to codify Shariah. This Westernizing process, foreign to the Islamic legal tradition, sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book.

Once the law existed in codified form, however, the law itself was able to replace the scholars as the source of authority. Codification took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law and transferred that power to the state.

Reaction to European colonialism

In the 19th century European encroachment on the Muslim world came with the retreat of the Ottoman Empire, the arrival of the French in Algeria (1830), the disappearance of the Moghul Empire in India (1857), the Russian incursions into the Caucasus (1857) and Central Asia.

The first Muslim reaction to European encroachment was of "peasant and religious", not urban origin. "Charismatic leaders", generally members of the ulama or leaders of religious orders, launched the call for jihad and formed tribal coalitions. Sharia in defiance of local common law was imposed to unify tribes. Examples include Abd al-Qadir in Algeria, the Mahdi in Sudan, Shamil in the Caucasus, the Senussi in Libya and in Chad, Mullah-i Lang in Afghanistan, the Akhund of Swat in India, and later, Abd al-Karim in Morocco. All these movements eventually failed "despite spectacular victories such as the destruction of the British army in Afghanistan in 1842 and the taking of Kharoum in 1885." [18]

The second Muslim reaction to European encroachment later in the century and early 20th century was not violent resistance but the adoption of some Western political, social, cultural and technological ways. Members of the urban elite, particularly in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey advocated and practiced "Westernization".

The failure of the attempts at political westernization, according to some, was exemplified by the Tanzimat reorganization of the Ottoman rulers. Sharia was codified into law (which was called the Mecelle) and an elected legislature was established to make law. These steps took away the Ulama's role of "discovering" the law and the formerly powerful scholar class weakened and withered into religious functionaries, while the legislature was suspended less than a year after its inauguration and never recovered to replaced the Ulama as a separate "branch" of government providing Separation of powers.^[19] The "paradigm of the executive as a force unchecked by either the sharia of the scholars or the popular authority of an elected legislature became the dominant paradigm in most of the Sunni Muslim world in the twentieth century." [20]

Modern political ideal of the Islamic state

In addition to the legitimacy given by medieval scholarly opinion, nostalgia for the days of successful Islamic empire simmered under later Western colonialism. This nostalgia played a major role in the Islamist political ideal of Islamic state, a state in which Islamic law is preminent.^[21] The Islamist political program is generally to be accomplished by re-shaping the governments of existing Muslim nation-states; but the means of doing this varies greatly across movements and circumstances. Many Islamist movements, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh, have found that they can use the democratic process to their advantage, and so focus on votes and coalition-building with other political parties. Other more radical movements such as Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh embrace militant Islamic ideology.

In the face of the tremendous poverty, corruption and disillusionment with conventional politics, the political ideal of the Islamic state has been criticized by many espousing liberal movements within Islam and for example by Ziauddin Sardar, as being utopian and not offering real solutions.

20th century

Following World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent dissolution of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (founder of Turkey), many Muslims perceived that the political power of their religion was in retreat. There was also concern that Western ideas and influence were spreading throughout Muslim societies. This led to considerable resentment of the influence of the European powers. The Baath Party was created in Syria and in Iraq as a movement to resist and harry the British.

During the 1960s, the predominant ideology within the Arab world was pan-Arabism which deemphasized religion and emphasized the creation of socialist, secular states based on Arab nationalism rather than Islam. However, governments based on Arab nationalism have found themselves facing economic stagnation and disorder.

Increasingly, the borders of these states were seen as artificial colonial creations - which they were, having literally been drawn on a map by European colonial powers.

Now from Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated under the red or national flag now march beneath the green banner. The targets are the same: foreign banks, nightclubs, local governments accused of complacency toward the West. The continuity is apparent not only in these targets but also the participants: the same individuals who followed Nasser or Marx in the 1960s are Islamists today.^[22]

Contemporary movements

Some common political currents in Islam include

- Traditionalism, which accepts traditional commentaries on the Quran and Sunna and "takes as its basic principle imitation (taqlid), that is, refusal to innovate", and follows one of the four legal schools or Madh'hab (Shaf'i, Maliki, Hanafi, Hanbali) and, may include Sufism. An example of Sufi traditionalism is the DEobandi school in India.^[23]
- Reformist fundamentalism, which "criticizes the tradition, the commentaries, popular religious practices (maraboutism, the cult of saints)", deviations, and superstitions; it aims to return to the founding texts. This reformism generally developed in response to an external threat (the influence of Hinduism on Islam, for example. 18th-century examples are Shah Wali Allah in India and Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (who founded Wahhabism) in the Arabian Peninsula.^[24] A modern example may be Salafism (*Salafiyya*).
- Islamism or political Islam, both follows and departs from reformist fundamentalism, embracing a return to the sharia, but adopting Western terminology such as revolution and ideology and taking a more liberal attitude towards women's rights.^[25] Contemporary examples include the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Islamic Revolution.
- Liberal movements within Islam generally define themselves in opposition to Islamic political movements, but often embrace many of its anti-imperialist elements.

Sunni and Shia differences

According to scholar Vali Nasr, political tendencies of Sunni and Shia Islamic revival differ, with Sunni fundamentalism "in Pakistan and much of the Arab world" being "far from politically revolutionary", while Shia fundamentalism is strongly influenced by Ruhollah Khomeini and his talk of the oppression of the poor and class war. Sunni fundamentalism "was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values." ... Khomeini's version of fundamentalism engaged the poor and spoke of class war.

This

cleavage between fundamentalism as revivalism and fundamentalism as revolution was deep and for a long while coincided closely with the sectarian divide between the Sunnis - the Muslim world's traditional 'haves', concerned more with conservative religiosity - and the Shia - the longtime outsiders, more drawn to radical dreaming and scheming."^[26]

Graham Fuller has also noted that he found "no mainstream Islamist organization (with the exception of [shia] Iran) with radical social views or a revolutionary approach to the social order apart from the imposition of legal justice."^[27]

Modern debates

Once the common opposition to colonialism, corruption and racism was established as a focus, debates on political Islam became generally focused on several core questions through the 1970s:

- The status of women and integration of priorities of feminism into a renewed fiqh
- Islamic economics and the role of debt in oppression and stagnation of Muslim states
- Zionism and the response to the formation of the Jewish state of Israel and the question of statehood
- Self governance in Muslims nations or in nations with significant Muslim minorities
- Control of oil revenues in the Middle East

United Nations cooperation was pivotal in this view - as was cooperation with secular forces and allies. The agenda of secular and Islamist movements during this period was all but indistinguishable. However, some rural movements were finding progress made here to be symbolic and unsatisfactory. In 1979 the political situation drastically changed, with Egypt making peace with Israel, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - all three events had wide-ranging effects on how Islam was perceived as a political phenomenon.

To understand this, consider the variety of attitudes Muslims with a fervent belief in Islam as a universal solution to political problems, took to the events of the 1980s and the 1990s:

Perception of persecution

Some Muslims place the blame for all flaws in Muslim societies on the influx of "foreign" ideas including debt-based capitalism, communism, and even feminism; a return to the principles of Islam is seen as the natural cure. This is however interpreted in very many ways: socialism and Marxism as a guide to adapting Islam to the modern world was in decline by the 1980s as the USSR invaded Afghanistan and polarized attitudes against Communism and other secular variants of socialism. Capitalism was often discredited by plain corruption.

One persistent theme that both proponents and opponents of Islam as a political movement note is that Muslims are actively persecuted by the West and other foreigners. This view is of course not distinguishable from a critique of imperialism including oil imperialism, since many Muslim nations are sitting on relatively vast oil reserves. Colonialism is often identified as the force which is 'against Islam', and seems to neatly encompass British Empire experiences as well as those of modern times - the long Ottoman domination being more or less forgotten.

Reactive Islam

It was largely through reactive measures that the movement that is labeled Islamist came to be visible to the West, where it was labeled as being a distinct movement from Islam, pan-Arabism and resistance to colonization. The legitimacy of this kind of distinction is very much in doubt. Olivier Roy holds that the primary motive of all of this activity is resistance to colonialism and control of the Islamic World by outsiders. In this view, the movement called Islamist is wholly reactive and incidental, just a convenient rationale used to justify what is in fact resistance of a cultural and economic sort.

However, there are many overt similarities. Those militants who follow a version of sharia based on the classical fiqh ("jurisprudence") as interpreted by local ulema ("jurists"), were the most prominent of several competing trends in modern Islamic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s. It was at this time that they became visible - and a concern - to the West, as they challenged the modernist dictators that the West had generally put trust in.

See militant Islam for a detailed review of some modern movements that are often labeled Islamist by their opponents. This article is only about the reactive definition of the West, leading to the label. Trends which led to this are summarized by Ziauddin Sardar.

Cold War exploitation

But such cross-cultural exchanges, polite activism and moderate views were very often suppressed by the funders of more militant strains who sought to exploit them against the Soviet Union. The United States, for instance, in the 1980s supplied university-authored textbooks to the mujahedeen of Afghanistan that encouraged militant attitudes and even taught arithmetic using examples involving hand grenades and "dead infidels".

There was also pressure against secular socialism in the Islamic World, and especially in Iraq, Syria and Iran, until the Iranian Revolution of 1979 proved it could well be counter-productive and lead to a backlash that put regimes in place that would be hostile to the Western, secular, world.

Role in terrorism

Some militant Islamist forces have been implicated in terrorism and have become targets in a series of military initiatives justified by the US rhetoric of "War on Terrorism", which has been adopted by Russia, Israel and other countries. This has led Muslims and the opponents of these initiatives (in the peace movement) to characterize it sometimes as actually a War on Islam.

As part of this war, they claim, literally every political interpretation of Islam, from classical fiqh to Marxist to such moderate views as those of Dr. Shakir, are all being classified as part of one "enemy" movement?

Movements described as 'Islamist'

What these groups have in common tends to be opposition to the United States and Israel. They vary widely in terms of the form of Islamic Law they prefer.

Globalization

Along with many other cultural phenomena, Islamic political thought has undergone its own globalization as adherents of many different strains have come together. Even in such strictly controlled, secretive groups as Al-Qaida, there were believing Muslims of drastically varying backgrounds coming together, some of whom accepted the tactics and priorities of the group, and some not. While violent fanatics deployed by cynical leaders make highly visible attacks on Western interests and even on 'homelands', this is thought by many to be no more than backlash for an entire 20th century full of cynical attempts by German, British, and American Empires to deploy Islamic idealists as a mere tactic.

When Russia joined the Council of the Islamic Conference in 2003, it emphasized that it had a long history of successful co-existence with Muslims, and a large integrated population of Muslims (few of which are in any sense Islamist). President Vladimir Putin, despite a long and bloody confrontation with rebels in Chechnya, offered to act as a bridge or neutral broker in dealings between Muslims and NATO, the EU and USA. This was a quite different rhetoric, a more pragmatic one likely reflecting the reality that the ex-Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan had substantial Islamic political movements - similar to those in Turkey and Pakistan, relatively modern in tone and willing to participate in the US War on Terrorism to some degree, although not as direct combatants.

Some analysts believe that the old Cold War battlelines have been redrawn, with Russia choosing new allies - those with a record of success in forcing US withdrawals from strategic territories (Beirut, Somalia and - depending on interpretation - Afghanistan and Iraq) with Muslim populations. In this view, the old Marxist alliance against colonialism is the dominant rhetoric.

Others accept the Russian pledge as sincere, and believe that Islamist movements of all stripes will eventually come to accommodation with domestic secular forces, and Islam as a global anti-corruption, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism movement, less focused on Zionism and Palestine. George W. Bush for instance has noted the real need as economic development in Muslim countries, to break the cycle of poverty that tends to feed into extremist

movements. In Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq, the Bush administration has worked closely with nominally Islamic forces and ruling political parties in government. It denies intensely that it is involved in a War on Islam. However, polls of Muslim nations indicate these denials are not trusted. Any accommodation will not be quick in coming.

Internationalism

Political Islam in a strictly non-evangelical sense cannot be described as Islamist. In a strictly political sense, born out of the struggles against colonialism and the war on terror, Islamic resistance movements can be seen to be analogous to other resistance movements, such as Latin American struggles against US "imperialism". In this sense political Islam falls within the scope of internationalism, which has many other branches - Maoist, Marxist and of course Latin American. The Latin American struggles have been reported for example in the magazine *New Internationalist* and likewise the struggles in the Islamic world have been reported in the magazine *Islamic Internationalist*.

See also

- Islamic Peace
- Islamism
- Jamaat-e-Islami
- Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamic political party
- Tanzeem-e-Islami Islamic revolutionary party working for establishing khilafah.
- Ayatollah Mohamed Hossein Kazemini Borujerdi Islamic activist for separation of politics from Islam

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- [3] Lewis, Bernard, *The Middle East : a Brief History of the last 2000 Years*, Touchstone, (1995), p.139
- [4] (http://alcor.concordia.ca/~shannon/201Lec02images_files/image004.jpg)
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- [22] Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (1994), p.4
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- [24] Roy, *Failure of Political Islam*, (1994) p.31
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- "Children of Abraham: An Introduction to Islam for Jews" Khalid Duran with Abdelwahab Hechiche, The American Jewish Committee and Ktav, 2001
- "The Islamism Debate" Martin Kramer, 1997, which includes the chapter The Mismeasure of Political Islam (<http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/martinkramerorg/Mismeasure.htm&date=2009-10-26+02:19:40>)
- "Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook" Charles Kurzman, Oxford University Press, 1998
- "The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder" Bassam Tibi, Univ. of California Press, 1998

However, the following sources challenge that argument:

- Edward Said, *Orientalism*
- Merryl Wyn Davies, *Beyond Frontiers: Islam and Contemporary Needs*
- G. H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, 1980
- Hamid Enyat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*

These authors in general locate the issues of Islamic political intolerance and fanaticism not in Islam, but in the generally low level of awareness of Islam's own mechanisms for dealing with these, among modern believers, in part a result of Islam being suppressed prior to modern times.

Further reading

Democracy in the Middle East, the role of Islamist political parties, and the war on terrorism:

- Ayooob, Mohammed. *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (<http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailDesc.do?id=189346>). University of Michigan Press, 2007.
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- Fawaz Gergez, Is Democracy in the Middle East a Pipedream? (<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5622>), *Yale Global Online*, April 25, 2005.

External links

- Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: The Search for Common Ground (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1475928)
- The Ideology of Terrorism and Violence in Saudi Arabia: Origins, Reasons and Solution (http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_Terrorism_In_KSA.pdf)
- Evaluating the Islamist movement (<http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0994/9409021.htm>) - written by Greg Noakes, an American Muslim who works at the Washington Report
- Muslim scholars face down fanaticism (<http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0695/9506017.htm>) - written by Aicha Lemsine, an Algerian journalist and author.

Opposing viewpoints

- Islam: The Greatest Colonizer Of All Time (<http://desicritics.org/2007/01/17/070633.php>)

Divisions of the world in Islam

A religious conceptualization of the world as belonging either to Muslim or non-Muslim territory, exists within Islam.^{[1] [2]} The idea of religious divisions was first suggested by the early Sunni Muslim jurist Imam Abu Hanifa, founder of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.

Some are geo-political religious divisions that are derived from non-scriptural sources. These conventions delineate several **divisions of the world** called "Houses" or "Dar"—literally "place" in Arabic. Other geographic divisions of the world are described in the Qur'an.

Origins

The house of divisions in Islam such as "Dar al-Islam" and "Dar al-Harb" does not appear in the Qur'an or the Hadith. This geo-political house of divisions was more acutely framed by another early ,]]], who issued a treatise.

Contemporary Islamic the inapplicability of this early philosophical division of the world given its lack of scriptof an early Muslim response to geo-political realities that simply do not exist world of international law.^[3]

Major religious divisions

Dar al-Islam (House of Islam)

Dar al-Islam (Arabic: دار الإسلام literally *house/abode of Islam*; or ***Dar as-Salam***, *house/abode of Peace*; or ***Dar al-Tawhid***, *house/abode of Union*) is a term used by Muslim scholars to refer to those countries where Muslims can practice their religion freely. These are usually Islamic cultures wherein Muslims represent the majority of the population, and so the government promises them protection. Most Dar al-Islam areas are surrounded by other Islamic societies to ensure public protection.

Muslim scholars maintain that the labeling of a country or place as being a part of *Dar al-Islam* revolves around the question of religious security. This means that if a Muslim practices Islam freely in his place of abode despite that the place happens to be secular or un-Islamic, then he will be considered as living in the *Dar al-Islam*.

Dar al-Islam is also known and referred to as Dar al-Salam, or house/abode of Peace. The term appears in the Koran in 10.25 and 6.127 as a name of Paradise.^[4]

According to Abu Hanifa, considered to be the originator of the concept, the two requirements for a country to be part of *Dar al-Islam* are^{[1] [2]}:

1. Muslims must be able to enjoy peace and security with and within this country.
2. It has common frontiers with some Muslim countries.

If the former does not apply then physical means such as *Jihad* can be used to correct the situation and in the latter case, individuals are required to do hijra to where they can practice their religion.

Dar al-Harb (House of war)

Dar al-Harb (Arabic: دار الحرب "house of war"; also referred to as ***Dar al-Garb*** "house of the West" in later Ottoman sources; a person from "Dar al-Harb" is a "harbi" (Arabic: حربى) is a term classically referring to those countries where the Muslim law is not in force, in the matter of worship and the protection of the faithful and Dhimmis. Territories that do have a treaty of nonaggression or peace with Muslims are called dar al-ahd or dar al-sulh.^[5]

In *Reliance of the Traveller*, point w43.2, a hadith is referred to containing the exact word Dar al-Harb. Scholars have, nevertheless, disagreed on its reliability as is commented in *Reliance of the Traveller*.

Dar al-Kufr (House of disbelief)

Dar al-Kufr (Arabic: دار الكفر "house/domain of disbelief") is a term used by Muhammad to refer to the Quraish-dominated society of Mecca between his flight to Medina and his triumphant return.

For much of Islamic history, the preferred term used to describe non-Islamic societies has been dar al-Harb, emphasizing various Islamic countries' aspirations to conquer such territories and render them part of dar al-Islam.

Other ideological perceptions and international relations


Dar al-Hudna (House of calm)

Dar al-Hudna (Arabic: دار الهدنة "*house of calm*"): The land of non-believers currently under a truce, which is a respite between wars. A truce is bought by tribute by harbis. If the harbis refuse to pay tribute in exchange for the truce, hostilities are resumed. Furthermore, only treaties that conform to Islamic prescriptions are valid; if these conditions are not fulfilled, the treaty is worthless.

Dar al-'Ahd (House of truce)

Dar al-'Ahd (Arabic: دار العهد "house of truce" or ***Dar al-Sulh*** "house of treaty") was invented to describe the Ottoman Empire's relationship with its Christian tributary states. The invention of Dar al-Ahd was necessary, as the worldview prevalent at the time did not allow for a protracted peace with non-Muslim states, even those under Muslim domination.

Today, the term refers to those non-Muslim governments which have armistice or peace agreements with Muslim governments. The actual status of the non-Muslim country in question may vary from acknowledged equality to tributary states.



Islamic flags, known as the *Flag of Islam* ('Alam al-Islam) or *Flag of Shahada* ('Alam al-Shahada) feature a script of the first Kalimah, the Shahada. White flags with black lettering represent 'Dar al-Salam/Islam' (such as the Taliban), and black flags with white lettering represent 'Dar al-Harb/Kufr' (such as the ICU). It was used by the Islamic Ottoman Empire.

Dar al-Dawa (House of invitation)

Dar al-Dawa (Arabic: دار الدعوة "house of invitation") is a term used to describe a region where the religion of Islam has recently been introduced. Since the population had not been exposed to Islam before, they may not fit into the traditional definition of dar al-Harb. On the other hand, as the region is not yet Muslim, it cannot be dar al-Islam either. The most frequent use of the term *dar al-Dawa* is to describe Arabia before and during the life of Muhammad commonly referred as *Jahiliyyah period*, era of ignorance of divine guidance.

More recently, the term *dar al-Dawa* has been proposed by Western Muslim philosophers to describe the status of Muslims in the West.

The term *dar al-Dawa* may be used in conjunction with, or in opposition to, the older terms *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-Harb*, from which it is derived, or simply be seen as just another sub-category of dar al-harb.

Dar al-Amn (House of safety)

Dar al-Amn (Arabic: دار الأمن "house of safety") is a term proposed by Western Muslim philosophers to describe the status of Muslims either in the West or other non-Muslim societies.

The term *dar al-Amn* may be used in conjunction with, or in opposition to, the older terms *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-Harb*, from which it is derived.

See also

- Ummah
- Caliphate
- Dhimmi
- Sulh

Islamism:

- Pan-Islamism
- Islamic studies

Non-Muslim:

- Christendom

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- [2] Ahmed Khalil: "Dar Al-Islam And Dar Al-Harb: Its Definition and Significance" (<http://english.islamway.com/bindex.php?section=article&id=211>)
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- [4] *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*. New Edition. Brill, Leiden. Vol. 2, p. 128
- [5] http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e490?_hi=17&_pos=3

Additional reading

- *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, by Tariq Ramadan
- *Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings*, by Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri


External links

- Spreading Islam by the Sword (<http://islamistheproblem.blogspot.com/2006/03/allah-shit-be-upon-him-sure-blesses.html>)
- (http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?pagename=IslamOnline-English-Ask_Scholar/FatwaE/FatwaE&cid=1119503544498)
- (http://islamonline.net/English/In_Depth/ViolenceCausesAlternatives/Articles/topic02/2005/07/03.shtml)
- Sects in Islam (<http://www.shaikhsiddiqui.com/islam.html>)

Succession to Muhammad

The **Succession to Muhammad** concerns the various aspects of successorship of Muhammad after his death, comprising who might be considered as his successor to lead the Muslims, how that person should be elected, the conditions of legitimacy, and the role of successor. Different answers to these questions have led to emerging several divisions in Muslim community since the first century of Muslim history; the most important of them are Sunnis, Shias and Kharijites.

From a historic viewpoint, with Muhammad's death in AD 632, disagreement broke out over who should succeed him as leader of the Muslim community. Umar (Umar ibn al-Khattab), a prominent companion of Muhammad, nominated Abu Bakr. Others added their support and Abu Bakr was made the first caliph. This choice was disputed by some of Muhammad's companions, who held that Ali (Ali ibn Abi Talib), his cousin and son-in-law, had been designated his successor.^[1] None of Muhammad's sons survived into adulthood, therefore direct hereditary succession was never an option. Later, during the First Fitna and the Second Fitna the community divided into several sects and groups, each of which had its own idea about successorship. Finally, after the Rashidun caliphate turned into Monarchies and Sultanates, while in most of the areas during Muslim history Sunnis have held power and Shias have emerged as their opposition.



A modern ambigram where the name Muhammad in Arabic script is read as 'علي' when rotated through 180°, and vice versa.

From a religious viewpoint, Muslims later split into two groups, Sunni and Shia. Sunnis assert that even though Muhammad never appointed a successor, Abu Bakr was elected first caliph by the Muslim community. The Sunnis recognize the first four caliphs as Muhammad's rightful successors. Shias believe that Muhammad explicitly named his successor Ali at Ghadir Khumm and Muslim leadership belonged to him who had been determined by divine order.^{[2] [3]}

The two groups also disagree on Ali's attitude towards Abu Bakr, and the two caliphs who succeeded him: Umar and Uthman ibn Affan. Sunnis tend to stress Ali's acceptance and support of their rule, while the Shia claim that he distanced himself from them, and that he was being kept from fulfilling the religious duty that Muhammad had appointed to him. Sunnis maintain that if Ali was the rightful successor as ordained by God, then it would have been his duty as leader of the Muslim nation to make war with these people (Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman) until Ali established the decree. Shias contend that Ali did not fight Abu Bakr, Umar or Uthman, because firstly he did not have the military strength and if he decided to, it would have caused a civil war amongst the Muslims.^[4] Ali also believed that he could fulfil his role of Imamate without this fighting.^[5]

Historiography

Most of the Islamic history seems to have been primarily transmitted orally until after the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate.^[6]

The historical works by later Muslim writers include the traditional Muslim biographies of Muhammad and quotes attributed to him (the sira and hadith literature), which provide further information on Muhammad's life.^[7] The earliest surviving written sira (biographies of Muhammad and quotes attributed to him) is *Sirah Rasul Allah (Life of God's Messenger)* by Ibn Ishaq (d. 761 or 767 CE)^[8]. Although the original work is lost, portions of it survive in the recensions of Ibn Hisham (d. 833 CE) and Al-Tabari (d. 923 CE).^[9] Many, but not all, scholars accept the accuracy of these biographies, though their accuracy is unascertainable.^[10] Studies by J. Schacht and Goldziher has led scholars to distinguish between the traditions touching legal matters and the purely historical ones. According to


William Montgomery Watt, in the legal sphere it would seem that sheer invention could have very well happened. In the historical sphere however, aside from exceptional cases, the material may have been subject to "tendential shaping" rather than being made out of whole cloth.^[11]

Modern Western scholars are much less likely than Islamic scholars to trust the work of the Abbasid historians. Western historians approach the classic Islamic histories with varying degrees of circumspection.

Hadith compilations are records of the traditions or sayings of Muhammad. It might be defined as the biography of Muhammad perpetuated by the long memory of his community for their exemplification and obedience. The development of hadith is a vital element during the first three centuries of Islamic history.^[12] There had been a common tendency among the earlier western scholars against these narrations and reports gathered in later periods; such scholars regarding them as later fabrications. Leone Caetani considered the attribution of historical reports to `Abd Allah ibn `Abbas and Aisha as mostly fictitious while proffering accounts reported without *isnad* by the early compilers of history like Ibn Ishaq. Wilferd Madelung has rejected the stance of indiscriminately dismissing everything not included in "early sources" and in this approach tendentious alone is no evidence for late origin. Madelung and some later historians do not reject the narrations which have been compiled in later periods and try to judge them in the context of history and on the basis of their compatibility with the events and figures.^[13]

The only contemporary source is The Book of Sulaym ibn Qays or *Kitab al-Saqifah* which is written by Sulaym ibn Qays (death: 75-95 AH (694-714)). This is a collection of hadith and historical reports from 1st century of the Islamic calendar and narrates the events which relate to the succession in detail.^[14]

Succession to Muhammad from historical viewpoint

<p>A series of articles on</p>  <p>Prophet of Islam Muhammad</p>	
Life	Companions · Family tree · In Mecca · In Medina · Conquest of Mecca · The Farewell Sermon · Succession
Career	Diplomatic career · Family · Wives · Military career
Succession	Farewell Pilgrimage · Pen and paper · Saqifah · General bay'ah
Interactions with	Slaves · Jews · Christians
Perspectives	Muslim (Poetic and Mawlid) · Medieval Christian · Historicity · Criticism · Depictions

Election of Abu Bakr

After uniting the Arabian tribes into a single Muslim religious polity in the last years of his life, Muhammad's death in 632 signalled disagreement over who would succeed him as leader of the Muslim community.^[15] At a gathering attended by a small group of Muslims at Saqifah a companion of Muhammad named Abu Bakr was nominated for the leadership of the community. Others added their support and Abu Bakr was made the first caliph. The choice of Abu Bakr disputed by some of Muhammad's companions, who held that Ali had been designated his successor by Muhammad himself.^{[3] [16]} However Sunnis allege that Ali accepted Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman's subsequent leadership.^[17]

Most, but not all Shia, believe that following his election to the caliphate, Abu Bakr and Umar with a few other companions headed to Fatimah's house to obtain homage from Ali and his supporters who had gathered there. Then Umar threatened to set the house on fire unless they came out and swore allegiance with Abu Bakr.^[18] There is not consensus among the sources about what happened next. Some sources say upon seeing them, Ali came out with his sword drawn but was disarmed by Umar and their companions. Fatimah, in support of her husband, started a commotion and threatened to "uncover her hair", at which Abu Bakr relented and withdrew.^[19] Ali, according to Shia, is reported to have repeatedly said that had there been forty men with him he would have resisted.^[18] When Abu Bakr's selection to the caliphate was presented as a *fait accompli*, Ali withheld his oaths of allegiance until after the death of Fatimah. Ali did not actively assert his own right because he did not want to throw the nascent Muslim community into strife.^[20]

Ali himself was firmly convinced of his legitimacy for caliphate based on his close kinship with Muhammad, his intimate association and his knowledge of Islam and his merits in serving its cause. He told Abu Bakr that his delay in pledging allegiance (*bay'ah*) as caliph was based on his belief of his own prior title. Ali did not change his mind when he finally pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr and then to Umar and to Uthman but had done so for the sake of the unity of Islam, at a time when it was clear that the Muslims had turned away from him.^{[3] [21]}

According to historical reports, Ali maintained his right to the caliphate and said:

By Allah the son of Abu Quhafah (Abu Bakr) dressed himself with it (the caliphate) and he certainly knew that my position in relation to it was the same as the position of the axis in relation to the hand-mill...I put a curtain against the caliphate and kept myself detached from it... I watched the plundering of my inheritance till the first one went his way but handed over the Caliphate to Ibn al-Khattab after himself.^[22]

The Sunni view of the succession

Sunni Muslims relate various hadith, or oral traditions, in which Muhammad is said to have recommended shura, elections or consultation, as the best method for making community decisions. In this view of the succession, he did not nominate a successor because he expected that the community themselves would choose the new leader — as was the custom in Arabia at the time. Some Sunnis argue that Muhammad had indicated his reliance upon Abu Bakr as second in command in many ways; he had called upon Abu Bakr to lead prayers and to make rulings in his (Muhammad's) absence. There are some hadiths asserting that Muhammad said that some would be desirous of power but he knew that God (and the Muslims) would make Abu Bakr the next leader (see Hadith of the succession of Abu Bakr). Sunnis point to the fact that the majority of the people accepted Abu-Bakr as their leader as proof that his selection was wise and just.

A narration by Mousa Ibn 'Aqabah in the book *Siyar a lam al-nubala* (Arabic: *سيرة النبلاء*) by Al-Dhahabi^[23] :

...Then Ali and Al-Zobair said: we see that Abu Baker is more worthier to be the rightful successor of the prophet than anyone else...

Ghadir Khumm

There is one hadith in the collection known as the *Musnad* which affirms that Muhammad made a speech at Ghadir Khumm, in which he said, "Of whomsoever I am the mawla, Ali is his mawla". The word *mawla* has many meanings in Arabic. In this case, say the Sunni scholars, Muhammad was merely saying that anyone who was his friend should also befriend Ali. This was a response to some soldiers who had complained about Ali.^[24] A similar incident is described in Ibn Ishaq's *Sirah*; there Muhammad is reputed to have said, "Do not blame Ali, for he is too scrupulous in the things of God, or the way of God, to be blamed." (Guillaume p. 650)

The Sunnis argue that it is a mistake to interpret an expression of friendship and support as the appointment of a successor. If Muhammad had wished to appoint Ali, surely he would have done so in Medina, in front of all the Muslim notables. The fact that there even *was* a dispute over the leadership after Muhammad's death is sufficient proof that no one had interpreted his words as a binding appointment.

Muhammad's last illness

Muhammad asked permission from his wives to spend his last days with Aisha (his most beloved wife) and died with his head in her lap. Reportedly, before he died, Muhammad made a gesture of enormous trust in Abu Bakr by asking him to lead the prayers in the mosque as imam — a highly visible role virtually always undertaken, when possible, by Muhammad himself. Historically, the imam of a mosque has always been a leader in his local Muslim community;

The events at Saqifah

The original Medinan Muslims, the Ansar, held a meeting to discuss choosing a new leader among themselves, to rule their part of the community. When the news of the meeting spread, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Abu Ubaidah ibn al Jarrah rushed to the scene. Abu Bakr argued that if the Ansar chose a leader, to lead the Ansar only, the Muslim community would split. The new leader must come from the Quraysh, Muhammad's clan; any other choice would destroy the community. Sa'd ibn Ubadah agreed to this. Abu Bakr suggested to the gathering that the people should choose either Umar or Abu Ubayda, as both were capable men of the Quraysh. Umar immediately grabbed Abu Bakr's hand and gave him bay'ah (declared his allegiance; an Arabian custom) causing the rest of the men at the gathering to also give their bay'ah. Umar later described this process as a *falta*, a rushed and hasty decision. However, this decision would not have been binding upon the rest of the Muslims unless they themselves chose to give their bay'ah, which all save the supporters of Ali did. According to the Sunni, this is the proof that the decision was the right one.

Ali's attitude towards Abu Bakr and Umar

Sunni accounts say that after a period during which he withdrew from public affairs, Ali eventually decided to cooperate with Abu Bakr and give his public submission. One version of the story is found in an oral tradition collected by Muhammad al-Bukhari.^[25]

Sunni accounts say that after giving his oath, Ali supported and advised Abu Bakr, as he did for the two caliphs who succeeded Abu Bakr (Umar and Uthman). They reject Shia views stating that Ali never gave his submission, or gave it only unwillingly and thereafter retired from public affairs rather than help those he regarded as usurpers.

Sunni attitude towards Ali

Sunni Muslims consider Ali as one of the prominent companions of Muhammad, among the ten, including Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, who were informed with the gift of paradise. They also consider Ali among the righteous caliphs and accept the hadiths narrated by him. They reject the Shia view that Ali considered Abu Bakr's succession undeserved.

The Shia view of the succession

The Shia believe that just as a prophet is appointed by God alone, only God has the prerogative to appoint the successor to his prophet. They believe that God chose Ali to be the successor, infallible and divinely chosen. Thus they say that Muhammad, before his death, appointed Ali as his successor.

Life of Ali

Ali was a leader in battle, and often entrusted with command. He was left in charge of the community at Medina when Muhammad led a raid on Tabuk. Ali was also his cousin, and the husband of his daughter Fatimah, and the father of his beloved grandchildren Hasan and Husayn. Ali's father was Abu Talib ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib, Muhammad's uncle, foster father, and powerful protector. As a member of Abu Talib's family, Muhammad had in fact played the role of an elder brother and guardian to Ali — and Ali had, as a youth, been among the first to accept Islam. He was now a charismatic defender of the faith in his own right, and it was perhaps inevitable that some in the Muslim community assumed that Ali would claim a leadership position following Muhammad's death. In the end, however, it was Abu Bakr who assumed control of the Muslim community.

The Qur'an

The Shia refer to three verses from sura Al-Ma'ida to make their argument on Qur'anic grounds: 5:55,^[26] 5:3,^[27] 5:67.^[28] They say that the verses refer to Ali, and the last two verses were revealed at Ghadir Khumm.^[29]

Hadith

The Shia point to a number of hadith that, they believe, show that Muhammad had left specific instructions as to his successor. These hadith have been given names: the pond of Khumm, Safinah, Thaqaalayn, Haqq, position, warning, and others.

Many of these oral traditions are also accepted by Sunni Muslims. However, the Sunni do not accept the Shia interpretation of these hadith.

The following two hadith are most often referred to by the Shia, when arguing for the explicit appointment of Ali by Muhammad.

Da'wat dhul-'Ashīrah - Summoning the Family

Islam began when Muhammad became thirty-seven years old. Initially, the mission was kept a secret. Then three years after the advent of Islam, he was ordered to commence the open declaration of his message. This was the occasion when God revealed the verse "*And warn your nearest relations,*"^[30]

When this verse was revealed, Muhammad organized a feast that is known in history as "*Summoning the Family — Da'wat dhul-'Ashīrah*". He invited around forty men from the Banu Hashim and asked Ali to make arrangements for the dinner. After having served his guests with food and drinks, when he wanted to speak to them about Islam, Abu Lahab ibn 'Abdul Muttalib forestalled him and said, "Your host has long since bewitched you." All the guests dispersed before Muhammad could present his message to them.

Muhammad then invited them the next day. After the feast, he spoke to them, saying:

O Sons of 'Abdul-Muttalib! By Allāh, I do not know of any person among the Arabs who has come to his people with better than what I have brought to you. I have brought to you the good of this world and the next, and I have been commanded by the Lord to call you unto Him. Therefore, who amongst you will support me in this matter so that he may be my brother (*akhhī*), my successor (*wasiyyī*) and my caliph (*khalīfatī*) among you?^[31]

This was the first time that Muhammad openly and publicly called the relations to accept him as the Messenger and Prophet of God, as well as being the first time that he called for a person who would aid him in his mission. At the time, no one but the youngest of them — Ali, stood up and said, "I will be your helper, O Prophet of God."^[31]

Muhammad then put his hand on the back of Ali's neck and said:

Inna hadhā akhhī wa wasiyyī wa khalīfatī fīkum, fasma'ū lahu wa atī'ū — Verily this is my brother, my successor, and my caliph amongst you; therefore, listen to him and obey.^[31]

Ghadir Khumm

In 632 CE, Muhammad made his last pilgrimage to the Kaaba in Mecca. Some early accounts say that after finishing his pilgrimage, on his return to Medina, he and his followers stopped at a spring and waypoint called Ghadir Khumm. Muhammad delivered a speech to his assembled followers, in which the traditions state that Muhammad said:

...for whoever I am his mawla, Ali is his mawla...

According to the Shia, this hadith, the hadith of the pond of Khumm, indicated the intent of Muhammad. They note that the translation of the word *mawla* as "friend" is highly unlikely and therefore misleading because: a) the word *sadeeq* is an appropriate, unambiguous and completely accurate translation of the word "friend". b) the connotations of the word *mawla* nearly always have an implication of a superior-inferior relationship. Hence, *mawla* can be taken to mean a variety of words in this context, such as master, commander or even slave, but friend is inaccurate. The Shia say that there were 120,000 witnesses to this declaration, including Umar and Abu Bakr.

Muhammad's last illness

Soon after returning from the Farewell Pilgrimage, Muhammad fell ill. He was nursed in the apartment of his wife Aisha, the daughter of Abu Bakr.

The Shia claim that most of the prominent men among the Muslims, expecting Muhammad's death and an ensuing struggle for power, disobeyed his orders to join a military expedition bound for Syria. They stayed in Medina, waiting for Muhammad's death and their chance to seize power.

According to `Abd Allah ibn `Abbas (cousin of Muhammad) Book 13 Hadith No. 4016, the dying Muhammad said that he wished to write a letter — or wished to have a letter written — detailing his wishes for his community. According to Sahih Muslim ibn `Abbas narrated that:

Ibn Abbas reported: When Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) was about to leave this world, there were persons (around him) in his house, 'Umar b. al-Khattab being one of them. Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon him) said: Come, I may write for you a document; you would not go astray after that. Thereupon Umar said: Verily Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) is deeply afflicted with pain. You have the Qur'an with you. The Book of Allah is sufficient for us. Those who were present in the house differed. Some of them said: Bring him (the writing material) so that Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) may write a document for you and you would never go astray after him And some among them said what 'Umar had (already) said. When they indulged in nonsense and began to dispute in the presence of Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him), he said: Get up (and go away) 'Ubaidullah said: Ibn Abbas used to say: There was a heavy loss, indeed a heavy loss, that, due to their dispute and noise. Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) could not write (or dictate) the document for them.

—Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, *Sahih Muslim*^[32]

When Muhammad died, Umar denied his death stating rather that he would return back, and threatening to behead anyone who acceded to his death. Abu Bakr, upon his return to Medina, spoke to Umar and only then Umar did admit that Muhammad had died, this all was perceived by the Shia as a ploy on Umar's part to delay the funeral and thus give Abu Bakr (who was outside the city) time to return to Medina.

The events at Saqifah

When Muhammad died, his closest relatives, Ali and Fatimah, took charge of the body. While they were engaged in washing the body and preparing it for burial, a secret meeting, of which Ali and the *Muhajirun* weren't told, was taking place at Saqifah, which ended with Abu Bakr being chosen as the new leader.

Shi'at of 'Alī

Just as Ali had refused to give his allegiance (bay'ah) to Abu Bakr, many of the Muslims of Medina had also refused, thus they were known as: "*Shi'at 'Alī*" (the "*Party of Ali*"). It took six months of threat and pressure to force the refusers to submit to Abu Bakr.^[33] However, upon his refusal to give allegiance, Ali had his house surrounded by an armed force led by Abu Bakr and Umar.^[34]

In Madinah, Umar took charge of securing the pledge of allegiance of all residents. He dominated the streets with the help first of the Aslam and then the Abd Al-Ashhal of Aws, who in contrast to the majority of Khazraj, quickly became vigorous champions of the new regime. The sources mention the actual use of force only with respect to Companion Al-Zubayr who had been together with some others of the Muhajirun in the house of Fatimah. Supposedly, Umar threatened to set the house on fire unless they came out and swore allegiance to Abu Bakr.^[35]

Umar pushed his way into the house; Fatimah, who was pregnant, was crushed behind the door. She miscarried her unborn son, whom the Shia mourn as Muhsin ibn Ali. She had been injured by Umar and soon died. Ali buried her at night, secretly, as he did not wish Abu Bakr or Umar, whom he blamed for her death, to attend her funeral. The Shia thus blame Abu Bakr and Umar for the death of Muhammad's daughter and grandson.^[36]

Ali submits for the sake of his followers

Some Shia believe that Ali took pity upon the sufferings of his devoted followers and gave his submission, his bay'ah, to Abu Bakr, only after Fatimah, Ali's wife and daughter of Muhammad who was angry with Abu Bakr when he refused to give her right to the inheritance of the garden of Fadak.^[37] It may be because of the sake of unity that he might have helped them in matters of jurisprudence and administration but could never admit his obedience to them.

Other Shia say that Ali did not give his allegiance, but only refrained from pressing his claims. Whatever happened, superficial unity was restored.

Western academic views

Many contemporary scholars who have sifted through the early Muslim historical writings are proposing narratives that are closer to the received versions. In most cases, this has meant a swing back towards the Sunni version of events. However, one recent publication, *The Succession to Muhammad* written by Institute for Ismaili Studies in London's researcher Wilfred Madelung^[38], ex Laudian Professor of Arabic at the University of Oxford, examines the course of events from 632, and the death of Muhammad, through the rise of the Umayyads — and rehabilitates some of the Shia narratives. On the right of Muhammad's household to succeed him, for instance, Madelung observes that:

In the Qur'an, the descendants and close kin of the prophets are their heirs also in respect to kingship (*mulk*), rule (*hukm*), wisdom (*hikma*), the book and the imamate. The Sunnite concept of the true caliphate itself defines it as a succession of the prophet in every respect except his prophethood. Why should Muhammad not be succeeded in it by any of his family like the earlier prophets? If God really wanted to indicate that he should not be succeeded by any of them why did He not let his grandsons and other kin die like his sons? *There is thus a good reason to doubt that Muhammad failed to appoint a successor because he realized that the divine design excluded hereditary succession of his family and that he wanted the Muslims to choose their head by Shura.* The Qur'an advises the faithful to settle some matters by consultation, but not the succession to prophets. That, according to the Qur'an, is settled by divine election, God usually chooses their successors, whether they become prophets or not from their own kin^[39]

Madelung writes on the basis of the hadith of the pond of Khumm Ali later insisted on his religious authority superior to that of Abu Bakr and Umar.^[40]

See also

- Abdullah Ibn Saba
- List of Sahaba not giving bay'ah to Abu Bakr

References

Footnotes

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[14] See:

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[15] Lapidus (2002), p.31 and 32

[16] See:

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[17] See:

- explanation of Nahj al-Balagha, Mohammed Abdah, 3/ 07.
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 - Ashraf (2005), pp. 99 and 100
- [22] See:
- Nahj al-Balagha Nahj Al-Balagha Sermon 3 (<http://www.nahjulbalagha.org/SermonDetail.php?Sermon=3>)
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External links

Shia perspective

- *Peshawar Nights* by Sultanu'l Wa'izin Shirazi, 2001 (<http://al-islam.org/peshawar/index.html>)
 - Succession to Muhammad (<http://www.hadith.net/english/ahl-al-bayt/succession.htm>)
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Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist

<i>Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist</i>	
Author	Ruhollah Khomeini; translated by Hamid Algar
Country	Iran and United Kingdom
Language	Translated into English
Subject(s)	Islam and state
Publisher	Alhoda UK
Publication date	Republished in 2002 in the UK ^[1]
Pages	139 pages
ISBN	9643354997
OCLC Number	254905140 ^[2]

Velayat-e faqih (Persian: *velāyat-e faqih*), also known as *Islamic Government* (Persian: *Hokumat-i Islami*), is a book by the Iranian Shia Muslim cleric and revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini, first published in 1970, and probably the most influential document written in modern times in support of theocratic rule.

The book argues that government should be run in accordance with traditional Islamic *sharia*, and for this to happen a leading Islamic jurist (*faqih*), must provide political "guardianship" (*wilayat* or *velayat*) over the people. A modified form of this doctrine was incorporated into the 1979 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran^[3] following the Iranian Revolution, with the doctrine's author, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the first *faqih* "guardian" or Supreme Leader of Iran.

History

While in exile in Iraq in the holy city of Najaf, Khomeini gave a series of 19 lectures to a group of his students from January 21 to February 8, 1970 on Islamic Government. Notes of the lectures were soon made into a book that appeared under three different titles: *The Islamic Government*, *Authority of the Jurist*, and *A Letter from Imam Musavi Kashef al-Qita*^[4] (to deceive Iranian censors). The small book (fewer than 150 pages) was smuggled into Iran and "widely distributed" to Khomeini supporters before the revolution.^[5]

Controversy surrounds how much of the book's success came from its persuasive power, and how much from the political skill and power of its author, who is generally considered to have been the "undisputed" leader of the Iranian Revolution. Many observers of the revolution maintain that while the book was distributed to Khomeini's core supporters in Iran, Khomeini and his aides were careful not to publicize the book or the idea of *wilayat al-faqih* to outsiders,^[6] knowing that groups crucial to the revolution's success -- secular and Islamic Modernist Iranians -- were likely to be irreconcilably opposed to theocracy. It was only when Khomeini's core supporters had consolidated their hold on power that *wilayat al-faqih* was made known to the general public and written into the country's new Islamic constitution.^[7]

The book has been translated into several languages including French, Arabic, Turkish and Urdu.^[8] The one reliable translation in English is generally agreed to be that of Hamid Algar,^[9] an English-born convert to Islam, scholar of Iran and the Middle East, and supporter of Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. [10] It can be found in his book *Islam and Revolution* or on the internet at [11]. The one other English language edition of the book, also titled *Islamic Government*, is a stand-alone edition, translated by the U.S. government's Joint Publications Research Service. It is considered an inferior work, being based on Arabic translation rather than the original Persian as well

as being "crude" and "unreliable", and its publication by Manor books "vulgar" and "sensational" in its attacks on the Ayatollah Khomeini.^[12]

Contents

Importance of Islamic Government

Khomeini believed that the need for governance of the faqih was obvious to good Muslims. That *"anyone who has come general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam"* would *"unhesitatingly give his assent to the principle of the governance of the faqih as soon as he encounters it,"* because the principle has *"little need of demonstration, for anyone who has come general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam"* (p.27)

Nonetheless he lists several reasons why Islamic government is necessary:

- To prevent *"encroachment by oppressive ruling classes on the rights of the weak,"* and plundering and corrupting the people for the sake of *"pleasure and material interest,"* (p.54)
- To prevent *"innovation"* in Islamic law *"and the approval of the anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments,"* (p.54) and so
- To preserve *"the Islamic order"* and keep all individuals on *"the just path of Islam without any deviation,"* (p.54) *"it is because the just fuqaha have not had executive power in the land inhabited by Muslims ... that Islam has declined."* (p.80)
- And to destroy *"the influence of foreign powers in the Islamic lands"* (p.54)^[13],

In its operation, Islamic government is superior to non-Islamic government in many ways. (Though Islamic government is to be universal, and Khomeini sometimes compares it to (allegedly) un-Islamic governments in general throughout the Muslim world, more often he contrasts it specifically with the Shah's government in Iran -- though he doesn't mention him by name.)

Non-Islamic government

- is mired in red tape thanks to *"superfluous bureaucracies,"* (p.58),
- suffers from *"reckless spending"*, and *"constant embezzlement,"* in the case of Iran, forcing it to *"request aid or a loan from"* abroad and hence *"to bow in submission before America and Britain,"* (p.58)
- has excessively harsh punishments, (p.33)
- creates an *"unjust economic order"* which divides the people *"into two groups: oppressors and oppressed,"* (p.49),
- though it may be made up of elected representatives does not *"truly belong to the people"* in the case of Muslim countries. (p.56)

While some might think the complexity of the modern world would move Muslims to learn from countries that have modernized ahead of them, and even borrow laws from them, this is not only un-Islamic but also entirely unnecessary. The laws of God (*Shariah*), cover *"all human affairs ... There is not a single topic in human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established a norm."* (p.29-30, also p.44) As a result Islamic government will be much easier than some might think.

"The entire system of government and administration, together with necessary laws, lies ready for you. If the administration of the country calls for taxes, Islam has made the necessary provision; and if laws are needed, Islam has established them all. ... Everything is ready and waiting." [p.137-8]

For this reason Khomeini declines *"to go into details"* on such things as *"how the penal provisions of the law are to be implemented"*(p.124)

In addition to the functional reasons above offered for guardianship of the jurist, Khomeini also gives much space to doctrinal ones that he argues establish proof that the rule of jurists is required by Islam. No sacred texts of Shia Islam specifically state that jurists should rule Muslims. Traditionally Shia Islam follows a crucial hadith where the

Prophet Muhammad passes on his power to command Muslims to his cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib, the first of a handful of "Imams" descended in a line a line^[14] that stopped with the "occultation" of the last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, in 939 AD and who is not expected back until end times, (*see: Muhammad al-Mahdi#Birth and early life according to Twelver Shi'a*). Shia jurists have tended to stick to one of three approaches to the state: cooperated with it, try to influence policies by becoming active in politics, or most commonly, remaining aloof from it.^[15]

Khomeini, however, endeavours to prove a leading jurist or jurists also have inherited the Prophet's political authority by explicating several ahadith of the Shi'a Imams. An example is his analysis of a saying attributed to the first Imam, 'Ali who in addressing a judge said:

The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch. (p.81)^[16]

Khomeini reasons that the term judges must refer to trained jurists (*fuqaha*) as they are "*by definition learned in matters pertaining to the function of judge*" (p.84), and since trained jurists are neither sinful wretches nor prophets, by process of elimination "*we deduce from the tradition quoted above that the fuqaha are the legatees.*" (p.84) He explains legatees of the prophet have the same power to command Muslims as the Prophet Muhammad and (in Shia Muslim belief) the Imams. Thus, the saying, 'The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch,' demonstrates that Islamic jurists have the power to rule Muslims.

The level of importance accorded rule of jurists and obedience to them by Khomeini in *Waliyat al-faqih* is as high as any religious duty a Muslim has. "*Our obeying holders of authority*" like jurists "*is actually an expression of obedience to God.*" (p.91) Preserving Islam "*is more necessary even than prayer and fasting*" (p.75) and without Islamic government Islam cannot be preserved.

What is Islamic Government?

The basis of Islamic government is exclusive adherence to *Sharia*, or Islamic law. Those holding government posts should have knowledge of *Sharia* (Islamic jurists are such people), and the country's ruler should be a *faqih*^[17] who "*surpasses all others in knowledge*" of Islamic law and justice (p.59) -- known as a *marja`* -- as well as having intelligence and administrative ability.

And while this *faqih* rules, it might be said that the ruler is actually *sharia* law itself because, "*the law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger [Prophet Muhammad] and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity ...*" (p.56)

"*The governance of the faqih*" is equivalent to "*the appointment of a guardian for a minor.*" Just as God established the Prophet Mohammad as the "*leader and ruler*" of early Muslims, "*making obedience to him obligatory, so, too, the fuqaha (plural of faqih) must be leaders and rulers*" over Muslims today. (p.63) While the "*spiritual virtues*" and "*status*" of the Prophet and the Imams are greater than those of contemporary *faqih*, their power is not, because this virtue "*does not confer increased governmental powers*". (p.62)

Islamic government is constitutional, but "*not constitutional in the current sense of word, i.e., based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority.*" Instead of the customary executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, "*in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly that is one of the three branches of government*" -- a legislature being unnecessary because "*no one has the right to legislate ... except ... the Divine Legislator*" (p.56)^[18].

Islamic government raises revenue "*on the basis of the taxes that Islam has established - khums, zakat ... jizya, and kharaj.*" (p.45) This will be plenty because "*khums is a huge source of income*" (p.44-5)

Islamic Government will be just but it will also be unsparing with "*troublesome*" groups that cause "*corruption in Muslim society,*" and damage "*Islam and the Islamic state.*" In this regard it will follow the example of the Prophet Muhammad who eliminated the tribe heads of Bani Qurayza, (p.89) after their murderous treachery.

Islamic government will follow the unflinching courage and rectitude of Imam 'Ali. His seat of command was simply the corner of a mosque (p.86); he threatened to have the hand of his daughter cut off if she did not pay back a loan from the treasury (p.130); and he *"lived more frugally than the most impoverished of our students."* (p.57) Islamic government will follow the *"victorious and triumphant"* armies of early Muslims who set *"out from the mosque to go into battle"* and *"fear only God,"* (p.131) and follow the Quranic command *"Prepare against them whatever force you can muster and horses tethered"* (8:60). In fact, *"if the form of government willed by Islam were to come into being, none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate"* (p.122)

Why has Islamic Government not been established?

Khomeini spends a large part of his book explaining *why* Islamic government had not yet been established, despite the fact that the need for governance of the faqih is obvious to *"anyone who has come general awareness of the beliefs and ordinances of Islam."* (p.27)

The *"historical roots"* of the opposition are Western unbelievers who want

to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands and our human resources. They want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be trapped in their misery ... they and their agents wish to go on living in huge palaces and enjoying lives of abominable luxury. (p.34)

"Foreign experts have studied our country and have discovered all our mineral reserves -- gold, copper, petroleum, and so on. They have also made an assessment of our people's intelligence and come to the conclusion that the only barrier blocking their way are Islam and the religious leadership." (p.139-40)

These Westerners *"have known the power of Islam themselves for it once ruled part of Europe, and ... know that true Islam is opposed to their activities."* (p.140) Making people think that *"Islam has laid down no laws for the practice of usury, for banking on the basis of usury, for the consumption of alcohol, or for the cultivation of sexual vice"* and wishing *"to promote these vices in the Islamic world"*, (p.31-2) Westerners have set about deceiving Muslims, using their *"agents"* to telling them that *"that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition."* (p.29-30)

The enemies of Islam target the vulnerable young: *"The agents of imperialism are busy in every corner of the Islamic world drawing our youth away from us with their evil propaganda."* (p.127)

This imperialist attack on Islam is not some ad hoc tactic to assist the imperial pursuit of power or profit, but an elaborate, 300-year-long plan.

The British imperialists penetrated the countries of the East more than 300 years ago. Being knowledgeable about all aspects of these countries, they drew up elaborate plans for assuming control of them. (p.139, also p.27-28, p.34, p.38).

In addition to the British there are the Jews:

From the very beginning, the historical movement of Islam has had to contend with the Jews, for it was they who first established anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, this activity continues down to the present. (p.27-8)

We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world. (p.127)

While the main danger of unbelievers comes from foreign (European and American) imperialists, non-Muslims in Iran and other Muslim countries pose a danger too,

centers of evil propaganda run by the churches, the Zionists, and the Baha'is in order to lead our people astray and make them abandon the ordinances and teaching of Islam ... These centers must be destroyed. (p.128)

Perhaps most alarmingly, the imperialist war against Islam has even penetrated the seminaries where Khomeini notes sadly, *"If someone wishes to speak about Islamic government and the establishment of the Islamic government, he must observe the principles of taqiyya, [i.e. dissimulation of the truth in defence of Islam], and count upon the opposition of those who have sold themselves to imperialism"* (p.34) If these *"pseudo-saints do not wake up"* Khomeini hints darkly, *"we will adopt a different attitude toward them."* (p.143)

As for those clerics who serve the government, *"they do not need to be beaten much,"* but *"our youths must strip them of their turbans."* (p.145)

Influences

Islamic

Khomeini himself claims Mirza Hasan Shirazi, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shriazi, Kashif al-Ghita, (p.124) as clerics preceding him who made what were "in effect" (p.124) government rulings, thus establishing de facto Islamic Government by Islamic jurists. Khomeini is said to have cited Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d.1829) and Shaikh Muhammad Hussain Na'ini (d.1936) as authorities who held a similar view to himself on the political role of the ulama.^[19]

Others credit the "juridical roots of the notion of Velayat-e Faqih" to the writings of a nineteenth-century Shi'i jurist, Mollah Ahmad Naraqi,^[20] and "earlier notions of political and juridical authority" in Iran's Safavid period. Another influence is said to be Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, a cleric and author of books on developing Islamic alternatives to capitalism and socialism, who Khomeini met in Najaf.^[21]

Non-Islamic

Other observers credit the "Islamic Left," specifically Ali Shariati, as the origin of important concepts of Khomeini's *Waliyat al-faqih*, particularly abolition of monarchy and the idea that an *"economic order"* has divided the people *"into two groups: oppressors and oppressed."* (p.49)^[22] The Confederation of Iranian Students in Exile and the famous pamphlet *Gharbzadegi* by the ex-Tudeh writer Jalal Al-e-Ahmad are also thought to have influenced Khomeini.^[23] This is in spite of the fact that Khomeini loathed Marxism in general,^[24] and is said to have had misgivings about un-Islamic sources of some of Shariati's ideas.

Governments based on constitutions, divided into three branches, and containing planning agencies, also belie a strict adherence to precedents set by the rule of the Prophet Muhammad and Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, 1400 years ago.^[25]

Scholar Vali Nasr believes the ideal of an Islamic government ruled by the ulama "relied heavily" on Greek philosopher Plato's book *The Republic*, and its vision of "a specially educated `guardian` class led by a `philosopher-king`".^[26]

Criticism

Doctrinal

Velayat-e Faqih has been praised as a "masterful construction of a relentless argument, supported by the most sacred canonical sources of Shi'i Islam ..." [27]

The response from high-level Shi'a clerics to *Velayat-e Faqih* was far more negative. Grand Ayatollah Abul-Qassim Khoei, the leading Shia ayatollah at the time the book was published rejected Khomeini's argument on the grounds that

- The authority of faqih — is limited to the guardianship of widows and orphans — could not be extended by human beings to the political sphere.
- In the absence of the Hidden Imam (the 12th and last Shi'a Imam), the authority of jurisprudents was not the preserve of one or a few fuqaha. [28]

Of the dozen Shia Grand Ayatollahs alive at the time of the Iranian Revolution, only one other grand ayatollah — Hussein 'Ali Montazeri — approved of Khomeini's concept. [29] [30]

A non-clerical scholar of Shia Islam, Moojan Momen, has commented that Khomeini cites two earlier clerical authorities — Mulla Ahmad Naraqī (d.1829) and Shaikh Muhammad Hussain Na'ini (d.1936) — as holding similar view to himself on the importance of the ulama holding political power, but neither made "it the central theme of their political theory as Khomeini does," although they may have hinted "at this in their writings." Momen also argues that the Hadith Khomeini quotes in support of his concept of *velayat-e faqih*, either have "a potential ambiguity which makes the meaning controversial," or are considered 'weak' (Da'if) by virtue of their chain of transmitters. [31]

When a campaign started to install *velayat-e faqih* in the new Iranian revolution, critics complained that Khomeini had gone back on his word (or outsmarted secular or Islamic modernist Iranians, depending on your point of view) to advise, rather than rule the country. [32] This *taqiyya*, or "lying for the defence of Islam," has sparked controversy. [33]

Functional

Finally *Islamic Government* is criticised on utilitarian grounds by those who complain that Islamic government as established in Iran by Khomeini has simply not done what Khomeini said Islamic government by jurists would do. [34] The goals of ending poverty, corruption, national debt, or compelling un-Islamic government to capitulate before the Islamic government's armies, have not been met. But even more modest and basic goals like downsizing the government bureaucracy, [35] using only senior religious jurists or [marja]s for the post of faqih guardian/Supreme Leader, [36] or implementing sharia law and protecting it from innovation, [37] have not succeeded. While Khomeini promised, "The entire system of government and administration, together with the necessary laws, lies ready for you.... Islam has established them all," (p.137) once in power Islamists found many frustrations in their attempts to implement the sharia, complaining that there were "many questions, laws and operational regulations ... that received no mention in the shari'a." [38] Disputes within the Islamic Government compelled Khomeini himself to proclaim in January 1988 that the interests of the Islamic state outranked "all secondary ordinances" of Islam, even "prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage." [39] The severe loss of prestige for the fuqaha (Islamic jurists) as a result of dissatisfaction with the application of clerical rule in Iran has been noted by many. [40] "In the early 1980s, clerics were generally treated with elaborate courtesy. Nowadays, clerics are sometimes insulted by schoolchildren and taxi drivers and they quite often put on normal clothes when venturing outside Qom." [41]

See also

- Rule of sharia
- Ruhollah Khomeini
- Iranian Revolution
- Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists

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- [15] Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, (1985), p.193
- [16] the comment was directed at a judge by the name of Shurayh who was neither a prophet, nor a legatee of a prophet, and thus, 'Ali implied, was a sinful wretch (p.81, 158)
- [17] Khomeini's English translator defines a *faqih* as a person "*learned in the principles and ordinances of Islamic law, or more generally, in all aspects of the faith.*" (p.150)
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- [40] Molavi, Afshin, *The Soul of Iran*, Norton, (2005), p.10
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External links

- Islamic Government, Hukumat-i Islami (<http://al-islam.org/islamicgovernment/>)
- "Democracy? I meant theocracy" (<http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2003/August/Khomeini/>)
- What Happens When Islamists Take Power? The Case of Iran (http://gemsofislamism.tripod.com/khomeini_promises_kept.html)

Majlis-ash-Shura

Majlis-ash-Shura (مجلس الشورى) is the Arabic term for *advisory council* or *consultative council*. In Islamic context, the Majlis-ash-Shura is one of two ways that a Khalifa (Islamic leader) may be selected, the other way being by nomination.

Council Membership

There are no strict guidelines as to who can become part of the Majlis-ash-Shura. However, adulthood (in Islam, anyone who has reached puberty), a sound mind and strong knowledge of Islam are the most agreed upon prerequisites. Even these conditions are not completely agreed upon, as in the case of the scholar Faiyadh, who wrote that experts in various non-Islamic fields like economics, engineering and medicine are also qualified.

The Khalifa: Election Conditions, Selection and Removal

Five conditions must be met before the Majlis-ash-Shura can select a new Khalifa:

1. There must be no Khalifa at the moment.
2. The selected person must accept the nomination.
3. The nominee must have been selected without pressure having been exerted upon the Majlis-ash-Shura.
4. The Majlis-ash-Shura must give the person their *bay'a* (pledge of allegiance).
5. The general populace must give the person their *bay'a*.

The most common condition for selecting a candidate being that there can be no objection (supported by evidence) to the candidate. Scholars, however, disagree on the amount of votes there need to be for a candidate to be further considered. The amount varies from two, to at least forty, to the majority of the Majlis-ash-Shura.

The Majlis-ash-Shura has the authority to remove a Khalifa if he behaves contrary to Islam's *Akhlaq* (practice of morality). In effect, removal is only expected in cases of oppression, and the Majlis-ash-Shura is to discreetly inform

the Khalifa of his problematic actions beforehand.

External links

- USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim Texts ^[1]

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[1] <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/politics/khalifa.html#majlis>

List of Caliphs

All years are according to the Common Era

Rashidun ("Righteously Guided") 632 - 661

Accepted by Sunni Muslims as the first four pious and rightly guided rulers. ^[1] ^[2]

- Abu Bakr- 632 - 634
- Umar - 634 - 644
- Uthman ibn Affan - 644 - 656
- Ali - 656 - 661

Umayyads of Damascus 661 - 750

[1] [3]

- Muawiyah I - 661 - 680 (Founder of the Umayyad dynasty).
 - Yazid I - 680 - 683
 - Muawiyah II - 683 - 684
 - Marwan I - 684 - 685
 - Abd al-Malik - 685 - 705
 - Al-Walid I - 705 - 715
 - Sulayman - 715 - 717
 - Umar II - 717 - 720 (Sometimes considered, honorifically as the fifth of the *Rashidun*).
 - Yazid II - 720 - 724
 - Hisham - 724 - 743
 - Al-Walid II - 743 - 744
 - Yazid III - 744
 - Ibrahim - 744
 - Marwan II - 744 - 750
-

Abbasids of Baghdad 750 - 1258

[4] [5]

- As-Saffah - 750 - 754 (Founder of the Abbasid dynasty).
- Al-Mansur - 754 - 775
- Al-Mahdi - 775 - 785
- Al-Hadi - 785 - 786
- Harun al-Rashid - 786 - 809
- Al-Amin - 809 - 813
- Al-Ma'mun - 813 - 833
- Al-Mu'tasim - 833 - 842
- Al-Wathiq - 842 - 847
- Al-Mutawakkil - 847 - 861
- Al-Muntasir - 861 - 862
- Al-Musta'in - 862 - 866
- Al-Mu'tazz - 866 - 869
- Al-Muhtadi - 869 - 870
- Al-Mu'tamid - 870 - 892
- Al-Mu'tadid - 892 - 902
- Al-Muktafi - 902 - 908
- Al-Muqtadir - 908 - 932
- Al-Qahir - 932 - 934
- Ar-Radi - 934 - 940
- Al-Muttaqi - 940 - 944
- Al-Mustakfi - 944 - 946
- Al-Muti - 946 - 974
- At-Ta'i - 974 - 991
- Al-Qadir - 991 - 1031
- Al-Qa'im - 1031 - 1075
- Al-Muqtadi - 1075 - 1094
- Al-Mustazhir - 1094 - 1118
- Al-Mustarshid - 1118 - 1135
- Ar-Rashid - 1135 - 1136
- Al-Muqtafi - 1136 - 1160
- Al-Mustanjid - 1160 - 1170
- Al-Mustadi - 1170 - 1180
- An-Nasir - 1180 - 1225
- Az-Zahir - 1225 - 1226
- Al-Mustansir - 1226 - 1242
- Al-Musta'sim - 1242 - 1258 (last Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad)

(During the latter period of Abbasid rule, Muslim rulers began using other titles, such as Sultan).

Other Caliphates

Umayyads (Rahmanid branch) of Córdoba 929 - 1031

(Not universally accepted; actual authority confined to Spain and parts of Morocco)^{[6] [7]}

- Abd-ar-Rahman III, 929-961
- Al-Hakam II, 961-976
- Hisham II al-Hakam, 976-1009
- Muhammad II, 1009
- Sulayman ibn al-Hakam, 1009-1010
- Hisham II al-Hakam, restored, 1010-1013
- Sulayman ibn al-Hakam, restored, 1013-1016
- Abd ar-Rahman IV, 1021-1022
- Abd ar-Rahman V, 1022-1023
- Muhammad III, 1023-1024
- Hisham III, 1027-1031

Almohads of Spain and Morocco 1145 - 1266

(Not widely accepted, actual dominions were parts of North Africa and Iberia)^{[8] [9]}

- Abd al-Mu'min 1145-1163
- Abu Yaqub Yusuf I 1163-1184
- Yaqub al-Mansur 1184-1199
- Muhammad an-Nasir 1199-1213
- Abu Ya'qub Yusuf II 1213-1224
- Abd al-Wahid I 1224
- Abdallah al-Adil 1224-1227
- Yahya 1227-1235
- Idris I 1227-1232
- Abdul-Wahid II 1232-1242
- Ali 1242-1248
- Umar 1248-1266
- Idris II 1266-1269

Abbasid branch of Cairo 1261 - 1517

(The Cairo Abbasids were largely ceremonial Caliphs under the patronage of the Mamluk Sultanate)^{[10] [11]}

- Al-Mustansir II - 1261 - 1262
 - Al-Hakim I - 1262 - 1302
 - Al-Mustakfi I - 1302 - 1340
 - Al-Hakim II - 1341 - 1352
 - Al-Mu'tadid I - 1352 - 1362
 - Al-Mutawakkil I - 1362 - 1383
 - Al-Wathiq II - 1383 - 1386
 - Al-Mu'tasim - 1386 - 1389
 - Al-Mutawakkil I (restored) - 1389 - 1406
 - Al-Musta'in - 1406 - 1414
 - Al-Mu'tadid II - 1414 - 1441
 - Al-Mustakfi II - 1441 - 1451
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- Al-Qa'im - 1451 - 1455
- Al-Mustanjid - 1455 - 1479
- Al-Mutawakkil II - 1479 - 1497
- Al-Mustamsik - 1497 - 1508
- Al-Mutawakkil III - 1508 - 1517 (surrendered the title to Selim I, below)

Sultans of the Ottoman Empire 1451 - 1922

Originally the secular, conquering dynasty was just entitled Sultan, soon it started accumulating titles assumed from subjected peoples.^{[12] [13]}

- Mehmed (Muhammed) II (the Conqueror of Constantinople, afterwards Istanbul) - 1451 - 1481 (actively used numerous titles such as of Caliph and Caesar)
- Beyazid II - 1481 - 1512
- Selim I - 1512 - 1520 (induced al-Mutawakkil III to formally surrender the Caliphate after defeating the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517; actively used the title)
- Suleiman the Magnificent - 1520 - 1566
- Selim II - 1566 - 1574
- Murad III - 1574 - 1595
- Mehmed (Muhammed) III - 1595 - 1603
- Ahmed I - 1603 - 1617
- Mustafa I (First Reign) - 1617 - 1618
- Osman II - 1618 - 1622
- Mustafa I (Second Reign) - 1622 - 1623
- Murad IV - 1623 - 1640
- Ibrahim I - 1640 - 1648
- Mehmed (Muhammed) IV - 1648 - 1687
- Suleiman II - 1687 - 1691
- Ahmed II - 1691 - 1695
- Mustafa II - 1695 - 1703
- Ahmed III - 1703 - 1730
- Mahmud I - 1730 - 1754
- Osman III - 1754 - 1757
- Mustafa III - 1757 - 1774
- Abd-ul-Hamid I - 1774 - 1789
- Selim III - 1789 - 1807
- Mustafa IV - 1807 - 1808
- Mahmud II - 1808 - 1839
- Abd-ul-Mejid I - 1839 - 1861
- Abd-ul-Aziz - 1861 - 1876
- Murad V - 1876
- Abd-ul-Hamid II - 1876 - 1909 (actively used title of Caliph)

From 1908 onwards the Ottoman Sultan was considered the equivalent of a constitutional monarch without executive powers, with parliament consisting of chosen representatives.

- Mehmed (Muhammed) V - 1909 - 1918
 - Mehmed (Muhammed) VI - 1918 - 1922
-

Republic of Turkey 1922 - 1924

- Abdul Mejid II - 1922 - 1924 (ceremonial Caliph under the patronage of the Republic of Turkey and its President Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha)

The Office of the Caliphate was transferred to the Turkish Grand National Assembly which dissolved the office on March 3, 1924, in keeping with the policies of secularism that were adopted in the early years of the Republic of Turkey. The current pretender to the Imperial House of Osman is Bayezid Osman.

Sharifan house in (now Saudi) Arabia

A last attempt at restoring the caliphal office and style with ecumenical recognition was made by al-Husayn ibn `Ali al-Hashimi, King of Hejaz and Sharif of Mecca, who assumed both 11 March 1924 and held them until his passing the kingship to his son `Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Hashimi, who did not adopt the khalifal office and style.^[14]

See also

- Caliph
- Caliphate
- Emir
- Sultan
- Shah
- Sheikh ul-Islam
- History of Islam
- Muhammad
- Succession to Muhammad
- Sunni Islam
- Shi'a Islam
- Khalifatul Masih
- Khilafah (*Caliphate*)

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